

# THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

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## THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW Continuing The Review of Historical Publications Relating to Canada

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## The Political Career of Sir Hector Louis Langevin\*

BARBARA FRASER

MANY OF CANADA'S POLITICAL LEADERS have acquired a label. There has been a Firebrand, a Prophet in Politics, an Old Chieftain, a Credible Canadian, and an Incredible Canadian. No such tag has ever been attached to Sir Hector Langevin, but if one were, it might well be the Forgotten French Canadian. Langevin was a member of Parliament for thirty-one years, and a Cabinet Minister for twenty-three; he was a father of Confederation, leader of the House of Commons, and dispenser of the immense patronage of the Public Works Department. At the height of his career, he was second only to Sir John and his acknowledged successor. He had inherited from Sir George-Etienne Cartier the leadership of the powerful French-Canadian wing on which so much of the strength of the Liberal-Conservative party depended. His was a position of entrenched power and yet, within three months of Macdonald's death, Langevin's career had come to an end. A scandal which had been long brewing in his department removed him from public life and his last fifteen years were spent in the virtual oblivion in which he has been left, even by Quebec historians. His memory has been overshadowed by such younger and more colourful rivals as Honoré Mercier and Joseph-Adolphe Chapleau. Yet his career had a solidity and substance which theirs lacked.

Born in 1826 in Quebec City, Langevin came of a family which had begun to co-operate with the English almost before the ink on the treaty had dried. Several generations of moderate prominence were climaxed by Sir Hector's own which produced a bishop of Rimouski, a vicar general, a Cabinet Minister, and a Clerk of the Senate. Sir Hector's path to power began in the Seminary of Quebec, and then led through the offices of Montreal lawyers A.-N. Morin and G.-E.

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Cartier.<sup>1</sup> He was called to the Bar in 1850 but, although he continued to work in Cartier's office, he does not seem to have seriously contemplated a career in law. Like Cartier he looked to railways and politics. Unlike his employer he became involved in the affairs of a city whose metropolitan dream failed, and of a railway which was still-born.

This was the North Shore Railway—a route designed to join Quebec and Montreal and tap the western trade.<sup>2</sup> The ubiquitous Quebec politician, J.-E. Cauchon, was its president, and Langevin became secretary-treasurer. Alas for their hopes. The railway was not built for twenty years, and came too late to assist Quebec's metropolitan aspirations. Yet these seemed less hopeless in 1853 than they do now, for Quebec was then a political capital, a university city, a ship-building centre, and a great port. A railway seemed to be the key to the trade of the continent, and Langevin lent his efforts to the attempt to seize control of the St. Lawrence traffic. His ideas received their most dramatic expression in an essay which took a prize at the Paris Exposition of 1855.<sup>3</sup> It contains an exhaustive description of Canada, but its most remarkable feature is surely the shining belief expressed in the future of the St. Lawrence River system which is compared to that of the Danube. Like this river, the St. Lawrence, with the addition of more canals and railroads, was to carry the commerce of a continent. Navies would navigate its length carrying produce and immigrants for both Canada and the United States. The development of the St. Lawrence would take work, but the results would be worth it.

More than essays were needed to effect such development, however, and Quebec was not alone in her metropolitan hopes. Not until 1856 did the time seem ripe to undertake the promotion of the North Shore Railway.<sup>4</sup> Then in one year of furious activity Langevin ran for alderman in Quebec, founded *Le Courrier du Canada*, ceaselessly promoted himself and his railway, and climaxed the year by becoming, almost simultaneously, Mayor of Quebec and member for Dorchester.

Langevin had run as a ministerialist, but his record was erratic in terms of party.<sup>5</sup> He preferred to put the welfare of his railway, his city, and Lower Canada ahead of the welfare of the Cartier-Macdonald ministry. His course was consistent in his own view, but sometimes

<sup>1</sup>The Collection Chapais in the Archives of the Province of Quebec has some material on this early part of Hector Langevin's life.

<sup>2</sup>Province of Canada, *Statutes, 1852-1853*, 16 Vic., c. 100.

<sup>3</sup>H. L. Langevin, *Le Canada, ses institutions, ressources, produits, manufactures, etc.*, (Quebec, 1855).

<sup>4</sup>This was as a result of the passing of a new land grant act from which the North Shore Railway might hope to benefit, *Statutes, 1856*, 18 Vic., c. 34.

<sup>5</sup>Microfilm copy of newspaper accounts of debates in the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council, 1846-1867, and the House of Commons, 1867-1874, from various newspapers, including the *Mirror of Parliament*, 1846-1862; and *Le Courrier du Canada*.



surprising to others, as when he first helped defeat the Ministry and then proposed the vote of no confidence on which its successor—the brief Brown-Dorion experiment—was chased out of office.<sup>6</sup> This independence did not endear him to Cartier and Macdonald, and sometimes hindered his plans for his railway and his city. As befitted a minister from Montreal Cartier resisted any suggestion for a land grant to the North Shore Railway, and only the intervention of Charles Baring, then in Toronto, forced the Ministry to accede to legislation which was essential to preserve Quebec City from immediate bankruptcy.<sup>7</sup> Langevin persisted, and at last secured both permission to use Quebec credit to finance his railway, and the indispensable land grant.

Two energetic years had been spent in these activities, but at last the railway had reached the point at which foreign capital must be secured. In 1859 Langevin brought his project to London where he presented it to Barings—the bankers who so often aided Canadians in search of money. Barings were reluctant to undertake such a dubious railway scheme, but they did their best. London investors, however, were not interested. Suddenly the railway was a failure, and with it all Langevin's other schemes for Quebec. Montreal forged ahead as a railway port to attain a quite conclusive commercial dominance; Quebec sank into a depression, which resulted eventually in the bankruptcy Langevin had foreseen.<sup>8</sup> The result was quite final. In November, 1860, Langevin announced that he would not run again for mayor, and turned decisively to provincial politics.

In the Assembly, Langevin's method was to talk, predictably, monotonously, but above all, frequently. He continued a flirtation with the Sicotte Liberals, but refused in 1862 to have his name put forward as a candidate for Speaker in opposition to Cartier's choice.<sup>9</sup> In 1863 he joined wholeheartedly in the Conservative attack on the Reform Ministry, and when the Conservatives regained office in 1864, Langevin was solicitor general. The decision to back Cartier, probably made in 1863, had paid handsomely. He had reached the Cabinet just in time

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>Baring Papers, Letters received from British North America, 1196, C. Baring to T. Baring, March 17, 1859, and 1204, April 12, 1859. All manuscripts are in the Public Archives of Canada unless otherwise noted. Also, Collection Chapais, Langevin to Mme Langevin, May 5, 1859; Langevin to his father, May 5, 1859.

<sup>8</sup>*Le Courrier du Canada*, Jan. 27, 1860, Annual Report of the Mayor of Quebec; Baring Papers, Letters received from British North America, 1764, report on Quebec, May 25, 1865.

<sup>9</sup>Collection Chapais, Sicotte to Langevin, Jan. 9, 1858, and Feb. 21, 1859; L. Bilo-deau to Langevin, Feb. 19, 1859, and Feb. 26, 1859; Langevin to Cartier, March 18, 1862; Macdonald Papers, 337, Alleyne to Macdonald, Sept. 22, 1862; *La Minerve*, March 20, 1862, and May 17, 1862.

to become a part of the Great Coalition dedicated to constitutional reform.

Langevin was an enthusiastic, if largely unnoticed, delegate to all the conferences of the next few years. Not until the Confederation Debates of 1865 did he secure a recorded part. His contribution here shows a particular awareness of the economic advantages which Confederation would bring. He was confident that it would also serve as a guarantee of Quebec particularism. Concerning the office of lieutenant governor, he was confident if confused; somewhat prophetically, he assured his hearers that the federal government would recall any lieutenant governor who exceeded his duties in the province. In addition he assumed responsibility for disposing of the question of marriage and divorce. Provision had had to be made for the latter, he informed his hearers, but it had been made as difficult as possible.<sup>10</sup>

There was one more session before Confederation would come into effect, and Galt had been promised a new education act for Lower Canada which was to protect the Protestants of the new province of Quebec. Langevin took charge of the bill, describing it in French primarily as a measure for securing proportionate distribution of provincial funds to the various sorts of schools. Galt supported it, in English, as a measure which would permit a separate Protestant school system in the province.<sup>11</sup> As introduced it was a moderate and unexceptionable measure. However the Catholics of Upper Canada believed it more generous than their own settlement and immediately introduced a companion bill of their own. In the resulting resurrection of religious and sectional strife, the Government was forced to withdraw its bill. Langevin was furious and considered resignation.<sup>12</sup> Galt had counted on the educational autonomy guaranteed in the bill and did resign. He and his constituents felt themselves betrayed and remained ominously ready to distrust the good intentions of any French Canadian who had not supported the bill.

London and the final conferences with the Colonial Office and the Maritime provinces were the next step towards Confederation. The possibility of leaving Langevin and Howland at home was briefly debated, but when the delegation sailed, Langevin went with it. In London, his contribution remains obscure, and can be gauged only from his few letters home. The Maritime bishops harangued lengthily on the importance of separate schools, and Tilley seemed ready to bargain. The intermediate steps are not reported although Langevin

<sup>10</sup>Province of Canada, Legislative Assembly, *Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North American Provinces* (Quebec, 1865), 362-92, 691-2.

<sup>11</sup>*Globe* (Toronto), Aug. 1, 1866.

<sup>12</sup>Collection Chapais, Langevin to Edmond Langevin, Aug. 3, 6, and 7, 1866.

thought that in the end what the bishops wanted had been secured. Maritime problems seemed to interest him, probably because they were unfamiliar, but his main concern was French Canada. He opposed any arrangement for enlarging the federal senate which might upset the delicate balance of interests which Lower Canada had achieved in its half of the Legislative Council. He rejoiced that the French language had been made as secure as humanly possible, and that he had preserved French Canadian sensibilities by assuring the Celebration of Marriage to the provinces, while preserving Marriage and Divorce to the federal government. The final draft of the bill had his unqualified support, and he recommended it to his constituents in Lower Canada for their approval.<sup>13</sup>

More important for Langevin's future, however, was that he had established himself as an important political leader before Confederation, and that, in London, he and Macdonald had what seems to have been their first chance to become well acquainted.

When the Fathers of Confederation returned to Canada, their first task was the selection of a new federal Cabinet. This did not concern Langevin. He himself became Secretary of State, and urged Galt to come into the Government,<sup>14</sup> but his main concern was in Quebec. The new provincial Cabinet was in the hands of Belleau, Cartier, Chapais, and Langevin. As a first step Belleau was rewarded for his services with the lieutenant-governorship to the gratification of French Canada which hailed his appointment as evidence of Quebec's autonomy. The next step was to enlist J.-E. Cauchon as premier. Cauchon refused at first and then, stipulating that he would accept no salary for his work, yielded to Langevin's persuasions.<sup>15</sup> The cause of his reluctance is not known, but perhaps Cauchon foresaw the opposition to his leadership that arose among the English.

Quebec Cabinets, like federal Cabinets, must achieve a subtle balance among interests and regions. Not least important of these in Quebec was the English of the Eastern Townships. But Mr. Dunkin, their representative, refused to enter a Cabinet under Cauchon without specific guarantees of educational autonomy.<sup>16</sup> Cauchon had op-

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, Langevin to Edouard Langevin, Nov. 22, 1866; Langevin to Mme Langevin, Nov. 27, 1866; Mgr. Connolly to Langevin, Dec. 15, 1866; Langevin to Edmond Langevin, Dec. 27, 1866; Langevin to J.-C. Chapais, Feb. 14, 1867.

<sup>14</sup>O. D. Skelton, *The Life and Times of Sir Alexander Galt* (Toronto, 1920), 417, Langevin to Galt, April 5, 1867.

<sup>15</sup>Collection Chapais, Langevin to Cartier, July 5 and 6, 1867; *Le Canadien*, Jan. 3, 1868, Cauchon to Belleau, and Belleau to Cauchon, July 5, and July 6, 1867.

<sup>16</sup>*Le Canadien*, Jan. 3, 1868, Dunkin to Cauchon, July 9, 1867, and July 13, 1867. Both R. Rumilly, *Histoire de la Province de Quebec* (29 vols., Montreal, 1940-56), I, 56-9 and C. M. Boissonault, *Histoire Politique de la Province de Quebec, 1867-1920* (Quebec, 1936), 3, suggest that Cauchon failed to form his government because of the

posed the Langevin bill of 1866 describing it as an insult to the well-known generosity of French Canadians. Not unexpectedly he also refused Dunkin's condition, but the adamant Dunkin would not place his trust in either Cauchon or the generous sentiments of French Canada. Negotiations broke down on this point, and Cauchon resigned. He was replaced by P.-J.-O. Chauveau, the deputy Commissioner of Education, who had drafted the Langevin bill, and was acceptable to the English. Under the tender guidance of Langevin and Cartier, he succeeded in forming a Cabinet, which was sworn in on July 15, 1867.

Through the troublesome post-Confederation years, Langevin moved serenely in the shadow of Cartier. He recognized that such safety might not always be his, and looked anxiously to a future in which he would have to take the lead.<sup>17</sup> But Cartier continued to lead, and Langevin accepted his pragmatic Conservatism based on a French-English co-operation dedicated to nation-building, railways, and survival. Langevin represented, however, not the prosperous Montreal and South Shore regions, but the depressed Quebec and northeastern regions. Politics in this area came to sound an aggrieved and sometimes Liberal note. Liberalism in the whole province was attempting to cast off its anti-clerical, radical past, and to build a new strength based on a dislike for federal power and for the Conservative party. New currents stirred Conservatives too, and began to threaten Cartier's control of "ses moutons." Ultramontanism, inappropriately imported from France in opposition to *rougism*, attempted to create a less tolerant, more exclusive Conservatism. New divisions revealed themselves in the last years of Cartier's reign. Had he lived he might or might not have suppressed them, but he died leaving the problem of party schism to Langevin.<sup>18</sup>

These problems did not appear immediately, however, and Langevin had several years in which to build for himself a reputation as a capable administrator and a first-rate parliamentary manager. He was no orator—a handicap in an age which took its oratory seriously—and regarded a speech as one of the higher forms of popular entertainment.

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extreme hostility of Cartier, Galt, and Langevin in particular. Both authors reject Dunkin's assertions that the English distrusted Cauchon after his opposition to the education bill of 1866. While it would be a mistake to suggest that Cauchon was really popular with the ministers, it seems likely that Cartier and Langevin were quite genuine in urging him to accept the premiership, and that it really was English distrust which prevented him from forming a government.

<sup>17</sup>Collection Chapais, Langevin to Edmond Langevin, Dec. 29, 1867.

<sup>18</sup>J. I. Cooper, "The Political Ideas of George-Etienne Cartier," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXIII (1942), 286-94; J. I. Cooper, "French Canadian Conservatism in Principle and Practice, 1873-1891," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (McGill, 1938); M. Ayeart, "The *Parti Rouge* and the Clergy," *Canadian Historical Review*, XV (1934), 390-405.

He had neither voice, gesture, nor poignant phrase. But both friends and enemies admitted his finesse, ability, good temper, and discretion in the handling of a legislature. His energy and competence were rewarded in December, 1869, with promotion to the powerful ministry of Public Works, making him one of the senior Ministers. Of the men who had been in the Cabinet of March, 1864, only he, Cartier, Chapais, and Macdonald were left. *La Minerve*, the voice of Cartier, hailed Langevin as the successor to Cartier, and other papers repeated the claim. Tacit recognition of this legacy was given at a political banquet in Chambly where Langevin was described as the heir in Cartier's presence.<sup>19</sup> But in 1870 Cartier's need of an heir did not seem immediate. He and Macdonald continued to deal with problems in their own fashion. When the crisis arose in the West Langevin was used only as an intermediary when the Government wished to communicate with Mgr. Taché through Mgr. Langevin. It was possibly this quite legitimate connection which led McDougall to accuse him of secretly abetting the Métis. Langevin, like many French Canadians, was probably sympathetic to the Métis but not to the point of embarrassing the Government. Nor did he accept the appeal of L. Beaubien to form a French *bloc*, both Conservative and Liberal, to resist the despatch of troops to quiet the West.<sup>20</sup> The acquisition of the new territory had to proceed without the intervention of *le parti national*.

Four years of comparative electoral peace had followed Confederation, but in 1871 provincial elections were due. In Quebec a militant wing of the Conservative party was organized under the title *le programme catholique*. This was the lay, political wing of ultramontanist, and its *programme* stated that it was the religious and political duty of each voter to support the candidate "qui offre des garanties sérieuses aux intérêts religieux."<sup>21</sup> Such candidates were only to be found in the Conservative party, but not all Conservatives qualified. The doubtful voter could seek guidance from his curé, who spoke the thoughts of his bishop, whose words were inspired by the directives of the (newly) infallible Pope. Doctrinal infallibility was thereby extended to all ranks. Neither the hierarchy nor the party considered the *programme* an unmixed blessing. Quebec clerical politics were complicated enough already without the laity joining in, and the Conservative party was unwilling to make a particular brand of religious orthodoxy a requirement for membership. The *Programmistes* were undismayed, enchanted as they were by the logic of ultramon-

<sup>19</sup>*Le Canadien*, Nov. 2, 1870.

<sup>20</sup>Collection Chapais, L. Beaubien to Langevin, April 5, 1870.

<sup>21</sup>First printed in *Le Journal des Trois-Rivières*, April 20, 1871, and copied in almost the entire French-Canadian press; Rumilly, *Histoire*, I, 153-9.

tanism.<sup>22</sup> Admittedly the doctrine has a charm, and the basic premises once accepted, its conclusions are inescapable, but it is supremely unsuited for mixed societies such as Canada. The Archbishop of Quebec urged his flock to eschew religious quarrels, Bishop Langevin firmly dissociated himself from the *programme*, Cartier joined battle with the ultramontane Bishop of Montreal, Langevin told his constituents in Quebec Centre that "jamais je ne ferai, en travaillant pour mes électeurs, de distinctions de race ni de religion."<sup>23</sup>

This speech—accepting an acclamation—was an important statement. Langevin dealt amiably with Quebec railways, colonization, agriculture, and industry. Then provincial election or not, he discussed the projected Pacific railway. The Government would not, he assured his listeners, give money or raise taxes to support the railway. Only land would be given to the private companies which would build it. Finally he essayed what was to be the Government line on the Washington Treaty. Sir John, he said, had always protested the fisheries clauses, and the treaty had been signed on the condition that these clauses would not come into effect until ratified by the Canadian Parliament. In this matter the Government had retained its full liberty of action. If this was not quite exact, it pleased Macdonald who wrote Langevin, "Your speech is all that could be desired. Without going into too much detail to forestall my remarks, it has stated the case in a manner to prepare the public mind favourably."<sup>24</sup>

Despite several promising issues, and the conflicts stirred up by the *Programmistes*, the Conservative Government was securely returned. Langevin who had been helping supervise the election, hurried off to inspect the newly acquired province of British Columbia. He consulted with Lieutenant Governor Trutch on appointments, examined existing and projected public works in which the Dominion might participate, made innumerable pleasant speeches, and enjoyed himself immensely. He returned with a truly significant report on the Pacific province, comprehensive, authoritative, and optimistic.<sup>25</sup> His return to the east was marked by a lively political banquet at which Quebec City honoured her famous son, and Cartier and Langevin made buoyant speeches about the future. The immediate future, however, contained a federal general election.

Once again *programmiste* cries were heard, this time on the question of the New Brunswick schools. Langevin had supported federal

<sup>22</sup>The best Canadian statement of this doctrine is perhaps the widely circulated joint mandement of Sept. 22, 1875, *Mandements, lettres pastorales, circulaires et autres documents publiés dans le diocèse de Montréal depuis son érection* (13 vols., Montreal, 1887), VII, 203-24.

<sup>23</sup>*La Minerve*, June 12, 1871.

<sup>24</sup>Macdonald Papers, 518, Macdonald to Langevin, June 13, 1871.

<sup>25</sup>Canada, Parliament, *Sessional Papers*, 1872, VI (10), "Report on British Columbia."



non-intervention, and Mgr. Langevin supported his brother, but the *Programmistes* were undaunted. In Montreal Cartier found his election complicated by several factors including the *programme* and some resentful young Conservatives. For both men it was a difficult election marked by party indiscipline. Cartier lost his own election, but the province was won for the Conservatives by work and money. Unfortunately too much of the latter had come from Sir Hugh Allan.

Immediate re-organization was necessary. The insurgent sections must be pacified, and the party held together for federal electoral purposes. But Cartier was no longer able to whip his province into line. Bright's disease was killing him, and he was forced to leave the task to Langevin.<sup>26</sup> The legacy Langevin had feared in 1868 was now his. Nor was it questioned. Even from the rival centre of Montreal came assurance. J.-A. Chapleau, already emerging as that city's next boss, wrote accepting "avec plaisir l'honneur de servir sous un Chef de la ville de Champlain."<sup>27</sup> There was much to do. Five years had passed since Belleau's appointment to Spencer Wood, and despite his pleas for re-appointment he was firmly evicted. Nor were the tarnished Cauchon or the weary Chauveau permitted the plum. Instead, distinguished, moderate, and dependable R.-E. Caron was drafted from the Bench to serve as lieutenant governor and shed an aura of respectability over the administration.<sup>28</sup> Cabinet re-organization took longer. Chauveau wished to retire, and Beaubien and de Boucherville were leaving with him. This left a serious weakness in Montreal Cabinet representation, and Montrealers willingly offered their advice. In the end Langevin selected pretty well the Cabinet he wanted, ignoring the advice of Chapleau, and of Dansereau of *La Minerve*. His choice—Ouimet, Chapleau, and Ross—was predominately moderate, and a rebuff to the *Programmistes* who had supported the ultramontane de Boucherville and Chauveau.<sup>29</sup>

Langevin completed his re-organization in Quebec just in time to meet the blast of the Huntington revelations. As the situation grew worse, their own supporters disowned the guilty Cartier, Langevin, and Macdonald. At last, yielding to the plea of Tilley, Pope, and Langevin that possibly neutral members not be forced to a choice in Parliament, Macdonald resigned. The new administration called an

<sup>26</sup>Collection Chapais, Cartier to Langevin, Feb. 8, 1873, and Feb. 20, 1873.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, Chapleau to Langevin, Jan. 25, 1873. The Chapleau-Langevin correspondence in the Collection Chapais has been edited by Fernand Ouellet in the *Rapport de l'Archiviste de la province de Québec pour 1959-1960: No. 40* since this article went to press [Ed.].

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, Dansereau to Langevin, Jan. 28, 1873; Langevin to Belleau, Feb. 5, 1873; Cartier to Langevin, Feb. 8, 1873; *Le Journal de Québec* (ed. Cauchon), 1872-3.

<sup>29</sup>Collection Chapais, Chapleau to Langevin, Jan. 25, 1873; Dansereau to Langevin, Feb. 14, 1873; Chapleau to Langevin (wire), Feb. 22, 1873; Macdonald Papers, 226, Ouimet to Macdonald, Oct. 12, 1880.



election, and in Quebec Langevin fell heir to the dead Cartier's political debts as well as his own. His task was impossible, but the job and the guilt were indisputably his. The suggestion of *Le Castorisme, Voilà l'ennemi*<sup>30</sup> that Langevin was one of several candidates and that he was imposed on the party by the ultramontanes of *Le Nouveau Monde* simply ignores the facts. Of the three possible candidates Masson had everything except ambition, Chapleau lacked the necessary prestige and authority, and Cauchon had already started his pilgrimage towards the Liberals. None of them could muster the political assets—the Public Works Department, a pre-Confederation reputation, and Cartier's patronage—that Langevin could. Quite literally, even had the leadership been particularly desirable in 1873, Langevin had no serious competition. Finally the *Nouveau-Mondistes* had no reason to prefer Langevin, who had not shown himself to be particularly sympathetic to them.

The Quebec Conservatives campaigned under Langevin's leadership, but he decided not to run himself. The voters were much too disposed to discuss the \$32,000 that he had received from Allan. The party itself was impoverished, shamefaced, and far from sympathetic to the federal railways policy. The election was a Conservative disaster. It was no less a disaster for Langevin. There was no offer of a safe seat from which to enter Parliament. Instead there was mutual agreement among the friends that Langevin had best avoid publicity until the voters had forgotten the scandal. Chapleau was rumoured to be manoeuvring for himself.<sup>31</sup> A thoroughly demoralized party was prey to dissension and coalition. It was a dark period for Langevin. Nevertheless he continued to represent, as no one else did, the Cartier concept of a federal Conservative party which transcended race and religion. To this end Langevin resisted the numerous suggestions of a coalition between Conservatives and Liberals to form a purely French party devoted to French-Canadian interests.

As if a federal scandal had not sufficiently weakened the Conservative party, the Quebec administration was detected in a shady land deal.<sup>32</sup> Liberals in Quebec proclaimed its downfall. Langevin moved swiftly to reform the Ministry and prevent a Liberal coup. Premier Ouimet and most of his colleagues were forced to resign for the good of their party.<sup>33</sup> This left a serious shortage of untarnished Cabinet material, but an administration was formed headed by de Boucherville and supported by some of the ultramontanes whose political integrity

<sup>30</sup>*Le Castorisme, Voilà l'ennemi, par un vrai Conservateur* (Montreal, 1892), 3, Public Archives of Canada Pamphlets, vol. II, no. 1766.

<sup>31</sup>Mackenzie Papers, Cauchon to Mackenzie, Jan. 30, 1874.

<sup>32</sup>The story of this scandal is in Rumilly, *Histoire*, I, 276-337.

<sup>33</sup>Macdonald Papers, 226, Ouimet to Macdonald, Oct. 12, 1880.

was unquestioned. The charge, however, that this wing had engineered the whole affair for this purpose, and that Langevin was at the least a willing tool of the *Nouveau-Mondistes* seems unrealistic.<sup>34</sup> Most ultramontanes were painfully honest. The extremists, such as those of *Le Nouveau Monde* and *Le Journal des Trois-Rivières*, were actually on a coalitionist tack in the name of upright government, although they usually eschewed Liberalism and all its works. Consequently the new Cabinet met with disapproval from the *Nouveau-Mondistes*.<sup>35</sup> What had been chosen, however, was a staunchly Conservative, unquestionably honest team with which to undertake the provincial general election of 1875. Not surprisingly political morality was an important issue in the campaign. But in spite of furious Liberal efforts, the Conservatives maintained their stronghold, and backed by this victory, Langevin decided that it was time for him to re-enter political life.

He decided to run just in time to get caught in the great debate on the meaning of the "undue influence" clause in the new act relegating contested elections to the courts. Could priestly influence be "undue"? And if so, could the courts take cognizance of it? For the Liberals—condemned as anti-clericals—the question was of the utmost importance. For the Conservatives—divided between the ultramontanes and the moderates—it was hardly less so, particularly as it affected their English wing which was nervously jibing at the claims of ultramontaniam. Langevin's election became a classic case in the interpretation of "undue influence."

The county was Charlevoix—bailiwick of the ubiquitous Cauchon. It was open because the election of the member, P.-A. Tremblay, had just been disallowed on the grounds of the most undue physical, financial, and spiritual influence. Elections in Charlevoix were run with old time zest, and candidates ran the risk of personal injury. Cauchon made certain that the county supported his candidate, whether as a Conservative, Independent, or Liberal. Charlevoix would be a particularly fitting trophy to mark Langevin's return. Both Langevin and Tremblay introduced clerical influence into the campaign. Langevin enlisted the support of his brother's clergy, in whose diocese the county lay; Cauchon, managing Tremblay's campaign, by-passed the local clergy but sought and found support in the notably Liberal archiepiscopal palace of Quebec.<sup>36</sup> He did not rely on spiritual force alone, however, but ordered, quite illegally, the Quebec river police to assist in the election.<sup>37</sup> Langevin had on his side, not only his

<sup>34</sup>*Le Castorisme, Voilà l'ennemi*, 4.

<sup>35</sup>*Le Nouveau Monde*, July 22, 1874, Aug. 18, 1874, and Aug. 20, 1874.

<sup>36</sup>Mackenzie Papers, Cauchon to Mackenzie, Jan. 7, 1876.

<sup>37</sup>Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1876, 177-81.

brother's clergy, but the political genius of ultramontane J.-I. Tarte of *Le Canadien*, and the financial strength of Thomas McGreevy.<sup>38</sup> The combination proved unbeatable. Langevin was delighted, both for himself and for his party. "L'exemple que nous venons de donner à Charlevoix," he exulted to J.-C. Chapais, "fait voir ce que nous pouvons faire avec de l'énergie, de l'activité, et de la détermination d'une bonne cause."<sup>39</sup>

Victory was not to be so easily won. The results had scarcely been declared before the Liberals announced their intention of contesting the election on the ground of undue clerical influence. Other aspects of both campaigns had been dubious, but it was on this point that the Liberals chose to fight. Certainly some curés had been promising their parishioners innumerable sorrows if they failed to vote for Langevin. But the curés believed that their actions were neither improper nor actionable in a civil court. The Liberals hoped to establish both these principles. On their side the Conservatives hailed the pacifying and purifying influence of the clergy. Protestant ministers, *La Minerve* stated, did not hesitate to offer political advice from the pulpit.<sup>40</sup> Clerical influence had been enlisted on both sides. In fact Langevin sent a protest to the Archbishop concerning two priests who had acted for the Liberals. Taschereau investigated, but declined to do more than require an apology from the curés involved, although he subsequently issued a *mandement* declaring both parties to be on an equal footing vis-à-vis the Church.<sup>41</sup>

The case of the Charlevoix by-election was heard by Judge Routhier, an old friend of Langevin and an ultramontane. Illness, and possibly distaste for the case, delayed his decision. Nearly a year later Routhier announced that he was unable to believe that the result of the election had been unduly influenced, or that he had a right to deal with evidence involving the actions of clergy in the performance of clerical duties.<sup>42</sup> He awarded the election to Langevin, and the Liberals promptly appealed to the newly established Supreme Court. The

<sup>38</sup>L. LaPierre, "Joseph-Israël Tarte: A Dilemma in Canadian Politics, 1874-1896," unpublished M.A. thesis (Toronto, 1957), 25-7; Canada, House of Commons, *Journals*, 1891, Appendix I, 1290, traces McGreevy's financial interest in Langevin back as far as this campaign.

<sup>39</sup>Collection Chapais, Langevin to J.-C. Chapais, Jan. 28, 1876.

<sup>40</sup>*Le Canadien*, July 29, 1876; *La Minerve*, Aug. 31, 1876.

<sup>41</sup>Collection Chapais, Langevin to Mgr. Taschereau, Jan. 31, 1876, and April 26, 1876; Mgr. Taschereau to Langevin, Feb. 4, 1876, and April 26, 1876; *Le Canadien*, Jan. 29, 1876; *Mandements, lettres pastorales et circulaires des évêques de Québec* (Québec, 1889), n.s. I, 403-9; Rumilly, *Histoire*, II, 146.

<sup>42</sup>*The Quebec Law Reports; Rapports judiciaires de Québec*, published by the Bar of the Province of Quebec, section of the district of Quebec (Québec, 1876, repr. 1877), II, 323-72; son Honneur le juge Routhier, *Jugement sur la contestation de l'Hon. Hector Langevin, député fédéral du comté de Charlevoix: O. Brassard et al., petitionnaires* (Québec, 1876), P.A.C. Pamphlets, vol. I, no. 4128; Rumilly, *Histoire*, II, 56-8.

decision was of the utmost importance. As Mackenzie pointed out to Brown, whose *Globe* was showing a disturbing tendency to support clerical intervention in elections, "At the present moment a desperate effort is made by the priests to defeat every Liberal candidate . . . if Langevin retains his seat we cannot win ten seats in Quebec at the coming general election. That power must now be firmly met and conquered or it will conquer us."<sup>43</sup> For Langevin the outcome meant a future in politics, or possible obscurity.

The Supreme Court moved more swiftly than the lower court had. On February 23, 1877, the Charlevoix election was annulled, and Langevin was charged \$6,000 costs. The verdict was written by Judge Taschereau, a Liberal and brother of the Archbishop of Quebec. He began by admitting the dilemma of a Catholic judge faced by a case involving the Roman Catholic clergy, but held that a case affecting the civil government belonged in the civil courts despite the difficulties involved. Further, he held that the evidence showed that Langevin had consented to the curés becoming his agents, and was therefore responsible for their acts. These acts included sermons which could create in the minds of docile and ill-taught parishoners a fear of committing an important sin, or of being denied the sacraments, should they vote Liberal. Such sermons might not unduly influence the educated and intelligent part of the congregation, but must constitute the most undue influence on the others. The secret ballot made it impossible to prove that more than six or eight votes had been affected, but even one vote, unduly influenced, was ground for annulling an election. The evidence suggested wholesale intimidation; four curés were particularly guilty, and their acts as agents bound their principal. The court was unanimous in annulling the election.<sup>44</sup>

The decision was a serious setback, and the costs, in addition to what the election had already involved, were staggering. Thomas McGreevy kindly assumed the considerable burden of Langevin's debts,<sup>45</sup> and Charlevoix being again open, Langevin ran again and was elected. His victory was immediately contested, but Judge Routhier rejected the plea on a preliminary objection, and the Supreme Court refused to entertain it. Langevin was back in Parliament, and ready to resume his role of *chef*. He was fortunate that no other undisputed leader had yet emerged. The powerful Cauchon had defected to the Liberals. Masson refused to sacrifice his health and his country life

<sup>43</sup>Mackenzie Papers, Mackenzie to Brown, Jan. 25, 1877.

<sup>44</sup>E. R. Cameron, *Notes and Annotations upon the Reports of the Judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada* (Toronto, 1925), I (1876-7), 145-234 (actual text of evidence and decision); C. Lindsey, *Rome in Canada: The Ultramontane Struggle for Supremacy over the Civil Authority* (Toronto, 1877), 284-6 (summary); Rumilly, *Histoire*, II, 70-1. Most of the evidence was also printed in *Le Canadien*, Sept. 16-22, 1876.

<sup>45</sup>*Journals*, 1891, Appendix I, 1015, 1100. This debt was still unpaid in 1891.

to politics. Mousseau and Caron suffered from youth and unsteadiness. Chapleau was the ablest but had still to acquire the prestige that would overcome his poor background and comparative youth. If the Conservatives won the next election, Langevin had every prospect of reclaiming the position he had held prior to the Pacific Scandal.

Liberals in Quebec continued their fight for political freedom, and began to receive support from English Protestants who found the clamour of the ultramontanes frightening. Laurier's speech on political Liberalism was designed not only to proclaim the religious neutrality of Canadian Liberals, but also to woo the English from their normal allies in the Conservative party. It was in this latter sense that Langevin understood Laurier, and his speech a few days later at Baie St. Paul included an eulogy of the happy history of French-English co-operation in the bosom of the Conservative party. He praised the alliance of English and French, Protestant and Catholic, on which the Conservative party both in Canada and in Quebec was and should be founded. Such a tradition had no existence in the Liberal party, and Laurier was merely imposing one to appeal to the English. The English however, Langevin was certain, would not be so easily fooled. Apart from this statement of the dualism of the Conservative party, the speech leaned heavily on figures showing the unfair distribution of Public Works, and of unemployment and distress in Canada. Langevin's remedy was protection to encourage industry and keep Canadians at home.<sup>46</sup>

Other Conservatives paid more attention to the problem of clerics in politics, and it was not only the Liberals and the English who found ultramontanism dismaying. Chapleau made a spirited attempt to oust the Castors from the Conservative party, and proposed a coalition with moderate Liberals for the purpose. He succeeded in inciting a bitter quarrel between *La Minerve* and *Le Canadien*, Tarte's ultramontane organ. Langevin tried to reconcile the two, but both Chapleau and Tarte remained convinced of the other's error.<sup>47</sup> The Conservative rift was widening, and Chapleau had managed to establish his leadership of the provincial moderates. Internal struggles were abandoned, however, when Laurier was forced to seek re-election in Drummond-Arthabaska. Conservatives of all shades of *bleu* united to secure his defeat, nor were they unduly disheartened when they failed to stop his second attempt in Quebec East. The first victory had been very sweet.

The Quebec administration which Langevin had selected for its

<sup>46</sup>H. L. Langevin, *Les Conservateurs et les Libéraux, discours prononcé à Baie St. Paul, le 5 août 1877* (Quebec, 1877), an unnumbered pamphlet in the Public Archives of Canada.

<sup>47</sup>Collection Chapais, Langevin to Chapleau, Sept. 11, 1877; Langevin to Masson, Sept. 15, 1877; Chapleau to Langevin, Sept. 15, 1877.

honesty proved too honest for its own good. Crisis threatened, and Langevin found it necessary to persuade de Boucherville to be more accommodating to the friends of the Government.<sup>48</sup> His efforts were in vain. Within a month the Government had been dismissed by a Liberal and irate Lieutenant Governor. Disaster was not, however, undiluted. The new Liberal administration had eked out the scantiest of victories in its hastily called election, and the crisis offered a superb theme on which to ring the changes of provincial autonomy. "I really believe," Langevin assured Macdonald, "that our Province will give a much better account of itself than it did in the local general elections."<sup>49</sup>

During the election of 1878, Chapleau began his long series of complaints about the organization of Quebec district. It is true that almost any politician in Quebec could have taken lessons from Chapleau when it came to organization, but it was not so widely recognized that Quebec district—depressed, abandoned by railways, and discontented with federal policy—was inherently more difficult for Conservative organizers. Chapleau might have managed it better, but on this occasion Langevin was likely right in saying that everything that could be done was being done.<sup>50</sup> The party results were good, but Langevin failed to carry Rimouski. There is no record as to why, except that he apparently counted on the county as safe, and devoted his time to the rest of the election. Sympathetic friends urged him not to delay entering Parliament and offered him seats.<sup>51</sup> There was plenty of time as Mackenzie dallied over his resignation, and Macdonald debated his Cabinet choices. Langevin was held to be certain for the ministry of Public Works, Chapleau was determined to finish the defeat of the Liberals in Quebec before considering a federal position, and a superfluity of Montrealers wrangled over their ambitions.<sup>52</sup> When the new Cabinet was announced at last, Quebec had four Ministers—Masson, Pope, Baby, and Langevin, but Langevin had been demoted to postmaster general. Undaunted he moved to Ottawa, establishing the home which he shared, from time to time in the next thirteen years, with his good friend, Thomas McGreevy.

The federal success was regarded as but the first step in restoring Quebec to Conservatism. Provincial Conservatives were determined to secure the dismissal of Lieutenant Governor Letellier, and the defeat

<sup>48</sup>Macdonald Papers, 200, A.-P. Caron to Macdonald, Jan. 26, 1878; 226, Langevin to Macdonald, Nov. 29, 1877, and Jan. 28, 1878; Collection Chapais, Macdonald to Langevin, Jan. 26, 1878.

<sup>49</sup>Macdonald Papers, 226, Langevin to Macdonald, June 19, 1878.

<sup>50</sup>Macdonald Papers, 204, Chapleau to Macdonald, Aug. 8, 1878; 226, Langevin to Macdonald, Aug. 22, 1878; Collection Chapais, Macdonald to Langevin, Aug. 12, 1878.

<sup>51</sup>Collection Chapais, Chapleau to Langevin (wire), Sept. 19, 1878; T. H. Allen to Langevin, Sept. 24, 1878.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, Chapleau to Langevin, Oct. 3, 1878.



of Premier Joly. The evidence suggests that, in the beginning at least, Langevin was more propelled by, than propellor of the Letellier-must-go movement. However, he apparently decided to put himself at the head of so important an agitation, and when it was determined to consult the Colonial Office, Macdonald was happy to send Langevin on the mission, and to urge the Colonial Office (secretly) not to hurry about returning him with the answer.<sup>53</sup> Langevin fretted in vain, anxious to return and take up the work of his newly acquired Department of Public Works. The Colonial Office dallied as long as it could, then returned the chalice to Macdonald. Langevin returned with an air of triumph, and Macdonald reluctantly dismissed Letellier.

The past months had seen a great improvement in Langevin's position. He was senior leader of the victorious Quebec Conservatives, and the holder of a major spending Department. He had triumphantly, if rather needlessly, negotiated with the Colonial Office. Letellier had been dismissed, and Chapleau was using every means he could muster to destroy Joly. Chapleau had emerged by now as the leading provincial Conservative, and his work in this battle marked him as master of the legislature. But he continued to rely on Langevin's friendly assistance for advice on parliamentary techniques, for federal aid, and for much of his communication with Macdonald and the rest of the Ministry.<sup>54</sup> Concluding one lament Chapleau wrote, "Je ne vous demanderai pas même de présenter mes amitiés à Sir John, ni à Masson, ni même à Caron—Je me bornerai à vous offrir les miennes en vous remerciant de votre inaltérable bienveillance à mon égard."<sup>55</sup>

When Joly's beleaguered garrison at last surrendered, and the Conservatives resumed control at Quebec, Langevin continued to assist Chapleau in various ways. The first necessity was to restore the province to financial health. A provincial dream of expansion had led to immense debts incurred in the name of railway development. Rehabilitation was complicated, and the only solution seemed to lie in the sale of the provincial railway.<sup>56</sup> This would be a dangerously controversial move, particularly while the party remained so divided. Not only did the ultramontanes oppose Chapleau's rule, but some of his friends, like J.-A. Mousseau, were willing to usurp his position. From Langevin, however, he received sympathy, support, and active

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*, Chapleau to Langevin, Nov. 28, 1878 and Dec. 20, 1878; Tarte to Langevin, April 10, 1879; Macdonald Papers, 226, Langevin to Macdonald, April 4, 1879; J. T. Saywell, *The Office of Lieutenant-Governor* (Toronto, 1957), 242 ff., Lorne to Hicks Beach, April 3, 9, 1879; *Debates*, 1879, 331-7; Rumilly, *Histoire*, II, 183-4.

<sup>54</sup>Collection Chapais, Chapleau to Langevin, Aug. 20, 1879, Aug. 28, 1879, and Sept. 28, 1879.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1879.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, Chapleau to Langevin, Dec. 14, 1879, Jan. 19, 1880, Feb. 4, 9, 22, 1880, and May 20, 1880.



assistance.<sup>57</sup> In time geography, rival ambitions, and differing concepts of Quebec Conservatism would separate these men, but in these years Chapleau needed Langevin's strength and experience at Ottawa just as Langevin needed Chapleau's hard-working political leadership in Quebec. They could work together and reinforce each other. Their followers were less amiable. The struggle between ultramontanes and moderates was never successfully terminated. J.-I. Tarte, ultramontane mouthpiece, set out to secure the recognition he believed he deserved, and to undermine the moderate Chapleau. In March, 1880, he could be observed discussing coalition for this end with Liberals Thibaudeau, Geoffrion, and Beausoleil.<sup>58</sup> When this failed he attempted to use Langevin's position to bolster the ultramontane cause. After all the ultramontanes had given Langevin much support, and in a series of open letters in *Le Canadien* Tarte explained to Langevin his duty to follow an ultramontane line.<sup>59</sup> He was ingratiating and flattering showing no sign of the Tarte who a decade later would pull down Langevin's career in ruins.<sup>60</sup> If Langevin was impressed, he did not show it. He knew that the Roman Catholic Church was important, he agreed that Liberals were wrong, but that he had either sympathy for, or even a full understanding of, ultramontanism is doubtful. His first interest was the federal Conservative party designed to support "John A. and his friends." Langevin accepted ultramontane support, as he accepted the support of any group which would vote for the Conservatives. But he could not accept their thesis, which was of doubtful value in Quebec, and pernicious in Ottawa. Nevertheless he became branded with an ultramontane label that Tarte had applied, and the moderates who wished to oppose ultramontanism found their leader in Chapleau. Each section sought to eliminate the other, and did not hesitate to seek Liberal coalition for that purpose.<sup>61</sup> The Liberals of Quebec were no less divided—doctrinaire Liberals like Thibaudeau vied with moderate Liberals like Mercier and federal Liberals like Laurier. The federal wings of both parties deplored coalition, and usually managed to prevent it, but the doctrinaires of each shared a chronic honesty, while the moderates had other interests in common.

A Conservative truce was declared briefly in the fall of 1880.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*, Chapleau to Langevin, Jan. 19, 1880; Dansereau to Langevin, Oct. 31, 1880; Macdonald Papers, 253, Mousseau to Macdonald, Nov. 22, 1880.

<sup>58</sup>*L'Etendard*, Sept. 7, 1883, published the correspondence relating to a series of coalition discussions.

<sup>59</sup>J.-I. Tarte, *Lettres à l'hon. H. L. Langevin* (Quebec, 1880), P.A.C. Pamphlets, vol. II, no. 245. These letters also appeared in *Le Canadien*, Aug. 4-7, 1880.

<sup>60</sup>*Autour d'une carrière politique: Joseph-Israël Tarte, 1880-1897* (Montreal, 1897).

<sup>61</sup>*L'Etendard*, Sept. 7, 1883; Alphonse Desjardins collected and printed many relevant documents in an Appendix to the Quebec Legislative Assembly *Debates*, 1883; Rumilly, *Histoire*, III.

Mousseau, who had been inciting trouble among Chapleau's followers, was silenced by a transfer to Ottawa where he replaced the retiring Masson, on the condition that when Chapleau might wish his place he would go to the Bench.<sup>62</sup> It is improbable that Langevin wished to see Chapleau move to Ottawa, for, as long as the younger man stayed in Quebec, and maintained a stable administration, his power enhanced Langevin's.<sup>63</sup> Peace was marked by one of those great demonstrations which every one attended and made interminable speeches about unity and progress. Thus united the party approached the federal session in which Macdonald intended to introduce his railway bill. On this occasion Langevin made one of his few great speeches. He followed Blake, and defended the bill against the latter's attack. Langevin stressed the urgency, inevitability, and future of the railway. To critics of the terms, he pointed out that compromise between the various parties involved was inevitable, but that Canada was a nation founded on compromise. Finally he spoke of the greatness of the idea of a Canada separate from the United States—prosperous, happy, and free under the British flag. The railway was a great measure, a crowning act of the Government.<sup>64</sup> The opposition differed, but the contract was approved, and the provinces began to total up what each would gain or lose individually on the project.

The process was acutely painful in Quebec. As chartered, the C.P.R. would neither spend money in Quebec, nor join up with existing Quebec railways. Obviously the solution was for the C.P.R. to acquire the provincial railway.<sup>65</sup> Railways were not properly the concern of the Minister of Public Works, but Quebec was. His sympathies were divided between the C.P.R. whose problems he knew all too well, and Quebec whose problems were also familiar. He hesitated to press claims that the C.P.R. could not entertain. Nor was the sale universally acceptable in Quebec. Ultramontanes clung to a railway associated with the almost sacred colonization policy. Its sale to an English concern was heresy. Their outcry drove moderates of both parties into coalition discussions, but no agreement was reached,<sup>66</sup> and the railway continued to trouble politics in Quebec.

Langevin could overlook these difficulties. Macdonald's Cabinet was enjoying a prosperous season, and Langevin shared in the general success of the Government. Even in Ontario, his part in the railway

<sup>62</sup>Collection Chapais, Chapleau to Langevin, Jan. 1, 1880; Dansereau to Langevin, Oct. 31, 1880; Macdonald Papers, 253, Mousseau to Macdonald, Nov. 22, 1880.

<sup>63</sup>Collection Chapais, Dansereau to Langevin, Oct. 31, 1880.

<sup>64</sup>*Debates*, 1880-1, 132-41.

<sup>65</sup>Macdonald Papers, 204, Chapleau to Macdonald, Feb. 26, 1881; Collection Chapais, Chapleau to Langevin, Feb. 15, 1881, Feb. 27, 1881, and March 6, 1881.

<sup>66</sup>*L'Etendard*, Sept. 7, 1883; *Le Canadien*, Sept. 10, 1883.

debate had attracted favourable notice. His ability in the House and in his department were well known. In 1881 he received the K.C.M.G. Briefly, perhaps, but undeniably he was Quebec's premier political leader, and all factions of his party recognized and sought to capitalize on it. Quebec City celebrated the knighthood with a banquet. Tilley, Bowell, O'Connor, Chapleau, Mousseau, Ross, Lynch, Garneau, and others were there. Speeches were long and ornate enough for the most exacting. Sir Hector, however, was brief. He dwelt on the success of the tariff, the advantages of immigration, the brilliance of the railway policy, and the general good fortune of the country. As was becoming his characteristic, he omitted any appeal to specifically French-Canadian feelings.<sup>67</sup> This was the beginning of a summer of triumphant speeches as Langevin toured Quebec, Ontario, and the Maritimes. In December his native city again hosted him, this time at a more intimate banquet celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of his entry into politics, as alderman of the Palace ward.

The serenity of the Ottawa scene was not reflected at Quebec. There provincial railway became the subject of a furious debate. Not that Chapleau had any doubts about selling the Québec, Montréal, Ottawa et Ouest.<sup>68</sup> But the suggestion had brought the whole history of provincial railways under review. The Liberals joyously uncovered evidence of Government boodling.<sup>69</sup> The ultramontanes followed the Liberals in their hot pursuit of corruption, and varied the theme with charges of betrayal of sacred Quebec interests. Chapleau was unshaken in his determination to sell the railway and balance the provincial budget. The project had Langevin's approval, and he offered to convey Chapleau's wishes to the C.P.R.<sup>70</sup> But the C.P.R. was in no position to purchase the Q.M.O.&O., even in the face of threats to sell it to such rivals as the Northern Pacific or Grand Trunk. Lack of a market did not deter Chapleau or his opponents. In an attempt to silence the ultramontanes once and for all, Chapleau called a mid-winter election on the railway issue. Ultramontanes continued hot on the track of the moderates right down to nomination day, when ranks abruptly closed. Newspapers which had all but forgotten their political allegiance in quarrelling over the railway (and assorted politico-religious issues) resumed their support of the Conservative administration. Firmly supported by moderates and ultramontanes alike the Government scored an overwhelming success—53 seats out of 65.

<sup>67</sup>*Le Courrier du Canada*, May 5, 1881.

<sup>68</sup>The railway in question is the successor to the old North Shore Railway, plus an Ottawa extension, built as a public work, and currently referred to as the Q.M.O.&O.

<sup>69</sup>See particularly Laurier's article "La Caverne des Quarante Voleurs," *L'Electeur*, April 4, 1881; Rumilly, *Histoire*, III, 63–5.

<sup>70</sup>Collection Chapais, Langevin to Chapleau, Oct. 19, 1881.

Ignoring the mixed basis of his electoral support Chapleau regarded the result as a personal victory for himself, his railway policy, and his moderates. The figures are probably somewhat misleading however, as the real battle in this election was fought before nomination day. Figures for Chapleau's success in this phase of the election are not easily available, but there clearly remained more opposition within the Conservative party than he cared to admit.

The ultramontanes continued to protest the sale of the railway,<sup>71</sup> but the province was in serious financial straits. Chapleau sold the Q.M.O.&O. for what it would bring—the Ottawa-Montreal section to the C.P.R., and the Quebec-Montreal section to a Montreal syndicate headed by L.-A. S  n  cal. The split within the party came out into the open again when J.-J. Ross resigned from the Cabinet, and in the Assembly J.-I. Tarte organized an opposition to the sale to such effect that Chapleau was forced to pause. Both men appealed to Langevin for help. Chapleau was particularly annoyed to see Langevin's self-proclaimed supporters in the forefront of his opposition.<sup>72</sup> Langevin apparently came to Chapleau's aid, and months later Tarte had not forgiven him for it.<sup>73</sup> *La Minerve* discounted the ideologies involved, and coolly put her finger on the regional nature of the dispute. Regionalism is not a factor which can be overlooked in Quebec politics, and the eastern end of the province was displeased with the terms of the sale and aggrieved over the disposition of patronage. The provision for three places for Quebec citizens on the syndicate did much to lessen Chapleau's opposition.<sup>74</sup> The railway resolutions were passed, and Chapleau felt that he had finished mastering his province. He looked for further fields, and to the standing offer of a Cabinet post at Ottawa. Langevin and Macdonald decided, however, that he should not leave Quebec until the incipient general federal elections should be over.<sup>75</sup> But as soon as this last obstacle had been overcome, Chapleau headed for Ottawa. At last the field was set for a struggle which would become famous as Chapleau attempted to dominate the federal scene as he had mastered the provincial. Against these pretensions Langevin maintained a steadfast resistance. The "inalterable bienveillance" which Chapleau had once hailed could not survive at such close quarters. But this could not be foreseen in the summer of 1882 when Chapleau arrived in Ottawa.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, Tarte to Langevin, Dec. 20, 1881; *Le Monde*, Dec. 28, 1881.

<sup>72</sup>Collection Chapais, Tarte to Langevin, March 17, 1882; Chapleau to Langevin, March 22, 1882; Macdonald Papers, 204, Chapleau to Macdonald, March 25, 1882.

<sup>73</sup>The evidence is vague, but Tarte clearly believed it, and said as much: *Le Canadien*, Dec. 15, 1882; and the paper generally believed to express the Ministers' views, *Le Courrier du Canada*, came to Chapleau's support.

<sup>74</sup>*La Minerve*, March 17, 1882; Collection Chapais, Chapleau to Langevin, March 22, 1882.

<sup>75</sup>Macdonald Papers, 524, Macdonald to Chapleau, May 22, 1882.

## II

The summer passed in a deceptive atmosphere of peace brought on by the return of prosperity and a successful election. But within the Quebec wing of the party serious changes were in progress. The relatively peaceful combination of Langevin at Ottawa and Chapleau at Quebec came to an end, as the younger man joined his colleague in the federal Cabinet. Chapleau had every intention of being first in Ottawa as he had been at Quebec, and the co-operation which had been possible between the two men was now replaced by a rivalry augmented by the existing divisions in the party. Each man had already become identified with one section, and the split which Langevin had striven to abolish from Ottawa was now firmly established there.

Chapleau took his seat in the Cabinet at the expense of J.-A. Mousseau despite what seems to have been a spirited attempt by Langevin to sacrifice Caron instead.<sup>76</sup> Chapleau, however, was insistent that Mousseau should take his place as Premier of Quebec, and refused to sympathize with him. "Few men," he claimed inaccurately, "have had such an opportunity of the leadership of a party, with such a majority and such a well disciplined House."<sup>77</sup> In truth Mousseau faced a difficult task, involving considerable re-organization. He was without experience in the Assembly, and Chapleau offered no assistance. Langevin came down to advise in the delicate matter of appointments, and under his guidance Mousseau selected a completely moderate Cabinet, excluding the ultramontanes from even the one portfolio they had expected. This alarmed them, and a Castor contested Mousseau's own election. On the other side, the moderate press which Chapleau and Sénécal controlled was also unfriendly. Caught in this cross-fire, Mousseau clung to Langevin.<sup>78</sup>

The Liberal press speculated hopefully on these developments. Prospects for Conservative chaos seemed much brighter, and coalition was again discussed as both wings of the Conservative party approached the Liberals. Mousseau, however, was unwilling to become involved, and Langevin, returning from one of his western trips, put a stop to the negotiations.<sup>79</sup> Within the party the moderates continued to fight with the Castors, while as federal leader, Langevin worked for peace and unity. But he could not afford to obtain this by reading Conserva-

<sup>76</sup>*Ibid.*, 524, Macdonald to Chapleau, June 30, 1882.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*, 204, Chapleau to Macdonald, July 7, 1882.

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid.*, 226, Langevin to Macdonald, July 27, 1882, July 29, 1882 (wire), and July 30, 1882; Mousseau to Langevin, Aug. 2, 1882 (wire); 253, Mousseau to Macdonald, Aug. 4, 1882; Rumilly, *Histoire*, IV, 12.

<sup>79</sup>Ontario Department of Public Records and Archives, Blake Papers, Laurier to Blake, July 31, 1882, Sept. 12, 1882, and Nov. 27, 1882; Pacaud to Blake, July 27, 1882; Langelier to Blake, Nov. 4, 1882; Blake to Langelier, Nov. 9, 1882 (copy).

tive supporters out of the party and enlisting the support of Liberal moderates to pursue a purely French-Canadian policy—as Chapleau was willing to do. Instead he suggested that the ultramontanes be pacified by inviting J.-J. Ross to re-enter the Cabinet. The gesture was not enough. Ultramontanes had been long and faithfully *bleu*. They had resented Mousseau and his all-moderate Cabinet, as they had resented Chapleau's struggles against them. They were prepared to fight. The moderates, in turn, had no liking for the ultramontanes or for Mousseau. The latter was in as difficult a position as can be imagined.

Winter was a period of uneasy peace, as Chapleau took his bronchial tubes in search of warmer weather, and Langevin continued to counsel conciliation. In the spring Mousseau faced his Assembly with a misplaced confidence. A hoped-for federal subsidy did not materialize, and the aura of peace was quickly dispelled. At the end of a difficult session Liberals and Castors joined in a loose coalition for electoral purposes, and opposed Mousseau's candidates in the by-elections. Masson, Langevin, and Mousseau tried and failed to quell this movement. The local organizations seem to have been completely out of hand. At length Langevin and Macdonald sent Chapleau, who was in some measure responsible for Mousseau, to take a hand in Quebec.<sup>80</sup> His assistance was fatal.

Although Chapleau had acquiesced in the attempt to conciliate the Castors, his opinion of them had not changed. He went to Quebec to smash them.<sup>81</sup> To what extent Mousseau assented to this is unknown. Certainly conciliation had failed for him. Perhaps he hoped that Chapleau would rally the moderates to his support. But Chapleau's speech at St. Laurent served only to inflame and complete the alienation of the Castors, without securing any alternative strength to the helpless Mousseau. From Ottawa, Langevin continued his attempt to hold moderates and ultramontanes together. As a federal Conservative his task was to convince as many voters as possible that the party of "John A. and his friends" best satisfied their needs, and in his opinion this could only be done by persuading all who wore the Conservative label to work and vote together regardless of political philosophy. Since Mousseau had notably failed to hold the Quebec party together, Langevin determined to replace him.<sup>82</sup> This move had a brief success. The Castors were quieted, and Chapleau affirmed his complete support

<sup>80</sup>Macdonald Papers, 525, Macdonald to Masson, June 30, 1883; 226, Langevin to Macdonald, July 12, 1883, July 23, 1883, and Aug. 2, 1883; 229, Masson to Macdonald, July 5, 1883, and July 29, 1883; 253, Mousseau to Macdonald, July 23, 1883, and Aug. 13, 1883; Collection Chapais, Macdonald to Langevin, July 17, 1883.

<sup>81</sup>Macdonald Papers, 204, Chapleau to Macdonald, May 6, 1883, May 20, 1883, and Aug. 13, 1883.

<sup>82</sup>Collection Chapais, Mousseau to Langevin, Oct. 25, 1883; Macdonald Papers, 317, Mousseau to Macdonald, Dec. 5, 1883.



of Sir Hector at a banquet given in the latter's honour and to mark party solidarity. All shades of party opinion were represented, and Langevin addressed them plainly. In a speech which embodied the traditional elements of his long years of service rendered without regard to nationality or province, and of the brilliant future awaiting the Canadian nation, Langevin also underlined the importance of the party system, and in particular the importance of the "parti qui soutient le gouvernement."<sup>83</sup> He did not succeed, however in impressing the Conservatives with the importance of solidarity.

The ideal successor to Mousseau would have been Masson, who declined the honour. The premiership was hard to fill, but at length, Chapleau and Langevin patched together a compromise Cabinet under the durable but reluctant J.-J. Ross. The immediate problem of inadequate finances faced Quebec, and the traditional solution of a raid on the federal treasury was proposed. When the federal Government balked at this, the Quebec members retired to their committee room, and refused their support to the Government at a crucial moment. It was a quite successful tactic, and Langevin grimly negotiated the Government surrender.<sup>84</sup> This incident is of interest less as an example of the successful coercion of the federal Government by a provincial government aided by the M.P.'s from that province, than as an episode in which the Conservative M.P.'s from Quebec briefly but decisively abandoned Langevin's leadership to pursue a policy which seemed more productive of immediate provincial gain.

Unfortunately the terms of the surrender could not be implemented immediately, and a portion of the Conservative press continued to attack the Government, and Langevin in particular. Among the angry editors was J.-I. Tarte who had commenced his long pilgrimage away from ultramontanist.<sup>85</sup> Rumour implicated Chapleau in the attack, but Langevin refused to credit this.<sup>86</sup> Once again he succeeded in patching up a peace, aided by Thomas McGreevy who pacified *Le Monde* by purchasing it.<sup>87</sup> But unity was a precarious thing at best. Castors and moderates continued to distrust each other, and the pressure to maintain a united front for federal purposes only annoyed provincial leaders, convinced that Quebec interests were being sacrificed to the interests of the rest of Canada.

<sup>83</sup>*Le Monde*, Oct. 19, 1883, and Oct. 25, 1883.

<sup>84</sup>Collection Chapais, Chapleau to Langevin, Feb. 11, 1884; Langevin to Chapais, Feb. 25, 1884.

<sup>85</sup>For details concerning Tarte's chequered career see LaPierre, "Joseph-Israël Tarte."

<sup>86</sup>Macdonald Papers, 227, Langevin to Macdonald, Aug. 2, 1884, and Aug. 18, 1884.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*; Caron Papers, 4752, P. Landry to Caron, Oct. 16, 1884; *Journals*, 1891, Appendix I, 1101-2.



Quebec matters were in this uneasy condition when the news of fresh troubles in the West began to reach eastern Canada. The north-west was of only peripheral concern to the Department of Public Works, but Langevin was not only a French Canadian—and presumably a friend of the Métis—he was also the Minister who had travelled most widely within Canada. Mgrs. Grandin and Taché appealed to him at length, and a deputation of Métis met him at Qu'Appelle in the summer of 1884 to present their grievances in person.<sup>88</sup> In November, 1884, Langevin, having received another complaint from Mgr. Grandin, warned Macdonald that Riel constituted "a permanent danger. However we must take care not to make a martyr out of him and thus increase his popularity. Some cessions to and good treatment of the half-breeds will go a long way to settle matters."<sup>89</sup> Whether Langevin, had he been the Minister responsible, would have taken his own advice in time cannot be known. But the matter was not in his hands, and the Government delayed action, permitting Riel to continue in a course which resulted in the establishment of a Métis provisional government.

English and French Canada joined loyally in putting down the rebellion. In Parliament Langevin and Chapleau maintained silence, while Caron as Minister of Militia enjoyed the limelight, and the Liberals began to censure the Government policy which had led to this danger. Riel was captured, and a long Parliamentary session dragged on without extracting any comment on the rebellion from Langevin. Perhaps he agreed with the Liberal censure of Government policy, but was too loyal to say so. His only intervention was to assure Parliament that the Government was indeed considering the matter of the government of the Territories, but that no action could be taken until the census returns were complete.<sup>90</sup>

In Regina, Riel was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. Tempers rose in eastern Canada, but the eventual hysteria was not foreseen. Macdonald attributed the manifestations in Quebec to *rouge* activity and assumed they would disappear.<sup>91</sup> The C.P.R. was more important. Its solvency was at last ensured, and the problem of its connection with Quebec City was solved under Langevin's tactful management. But the C.P.R. was not going to get the Ministry out of the grief of the Riel affair, even though Riel had saved the C.P.R.

Parliament prorogued, and the ministers scattered—some as far as France. Langevin stayed in Ottawa and watched the crisis develop.

<sup>88</sup>Concerning the Métis see M. Giraud, *Le Métis canadien, son rôle dans l'histoire des provinces de l'ouest* (Paris, 1945).

<sup>89</sup>Macdonald Papers, 227, Langevin to Macdonald, Nov. 6, 1884.

<sup>90</sup>*Debates*, 1885, 3405-6.

<sup>91</sup>Macdonald Papers, 106, Macdonald to Lord Lansdowne, Aug. 28, 1885.

He has been accused of actually encouraging this hysteria in Quebec for the purpose of forcing Macdonald to commute Riel's sentence, or at least of failing to direct the press and guide French Canadians in a way that would have made Riel's death tolerable to Quebec. The evidence for this role is scant and inconclusive. The Conservative press, and especially *Le Monde*—regarded as the voice of Langevin—seemed convinced that Riel would not hang.<sup>92</sup> Tassé of *La Minerve* complained of a lack of direction, and when all was over T.-C. Casgrain insisted that had the press been used to put French Canadians in possession of the true facts of the case it would have been impossible for them to sympathize with Riel. In December, Chapleau wrote that "avec un peu de travail on aurait prévenu le mouvement qui a suivi la mort de Riel," but in September he had rather sympathized with that sentiment in Quebec which he regarded as admirable if mistaken. On balance it seems likely that Langevin may have encouraged *Le Monde* to believe that Riel would not hang, that he left the press free to follow its own line, and that he made no attempt to quell the tumult in Quebec, unless the message in his son-in-law's paper on the day of the hanging, "Riel sur l'échafaud ne personnifie pas pour nous la race canadienne-française, pas même la race métisse," was inspired by him.<sup>93</sup>

The evidence does not make it clear whether the Sanity Commission which Langevin urged on Macdonald was intended to placate French Canada, or to obtain clemency for Riel. It was, however, probably the latter, since he assured a friend that in it lay the best chance of saving Riel's life.<sup>94</sup> It was, however, a very long chance since it seems fairly clear that Macdonald had no intention of interfering to save Riel from the due process of law.<sup>95</sup> Whether his colleagues realized this is another matter. Once again the evidence is not clear, but it is possible, and it would be in accord with what is known of his actions and character, that Langevin believed he could persuade Macdonald to spare Riel. Langevin may have believed that his position and his long years of friendship and service combined with the distress in Quebec would be the lever to pry Riel out of the hangman's hands. If he believed this he was mistaken. But if he believed this Macdonald allowed him to continue in his error until November 11 when it was already too late to

<sup>92</sup>*Le Monde* took this line as late as Nov. 13, 1885; see also Rumilly, *Histoire*, V, 55, 78.

<sup>93</sup>Macdonald Papers, 421, Tassé to Macdonald, Nov. 2, 1885; Collection Chapais, Casgrain to Sir Alexander Campbell, Nov. 17, 1885; Chapleau to Langevin, Dec. 17, 1885, and Sept. 22, 1885; *Le Courrier du Canada*, Nov. 16, 1885; R. W. Cox, "The Quebec Provincial General Election of 1886," unpublished M.A. thesis (McGill, 1948), discusses this question.

<sup>94</sup>Collection Chapais, Langevin to L.-H. Huot, n.d.

<sup>95</sup>Donald G. Creighton, *John A. Macdonald. II. The Old Chieftain* (Toronto, 1955), 432-7.

attempt to reconcile Quebec. A powerful current was sweeping over the province. Perhaps if it had been taken seriously early enough the Conservatives might have been able to guide it. As it was, only the Liberals would benefit from it.

At last Macdonald warned his colleagues that Riel must die, and that he would, if forced, govern without Quebec. He may even have threatened to hold an election, on what would, necessarily, have been a straight issue of race.<sup>96</sup> No wonder the French-Canadian ministers submitted! Years later Tupper credited Langevin's acquiescence to a promise of the succession to Macdonald. Professor Creighton attributes it to simple loyalty to his chief.<sup>97</sup> Loyalty was almost certainly a factor. A problematical future prime ministership might have affected the issue. Langevin himself states quite simply that he decided that the whole of French Canada could not be sacrificed for one criminal. Riel was clearly guilty. He had incited rebellion, had roused the savages against harmless citizens, including priests, and had been responsible for death and devastation. In conscience Langevin felt that the law must be allowed to take its course. "Il est possible que nous perdions l'appui de la majorité des députés français mais notre conscience nous appuie et l'avenir dira que nous n'avons fait que notre devoir." Resignation would not have saved Riel. It would merely create an impassable gulf between the Government and French Canada. Even yet Riel's crime might be the cause of a war of nationalities.<sup>98</sup>

The evidence does not show whether Langevin ever threatened to resign, but that he considered the possibility is clear from his letters to his brother. His decision to stay was less publicized, but just as important as Chapleau's. Langevin's resignation would have almost forced his colleagues to resign also, and race would have been set against race. As it was the normal channels of co-operation remained open. His critics accused him of clinging to office, but he was also clinging to a long tradition, established by Lafontaine and Cartier, that in Canada, French and English could and must live peacefully together. He accepted the painful responsibility for Riel's death so that his compatriots might be spared a greater evil.<sup>99</sup> But his action cost him much personal support, especially among the more ultra-montane Conservatives who had once hailed his leadership most vociferously.

<sup>96</sup>J.-I. Tarte, 1892, *Procès Mercier, les causes qui l'ont provoqué: Quelques faits pour l'histoire* (Montreal, 1892), 21, P.A.C. Pamphlet, vol. II, no. 1767.

<sup>97</sup>W. A. Harkins, ed., *The Political Reminiscences of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Tupper, Bart.* (London, 1914), 147; Creighton, *Macdonald*, II, 437.

<sup>98</sup>Collection Chapais, Langevin to Edmond Langevin, Nov. 16, 1885, and Nov. 20, 1885.

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*, L.-H. Huot to Langevin. Nov. 16, 1885.

Even members of Parliament repudiated the decision of Caron, Chapleau, and Langevin to accept Riel's execution, and in Quebec the hanging was followed by an hysterical outburst and the formation of *le parti national*. Ultramontanes ignored the attempts of the hierarchy to contain this reaction and joined leading Liberals in the task of convincing the voters of Quebec that Ottawa, as they had long suspected, did indeed discriminate against them. "Si Riel avait été un métis anglais protestant il n'aurait pas été pendu,"<sup>100</sup> they proclaimed with much justice. Langevin was attacked for failing to save Riel, for not resigning, and for shirking his duty to French Canada. Few recognized that his refusal to be stampeded had preserved more for French Canada than it had lost. As the tumult rose Langevin remained quiet. He correctly predicted the return of the Quebec deputies to the Conservative fold,<sup>101</sup> but made no estimate of the reaction of the constituencies. Chapleau made a largely ineffectual attempt to counter the work of *le parti national* in the counties, and Conservative deputies who had once repudiated all responsibility hurried off to placate their electors. Conservative efforts were far from successful and Senator Bolduc reported unhappily that he feared lest "dans quelques comtés, le mal soit irréparable; ce sont les libéraux qui en profiteront. Il est à espérer que les journaux se montreront plus prudents une autre fois."<sup>102</sup>

Before facing Parliament the French-Canadian ministers wanted time for the reaction to fade, and Chapleau, in particular, wanted the rewards of loyalty and the symbols of power to assure the French Canadians of their importance in the Cabinet. Chapleau urged the necessity of this on Langevin who alone might be able to influence Sir John.<sup>103</sup> Time Macdonald was willing to grant, but a promotion for Chapleau was not forthcoming, although three English Canadians were appointed to senior Cabinet posts.

When Parliament met the management of the inevitable debate on Riel was left to Langevin. A back-bencher, P. Landry, moved censure on the Government for permitting Riel to hang. Here was a motion on which English and French Liberals could not hope to agree. Langevin rose swiftly to defend the Government and himself, pointing out that he was in the Cabinet as a representative not of French Canadians alone but of all Canadians for all of whom it was his duty to seek justice. Then as had been agreed with Macdonald, he moved the previous question.<sup>104</sup> No amendments were possible, and the whole

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, anonymous enclosure in letter from Gelinas to Langevin, Dec. 1, 1885.

<sup>101</sup>Macdonald Papers, 227, Langevin to Macdonald, Nov. 19, 1885.

<sup>102</sup>Collection Chapais, Joseph Bolduc to Langevin, Dec. 11, 1885.

<sup>103</sup>*Ibid.*, Chapleau to Langevin, Dec. 17, 1885.

<sup>104</sup>*Debates*, 1886, 77.

question of Government policy in the northwest was closed. Thereafter it was merely a matter of securing priority for the motion. When the vote came only seventeen French-Canadian Conservatives—three less than Langevin had predicted—opposed the Government. The arguments of Caron, Chapleau, Langevin, and Mgr. Taché had been effective.<sup>105</sup>

In Quebec the Assembly repulsed the attacks of *le parti national* with equal success, and if there had not been both a provincial and a federal general election due within the year, these two defeats might have ended the matter. But the issue was too useful for Mercier and his *parti national*. The provincial election campaign was conducted almost exclusively on the Riel crisis. Ross lost his majority, but since the opposition was not united, it was hoped that the Conservatives might be able to stay in office, at least until after the federal election. But Conservative machinations failed, and when the Assembly met Mercier assumed office supported by a group of ex-ultramontanes.<sup>106</sup>

The provincial defeat was serious both for the coming federal election, and for Langevin personally. The relationship between federal and provincial politics was peculiarly close in Quebec, and without solid provincial support neither Langevin nor Chapleau could hope to advance federally. The blow was particularly severe for Langevin. The party which he had mended so often was broken. The ultramontanes whom he had so often protected from Chapleau had deserted. His concept of party organization, in which *les bleus*—whatever their differences of opinion—remained intact as a voting group, had failed. He had resisted all attempts by moderates to form a party with purely Quebec interests. Now the Castors, many of whom had once decried Liberalism in all its forms, had confused race, religion, and party. They had deserted the non-racial alignment of the Conservative party for a cry of French-Canadian unity and a slightly disguised Liberal party. Macdonald may have believed that the Riel affair had increased Langevin's stature.<sup>107</sup> Chapleau and Langevin knew better what had been lost. The Castors had defected, and the moderates had always preferred Chapleau.

The election campaign further handicapped Langevin. His talent lay in the management of a parliamentary party, in raising funds, soothing deputies, and juggling patronage. But these talents were not suited to a hard-fought campaign. Langevin was no orator who could sway the hearts and votes of the crowds as Mercier, Laurier, and

<sup>105</sup>Mgr. Taché actually sat in the gallery and lobbied the members. *Le Courrier du Canada*, Jan. 22, 1887, printed a letter from Taché to Lafèche, March 3, 1886.

<sup>106</sup>Details of this episode are in Saywell, *Office of Lieutenant-Governor*, 97-9; and in Rumilly, *Histoire*, V, 204 ff.

<sup>107</sup>Creighton, *Macdonald*, II, 505.

Chapleau could. Langevin dared not participate in one of the popular *assemblées contradictoires*. Chapleau, on the other hand, was one of the best speakers in Lower Canada and his ability won him a popular support that Langevin never had. This was his opportunity to exploit Langevin's weakness.

Chapleau's first step was to secure absolute control of the Montreal district organizations. He wrote to Macdonald warning him that two distinct Conservative factions contested the Montreal scene, and that this must cease. He wanted the sole direction, and urged Macdonald to "see Langevin about this and have it well understood, because I tell you frankly if things do not work out that way I shall withdraw absolutely from the direction of the election and confine myself to my own constituency."<sup>108</sup> This first protest seems to have been ignored because Langevin and his paper *Le Monde* continued to participate in Montreal affairs, and in January Chapleau tried again. Langevin's senior position irritated him, and at an *assemblée* "il a accusé le Ministère de lui être déloyal, depuis longtemps qu'il apercevait qu'on voulait le jeter par dessus bord et comme il représente le plus beau district de la Province, il mérite la plus belle position,"<sup>109</sup> and reinforced his claims with a threat to resign.<sup>110</sup> An alarmed Macdonald and Langevin consulted while the crisis dragged on, but Chapleau's terms were plain: a free hand in Montreal district and suppression of *Le Monde*. Cession was inevitable, and when Chapleau insisted that his resignation be communicated to the Governor General, his claims were accepted.<sup>111</sup> This may have been partly a tactical withdrawal on Langevin's part, since his paper continued to operate in Montreal, although more discreetly. But the surrender infuriated him to a point where he contemplated the unusual step of making his anger public. A few months later only Macdonald's firm intervention prevailed upon Langevin to uphold party solidarity and attend a banquet held in Chapleau's honour.

Conservative misgivings about the election results were justified. They suffered a net loss of fifteen or twenty members, leaving the Quebec contingent almost evenly divided between the parties. Chapleau enjoyed tremendous success in Montreal district, and his name became almost synonymous with electoral victory. Langevin's district showed a dismaying tendency to vote Liberal, although he himself was safely returned. The contrast between the Montreal and Quebec districts was

<sup>108</sup>Macdonald Papers, 205, Chapleau to Macdonald, Oct. 31, 1886.

<sup>109</sup>Collection Chapais, J. Lessard to Langevin, Jan. 22, 1887.

<sup>110</sup>*Ibid.*, Macdonald to Langevin, Jan. 15, 1887.

<sup>111</sup>Macdonald Papers, 205, Chapleau to Macdonald, Jan. 20, 1887 (It is an index to Chapleau's mood that he addresses Macdonald in French in this letter); later the same day; 527, Macdonald to Chapleau, Jan. 21, 1887.



dismal, but Chapleau was probably guilty of over-estimating his personal responsibility for the results in Montreal. Montreal was a wealthy region, blessed by the federal railway policy, while Quebec was chronically impoverished, and convinced that federal railway policy was discriminatory. Economic dissatisfaction in Quebec probably helped the Liberals. Whatever his responsibility Chapleau failed to secure the prize for which he had worked. In Ottawa Langevin continued to enjoy the trappings if not the fact of leadership.

This election marks it seems the true end of Langevin's career. Never after this time can he be seen hurrying down to Quebec to impose order on a fractured party. Organization was left to others, primarily Chapleau. Langevin stayed in Ottawa, secure in office, and still master of an enviable power, patronage, and prestige. The Riel crisis and its aftermath had cost Langevin much. In 1885 he had been a *chef*, assaulted but assured. Like Cartier he had worked towards the sort of politics in which French Canadians would be safe, since divisions were made on other issues than race. Yet now Canada threatened to divide along racial lines, although it was to prevent this that he had supported Macdonald over Riel. In spite of him Mercier had formed a *parti national* from Castors and Liberals. The only slightly less *national* moderates were backing Chapleau, whose oft proposed coalition of moderates would have resulted in a similar *bloc*. Chapleau was a proven crowd-pleaser and vote-getter. Langevin's political techniques were demonstrably inadequate. His approach to party, and politics, had been rejected by his countrymen. This is what he must have known when he yielded to Chapleau in January, and when he read the election returns in March. In Quebec he had nothing left, but he would be hard to dislodge from Ottawa.

The first attempt to remove him came almost immediately. "I am only sorry," wrote Chapleau, "that one of us, Langevin, Caron or I is not forced to go to the Senate."<sup>112</sup> Nor was the Senate the only refuge for a surplus French-Canadian minister. Spencer Wood was available, and a spirited movement developed to draft Langevin for that spot. This clique centred on Caron, Tarte, Casgrain, and Turcotte who wished to get rid of Langevin whom they suspected of aspirations for the prime ministership.<sup>113</sup> Their animadversions were without effect, and when Langevin was offered the post, he declined. Macdonald then suggested that Chapleau might like to be Lieutenant Governor of his native province. Chapleau hesitated rather longer, and then also refused.<sup>114</sup> The bitterness that had developed in January,

<sup>112</sup>*Ibid.*, 205, Chapleau to Macdonald, April 18, 1887.

<sup>113</sup>Caron Papers, 10883, Turcotte to Caron, May 29, 1887; Tarte to Caron, May 30, 1887; Casgrain to Caron, May 30, 1887.

<sup>114</sup>Macdonald Papers 205, Chapleau to Macdonald, June 20, 1887.



1887, was not to be rooted out of the Cabinet so easily. What solution Macdonald would have preferred cannot be known. Langevin had lost support in Quebec, but he was an amiable and capable colleague. Chapleau was a far less good-natured and competent Cabinet Minister, but he wielded an indispensable power in Quebec. Of course, he could have exercised the latter effectively, if unconstitutionally, from Spencer Wood. As it was, Macdonald was not prepared to force a decision. A lieutenant governor of the utmost rectitude was found in A.-R. Angers, and a surface truce was arranged in the Cabinet.<sup>115</sup>

Amidst the lively politics of the later eighties, Langevin scarcely moved. The federal Government's war with Mercier was left in Thompson's capable hands, and Langevin confined himself to the work of his Department. Macdonald remained loyal to his old friend, and at one of the innumerable banquets which characterized Quebec politics took occasion to refer to Sir Hector in glowing terms. He traced the history of their association, draped Cartier's mantle over Langevin's shoulders, lauded his loyalty, sincerity, wisdom, and prudence, and concluded "et vous gens de Québec, vous devez être fiers qu'il vienne d'au milieu de vous. Aucun homme en Canada, n'occupe une place plus élevée dans l'estime du parti conservateur et de ceux qui le connaissent comme homme privé ou homme public, que mon collègue et ami Sir Hector Langevin."<sup>116</sup> Such a demonstration undoubtedly contributed to the feeling of discontent and frustration in Ottawa which led Chapleau to consider "une politique provinciale qui s'occupe enfin des intérêts du Bas-Canada, sans consulter les convenances ou les besoins d'Ottawa."<sup>117</sup> Ottawa, however, held him fast, and he continued to work to strengthen the Conservative party.

Langevin had abdicated from that aspect of politics, but his work as Minister of Public Works took him to all parts of Canada, and before all sorts of audiences. He had developed a pleasant, undramatic style in either French or an accented English. He expertly invoked such reliable topics as the War of 1812, the British North America Act, Cartier, and British liberties. He continued to uphold the idea of one Canada in which all should share, while also advocating a large degree of autonomy for the provinces. He was completely orthodox on protection, while advocating more extended trade relations with both the United States and the United Kingdom. He deprecated any step which might lead to annexation or to imperial federation since these would involve a sacrifice of Canadian rights and liberties. In general, he seemed to find the status quo quite satisfactory, and assured his

<sup>115</sup>*Le Courrier du Canada*, Nov. 23, 1887; *La Minerve*, Nov. 25, 1887; *L'Electeur*, Nov. 25, 1887.

<sup>116</sup>*Le Courrier du Canada*, Feb. 13, 1888. (Sir John, of course, spoke in English, and the translation is courtesy of the newspaper.)

<sup>117</sup>Rumilly, *Histoire*, VI, 15, Chapleau to Nantel, April 30, 1888.

listeners: "Nous vivions à l'ombre du drapeau britannique, nous sommes heureux et prospères."<sup>118</sup>

Goaded by the threat of Mercier, Conservatives attempted to enlist the ultramontanes who had deserted to *le parti national*. This was just the sort of alignment on which Langevin had always insisted, but this time he left the negotiations to his old colleagues, Chapleau, Caron, Taillon, and de Boucherville. He did not even attend the banquet which, as usual, marked the conclusion of an agreement.<sup>119</sup>

In the session of 1890, a move to remove the guarantees to the French language in the Northwest Territories Act galvanized Langevin to an unaccustomed activity. He spoke vehemently, and he spoke in English that that portion of his audience might be sure of understanding him. He described the motion as unjust, and said it raised a "question of race and nationality . . . a question of self-preservation," a question on which if necessary all French Canadians would join together to preserve autonomy, language, and institutions.<sup>120</sup> It was a stirring speech for the French Canadians, but not likely to conciliate the English Canadians in the House. As the motion made its way through the House Langevin voted with a French-Canadian *bloc*. Curiously Chapleau voted with the English Canadians. It was left for Thompson to work out an acceptable compromise.

The speech was an odd one for Langevin to make. He had so often stressed his responsibility to all his compatriots, saying "Je ne resterais dans le gouvernement si je devais représenter une seule race." His French Canadians had shown, however, that impartiality was not what they expected of their leaders. The frankly *national* appeal of Mercier and Chapleau had been far more successful in Quebec. Previously, Langevin had said, "je sais qu'il faut deux partis, l'un qui soutient le gouvernement et l'autre qui le combat; les deux partis sont importants, . . ."<sup>121</sup> Now he advocated the submergence of party, and the formation of a *bloc*! Was this speech one last attempt to rally support in Quebec? On no other interpretation does it make sense. For many years, and on far harder issues, Langevin had held fast to the Conservative party as the bastion of French Canada's safety. But a virulent racism was evident in both French and English Canada. The Conservative party, and the concept of mutual tolerance and co-opera-

<sup>118</sup>*Le Courrier du Canada*, Aug. 9-11, 1888.

<sup>119</sup>Caron Papers, 12868, Beaubien to Caron, March 1, 1889, April 24, 1889, May 10, 1889, and June 11, 1889; *Le Courrier du Canada*, May 31, 1889; Rumilly, *Histoire*, VI, 88.

<sup>120</sup>*Debates*, 1890, 602-12.

<sup>121</sup>*Banquet offert à Sir Hector L. Langevin, C.B., K.C.M.G., ministre des Travaux publics, par les citoyens de Montréal à l'Hotel Windsor le jeudi, 18 octobre 1883* (Montreal, 1883).

tion, must have seemed a less sure stronghold. In one of his last important utterances Langevin returned to the attitude of the young member from Dorchester who had always voted "en faveur du Bas-Canada."

Even as Langevin made this speech, the scandal which would drive him from office was starting to unfold. The long co-operation of the McGreevy brothers to secure profitable government contracts for the firm of Larkin, Connolly, and Co., in return for large contributions at election time, had come to an end. Early in 1889 Thomas took Robert into court in an attempt to extract a larger share of the profits from his brother. Just why he did so insane a thing, has never been explained, but once the case was blazoned in the press the rest of the McGreevy affair was well nigh inevitable.

Aggrieved by Thomas' prosecution, Robert McGreevy assembled a dossier convicting his brother of conduct unbecoming to a member of Parliament. The evidence in the dossier involved activities of Thomas McGreevy's good friend, the Minister of Public Works. Robert took his papers to Macdonald who questioned Langevin and McGreevy who denied all guilt.<sup>122</sup> Balked, Robert turned the papers over to Tarte, all unaware he claimed of the feud which existed between the latter and Thomas. Tarte again took the papers to Macdonald, and when nothing happened began, in spite of Roberts' stipulation for secrecy, to publish titillating bits in *Le Canadien*. Thomas sued Tarte for libel, and the scandal continued to unroll. The matter was introduced into Parliament by Laurier, in spite of protests from Mercier who had also enjoyed the McGreevy largesse.<sup>123</sup> Laurier attested to general Liberal innocence and wanted to know what truth there was in *Le Canadien's* articles. Langevin upheld the virtue of himself and his department, and there the matter rested.<sup>124</sup> But Tarte was not finished. His revelations continued in a series entitled "Les Couloisses de McGreevéisme," and on November 19 he published the first document involving the Minister. It was a statement that Larkin, Connolly, and Co. had given Thomas McGreevy \$5,000 for Sir Hector Langevin.

Tarte's attack was an external evidence of the struggle that was raging, more or less privately, in the Cabinet. Caron and Chapleau, both of whom had probably given Tarte at least tacit approval, were at loggerheads with Langevin, but Macdonald, who was after all in a position to almost guarantee it, was sure that Langevin would not be compromised, and continued to support him.<sup>125</sup> Chapleau, on the other hand, found Macdonald singularly difficult to deal with. Ap-

<sup>122</sup>*Journals*, 1891, Appendix I, 725, 1092. On the scandal see the detailed study in LaPierre, "Joseph-Israël Tarte;" B. Fraser, "The Political Career of Sir Hector Langevin," M.A. Thesis (Toronto, 1959).

<sup>123</sup>Laurier Papers, Mercier to Laurier, March 29, 1890.

<sup>124</sup>*Debates*, 1890, 4827, 4935.

<sup>125</sup>Macdonald Papers, 530, Macdonald to Anger, Dec. 26, 1890.

pointments which he sought were not forthcoming, and when he protested in his vehement fashion, Macdonald answered coldly, demanding explanations of intemperate expressions, and advising immediate reforms in the Printing Bureau unless Chapleau wanted his management to undergo Parliamentary investigation.<sup>126</sup> In his difficulty, Chapleau turned continuously to Thompson who was noncommittally sympathetic.<sup>127</sup> But Thompson was not his only confidant. Friends reported to Langevin that Chapleau had been seen in consultation with Tarte, Nantel, and Mercier.<sup>128</sup> There was no evidence that Chapleau was engaged in improper dealings with these old friends of his, but the possibility amounting to probability exists. Macdonald and Langevin presumably thought so for they blandly delayed the appointment, so vital in Chapleau's scheme of things, of Dansereau as Postmaster of Montreal.<sup>129</sup>

The press attack and the Cabinet struggles were a bad omen for the oncoming election, and Macdonald made an attempt to resolve the strife in Quebec. Langevin was again offered the refuge of Spencer Wood for the purpose, according to Tupper, of reconciling Tarte who would halt his attack if Langevin would leave the Cabinet. Langevin would not retreat, and after further discussion, Macdonald faced the election with the Quebec difficulties unresolved.<sup>130</sup>

Chapleau led and organized the Conservatives in Quebec, and under his amiable guidance party lines tended to blur, as candidates changed allegiance, and leaders politely traded acclamations. Langevin concentrated on his own re-election in Trois-Rivières, but seems to have quite innocently upset Chapleau's arrangements when Richelieu also insisted on nominating him, although Laurier and Chapleau had "paired" the county with Verchères. Chapleau complained, Macdonald advised tact, but Langevin was returned for both counties.<sup>131</sup> An ominous symptom was Tarte's election in Montmorency. He had decided to enter Parliament for the purpose of directly

<sup>126</sup>Thompson Papers, Chapleau to Thompson, Dec. 12, 1890; Chapleau to Macdonald, Dec. 22, 1890 (copy enclosed in above); Macdonald Papers, 205, Chapleau to Macdonald, Dec. 28, 1890; 530, Macdonald to Chapleau, Dec. 31, 1890.

<sup>127</sup>Thompson Papers, Chapleau to Thompson, Jan. 2, 1891.

<sup>128</sup>Macdonald Papers, 227, Langevin to Macdonald, Jan. 11, 1891.

<sup>129</sup>Collection Chapais, Chapleau to Langevin, Jan. 3, 1891; Langevin to Chapleau, Jan. 5, 1891; Macdonald Papers, 227, Langevin to Macdonald, Jan. 5, 1891 (enclosing a translation of Chapleau to Langevin, Jan. 3, 1891).

<sup>130</sup>Macdonald Papers, 530, Macdonald to Angers, Jan. 19, 1891; 186, Angers to Macdonald, Jan. 22, 1891; 530, Macdonald to de Boucherville, Feb. 2, 1891; 205, Chapleau to Macdonald, Feb. 8, 1891, and Feb. 10, 1891; Harkins, ed., *Reminiscences of Sir Charles Tupper*, 152.

<sup>131</sup>Macdonald Papers, 530, Macdonald to Langevin, Feb. 13, 1891; 205, Chapleau to Langevin, March 17, 1891; Collection Chapais, Macdonald to Langevin, Feb. 15, 1892 (should be 1891); Chapleau to Langevin, Feb. 17, 1891.

attacking the Minister of Public Works, and campaigned on a platform of further revelations. These included the testimony of the head of the Quebec Harbour Commission that the misappropriations in the Quebec harbour contracts were the direct responsibility of Langevin.<sup>182</sup> When Parliament met, Tarte introduced these charges, and demanded an investigation into the actions of Thomas McGreevy, Sir Hector Langevin, and the Department of Public Works. The Minister categorically denied the charges in the name of himself, his officers, and his department. McGreevy also denied the charges, although the evidence against him was already damning, and the affair was referred to the Standing Committee on Elections and Privileges.<sup>183</sup>

Almost before the Committee could begin work, the Canadian political world was upset by the death of Macdonald. The election had been a terrible strain from which he had not recovered, and on May 29, Langevin announced Macdonald's illness to the House. That he would not return became obvious at once, and the party began to speculate about a successor. Various names were mentioned: Tupper, Abbott, Langevin, and Thompson; but there was no clear choice, and Macdonald himself offered no guidance. On June 8, Langevin briefly announced his friend's death, saying, "having spent half my life with him as his follower and his friend, his departure is the same as if I lost half my existence." He managed a few more sentences about Macdonald before he broke down, and was forced to conclude quickly, "Mr. Speaker, I would have wished to speak of our dear departed friend, and spoken to you about his goodness of heart the witness of which I have been so often, but I feel that I must stop! My heart is full of tears. I cannot proceed further."<sup>184</sup> The last sentence was twice true. Deprived of Macdonald's unfailing support, smeared by the muck of the McGreevy scandal, Langevin could indeed proceed no further. His end would be a little more drawn out, but no less certain.

Without the scandal Langevin, as senior Minister and Macdonald's oldest and ever loyal friend, might have claimed the office of prime minister.<sup>185</sup> As it was he was ineligible in the eyes of all save a few Quebec papers such as *Le Monde*. Probably this was just as well, for in the nature of things, he could never have secured a united Cabinet, and his rule might have been personally disastrous. The scandal, however, saved him from the need for decision. Under the circumstances he decided to resign at the end of the session,<sup>186</sup> and apparently let

<sup>182</sup>*L'Electeur*, Feb. 18, 1891.

<sup>183</sup>*Debates*, 1891, 146, 153.

<sup>184</sup>*Ibid.*, 883-4.

<sup>185</sup>J. T. Saywell, "The Crown and the Politicians: The Canadian Succession Question: 1891-1896," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXVII (1956), 310.

<sup>186</sup>Collection Chapais, Abbott to Langevin, July 28, 1891.

the Cabinet negotiations proceed without his intervention. A compromise Prime Minister was found in Abbott, the business of the session was resumed, and the investigation into the Department of Public Works dragged on through the heat of an Ottawa summer. Langevin, himself, appeared twice before the Committee, and defended himself with considerable skill, but the evidence itself, in spite of its curious gaps, is quite conciusive.<sup>137</sup> The Department of Public Works had woefully failed to protect the public interest, and had let contracts, that on the friendliest estimate, allowed an unjustifiable profit amounting to at least five per cent.<sup>138</sup> Nor, in spite of a majority report exonerating him, could Langevin have been unaware of the malversation of funds under his control. The corrupt contracts had been arranged through McGreevy, and Thomas McGreevy was Langevin's old friend, creditor, and party manager.

McGreevy is, in fact, one of the most curious actors in this whole affair. His uncommunicative presence was frequently felt in Quebec political affairs. He supported either party, as it suited him,<sup>139</sup> and extracted his tithe from any project he could get a grip on. Tarte described him, with what accuracy it is impossible to say, as a sort of all-powerful puppet master manipulating politicians to his will.<sup>140</sup> McGreevy was actually guilty of starting the whole investigation, since without his prosecution of Robert, Tarte's attack on Langevin would have been impossible. On the face of it, taking his brother into court was sheer foolishness, unless McGreevy, like Tarte, was also in the process of a political re-alignment. The fact remains that in his long years as Langevin's friend, and as treasurer of the Quebec Conservatives, McGreevy had undoubtedly raised money by using the Minister's name. He had traded contributions for contracts, and Langevin had clearly condoned, or more probably, encouraged this. Sheer political realism demands that a party treasurer be successful in raising money. It might also suggest that he be neither a member of Parliament nor too closely connected with one of the big spending departments of the Government.

The Committee was less successful in finding out where the money went. For the most part, the witnesses were uncommunicative. McGreevy refused to answer, and Tarte, who as one of Langevin's ex-organizers had probably had the spending of some of it, also pleaded political honour. *Le Monde* absorbed a good deal of money,<sup>141</sup> and a

<sup>137</sup>*Journals*, 1891, Appendix I; see also Appendix II for the account of the investigation conducted at the same time into the building of the Langevin Block.

<sup>138</sup>*Debates*, 1891, 5784.

<sup>139</sup>Laurier Papers, Tarte to Laurier, Oct. 7, 1890.

<sup>140</sup>*Debates*, 1891, 5796.

<sup>141</sup>*Ibid.*, 5813.



subsequent investigation into another scandal unearthed some of McGreevy's election accounts.<sup>142</sup> Presumably the money was for party purposes, but there is little evidence as to how it was spent, or for which party.

Both Conservatives and Liberals on the Committee were much disturbed by all these revelations, and Langevin eventually traded an immediate resignation for a favourable majority report.<sup>143</sup> The minority report condemned him, but the majority report clearing him of personal corruption was accepted by a straight party vote.<sup>144</sup> This marked the end of his career. His party could not even retire him to some peaceful but remunerative post. Spencer Wood went to Chapleau within a year and a half, but Langevin continued to sit in the House until the next election. At that time he retired to the obscurity in which he remained until he died of a stroke and pneumonia on June 12, 1906. After almost forty years in politics, after a career characterized by loyalty,<sup>145</sup> Langevin died with his name a by-word for corruption.

### III

Langevin's life had been an interesting one. If he himself did not quite make the first rank politically, he was intimately associated with two who did, Cartier and Macdonald. In addition, his political relationship with the irrepressible Chapleau and with the ultramontane group is worth considering.

Ever since 1873 ambitious Quebec politicians have claimed the "manteau de Cartier." Some have even been awarded this garment. Langevin like the others asserted his title to the cloak. His right to it, however, was frequently challenged, and in the later years of his career Chapleau made a determined effort to wrest it from him. There were many who believed that Langevin had no right to the mantle.<sup>146</sup> Certainly he lacked the political strength that had characterized Cartier. At the height of his career Cartier had dominated the politics of his province. This Langevin was never able to do, but in so many other ways he was a very real successor to Cartier. To begin with Cartier had chosen him. The suggestion that Chapleau was the natural successor, trained in fact by Cartier,<sup>147</sup> is negated by evidence which suggests that Cartier was in fact deliberately ignoring the young

<sup>142</sup>*Sessional Papers*, 1893, no. 27, 90-229.

<sup>143</sup>Collection Chapais, Abbott to Langevin, Sept. 5, 1891; Langevin to Abbott, Sept. 7, 1891. He had resigned previously on Aug. 11, 1891, but it had not been officially accepted, *ibid.*, Langevin to Abbott, and Abbott to Langevin, Aug. 11, 1891.

<sup>144</sup>*Debates*, 1891, 6125-6.

<sup>145</sup>J. Willison, *Reminiscences, Political and Personal* (Toronto, 1919), 194.

<sup>146</sup>Tarte, *Procès Mercier*, 19; and LaPierre, "Joseph-Israël Tarte," 126.

<sup>147</sup>*Le Castorisme, Voilà l'ennemi*, 3.

Conservative in Montreal.<sup>148</sup> After a brief fling with rather *nationaliste* politics, "en faveur du Bas-Canada," and a flirtation with the Sicotte moderate Liberals, Langevin had settled down modestly in Cartier's *équipe*. Here he imbibed many of the ideas of his leader. Indeed he and Cartier had already shown tastes in common. Had not Langevin attempted to build a railway, tap the western trade, and make a great metropolis of Quebec? Cartier's successful association with the Grand Trunk in just such an endeavour is well known. Chapleau's later interest in railways was quite different. His railway policy remained provincial, and inextricably mixed up with the colonization of Quebec province. After the death of Cartier, Langevin continued to forward the development of the national railway and the opening of the West, whereas Chapleau rather approved of the threat in 1884 to stop the C.P.R. unless provincial demands were met.<sup>149</sup> This was not only an attack on national development, but also a step in the direction of the dangerous *bloc* politics.

Cartier always advocated the insurance of French-Canadian particularism by means of co-operation with the English Canadians. Langevin too, paid continuous service to this ideal, and sponsored projects designed to insure racial amity such as the Langevin education bill of 1866. He apparently did not even consider leading his province on a religious crusade in 1872 over the matter of the New Brunswick schools, or on a *nationaliste* crusade in 1885 over Riel. Chapleau, on the other hand, was quite able to propose sulkily a *politique provinciale*, when he failed to get his own way in the Cabinet.

Cartier and Langevin were both apparently well liked by their English colleagues, whereas Chapleau was distrusted. In 1879 he was unable to muster a single English vote in the Conservative Legislative Council to help him in his battle with Letellier and Joly. His flamboyant oratory did not please the English either. Langevin and Cartier, however, without being orators of any note, won the respect of their English colleagues by their skill in parliamentary management.

Like Cartier too, and quite unlike Chapleau, Langevin was mildly aristocratic. He came from an old family which could afford to educate its own offspring. Chapleau, of course, the son of a stone mason, had been educated by the Masson family, and had never forgiven them for it. His background helped Chapleau appeal to the large crowds before which he loved to speak. This was an aspect of politics to which Cartier and Langevin devoted little attention. Both of them were accustomed to deal with the professional politicians of Quebec rather

<sup>148</sup>Collection Chapais, Dansereau to Langevin, Sept. 7, 1872.

<sup>149</sup>LaPierre, "Joseph-Israël Tarte," 91.

than with the populace.<sup>150</sup> Cartier had a generally conservative attitude toward law, society, and property. Even in his youth, Langevin had questioned the wisdom of extending the franchise to paupers whose vote would then equal that of wealthy men.<sup>151</sup>

A difference between the two men is sometimes found in their attitude towards the Church. Langevin is described as "très religieux."<sup>152</sup> He is accused of an alliance with the ultramontanes.<sup>153</sup> Cartier, on the other hand, is described as a religious moderate, with anti-clerical leanings. Yet this distinction is unfair. Cartier was quite willing to make use of the Church, and this was essentially Langevin's position in regard to the ultramontanes. Even his critics admit that he was not one himself. There is no record of his making an ultramontane speech, or even understanding ultramontanism. To Langevin, they were a group whose voting power had always belonged to the Conservative party, and whose support should still be enlisted. He believed in the Church, of course, and French Canada's special interests, but he was primarily interested in the ultramontanes as a political, not a religious, group. His troubles arose when other Conservatives attempted to exclude the ultramontanes—a step of which Cartier's very inclusive Conservatism, would have never approved.

Chapleau, on the other hand, for ideological reasons wished to detach the Castors from his supporters and coalesce with the moderate Liberals. Langevin was unable to appreciate the ideologies involved, and could only see that such a step would so confuse party in Quebec as to endanger the federal Conservatives. He insisted that the Conservative party be kept together. Chapleau reluctantly acquiesced, and from 1878 to 1882 despite the widening rift in the party, the two leaders were usually able and willing to co-operate. The same was not true of the two wings of the party, and when Chapleau arrived at Ottawa his strength no longer complemented Langevin's and the two men became competitors. Already the Castors had identified their cause with Langevin, and this identification remained, while the moderates in their turn had lined up behind Chapleau. It was a competition which Chapleau won. Here it is that Langevin differs most radically from Cartier. Cartier was accustomed to win his battles, but it can be suggested that Cartierism as practised by the master himself would have broken down under the impact of new ways and issues.<sup>154</sup> It was in the ascendancy he held over his province that Chapleau

<sup>150</sup>Cox, "The Election of 1886," 49.

<sup>151</sup>Collection Chapais, Langevin to Edmond Langevin, Aug. 13, 1850.

<sup>152</sup>L. O. David, *L'Union des Deux Canadas, 1841-1867* (Montreal, 1898), 170.

<sup>153</sup>LaPierre, "Joseph-Israël Tarte," 126.

<sup>154</sup>Cox, "The Election of 1886," 5.

finds his best title to the "manteau de Cartier," and even here he did not equal the old leader.

The other specific characteristic in which Langevin failed to follow Cartier was in his inability to achieve a position of equality with Macdonald. Cartier had not been a mere lieutenant in the Cabinet. Langevin was. He was invaluable in directing Quebec affairs, and Macdonald leaned heavily on him, but he was never responsible for policy. As he gained much of his political ideas and orientation from Cartier,<sup>155</sup> so he gained much of his political strength from Macdonald. It was not entirely a coincidence that Langevin's downfall came at a time when Macdonald was ill, and that he was forced out of the Cabinet within two months of the latter's death.

Langevin was one of those Quebec politicians who on arrival at Ottawa become identified with the national scene. Cartier accomplished this without losing his Quebec identification. Langevin lost touch, and in 1887 was forced to admit it. Chapleau, on the other hand, was never quite at home in Ottawa. Langevin and Cartier were much alike—both pragmatic, hard-working men, unaccustomed to theorizing. To the extent that he was able, Langevin followed Cartier. He was perhaps an unworthy follower, but he was closer in many ways than any of the others who have claimed that mantle. The two men had one final touch in common. Both saw their careers end in a scandalous revelation of corruption entered into for the sake of party.

<sup>155</sup>Cooper, "Political Ideas of Cartier," is the source for the statements on Cartier's position.

## The *Georgian* Affair: An Incident of the American Civil War

GUY MACLEAN

THE ACTIVITIES of Confederate agents in Canada during the American Civil War have never been fully explored for the simple reason that their very nature made secrecy necessary and publicity undesirable. A relatively minor incident which provides a small window into Confederate activities constitutes the subject of this study—the affair of the propeller *Georgian*, a vessel owned by a neutral British subject. The *Georgian* was suspected of being an intended Confederate privateer and as such was seized by the Canadian government which held it in custody until after the war when it was successfully claimed by the United States government as Confederate property. Were there a clearer record of the case, it would undoubtedly be one of considerable interest to students of international law.

In the early days of the Civil War there was little Confederate activity in British North America but as the tide began to turn in 1863, the Confederates were prepared to resort to reckless expedients in the North in order to relieve the pressure on their armies at home.<sup>1</sup> In the summer of 1864 a commission consisting of Colonel Jacob Thompson and Senator C. C. Clay was dispatched to Canada. Thompson, who had been Secretary of the Interior in the Buchanan administration before the war when he joined the Confederate Army, made his headquarters in Toronto while Clay spent most of his time in Montreal. They were supplied with large amounts of money and instructed to use it as they saw fit. Jefferson Davis' instructions to them were of a very general nature: "Confiding special trust in your zeal, discretion and patriotism, I hereby direct you to proceed at once to Canada, there to carry out such instructions as you have received from me

<sup>1</sup>L. B. Shippee, *Canadian-American Relations, 1849-1874* (New Haven, 1939), 137.

verbally, in such manner as shall seem most likely to conduce to the furtherance of the interests of the Confederate States of America which have been intrusted to you."<sup>2</sup>

Thompson, who appears to have been the more active of the two commissioners, was reasonably well satisfied with the results of his first few months in Canada. "I do not think," he reported, "my mission has been altogether fruitless."<sup>3</sup> His main efforts were spent in attempts to free the three thousand prisoners of war held on Johnson's Island, near Sandusky on Lake Erie. This coup was to have been followed by the release of another eight thousand Confederates in Camp Douglas, near Chicago, eight thousand more near Columbus, Ohio, and the four thousand at Camp Morton, near Indianapolis.<sup>4</sup> The main obstacle to the execution of this plan was the American gunboat *Michigan*. After one expedition against the *Michigan* failed dismally, Thompson purchased the steamer *Georgiana* through a Dr. James T. Bate. The American authorities became suspicious that the *Georgiana* was to be used against their cities and promptly warned the Canadian government which had the vessel kept under a close watch.<sup>5</sup> Thompson, recognizing that the plan could not be carried through, disposed of the *Georgiana* and reported to his superiors in Richmond that the Canadian government was making it impossible to continue such clandestine operations: "The bane and curse of carrying out anything in this country is the surveillance under which we act. Detectives or those ready to give information stand at every street corner. Two or three cannot interchange ideas without a reporter."<sup>6</sup> Some of the Confederates suspected that the Unionists had been informed of the plot by Godfrey Hyams, a Jewish shoemaker from Arkansas who had established the closest confidential relationship with Thompson.<sup>7</sup>

Thompson's complaints about the difficulties he was encountering demonstrated that the firmer policy of repression instituted by the

<sup>2</sup>Jefferson Davis to Jacob Thompson, April 27, 1864, *The War of the Rebellion: Official Record of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Series 4, vol. III, 322.

<sup>3</sup>Thompson to J. P. Benjamin, December 3, 1864, *Official Record*, Series 1, vol. XLIII, pt. II, 930.

<sup>4</sup>Charles E. Frohman, "Piracy on Lake Erie," *Inland Seas*, XIV (3), 175.

<sup>5</sup>For detailed descriptions of the attempts to rescue the Confederates from Johnson's Island, see W. F. Zornow, "Confederate Raiders on Lake Erie," *Inland Seas*, V (1), 41-7; V (2), 101-5; Charles E. Frohman, "Piracy on Lake Erie," *Inland Seas*, XIV (3), 172-80; W. F. Zornow, "John Wilson Murray and the Johnson's Island Plot," *Inland Seas*, VI (4), 249-57; W. M. Robinson, *The Confederate Privateers* (New Haven, 1928), 221-30.

<sup>6</sup>Thompson to Benjamin, December 3, 1864, *Official Record*, Series 1, vol. XLIX, pt. II, 934.

<sup>7</sup>John W. Headley, *Confederate Operations in Canada and New York* (New York, 1906), 281.



Canadian authorities late in 1864 was having a serious effect. The Union government had been justifiably apprehensive concerning the Confederates in Canada ever since Thompson had been sent there and the incidents on the Great Lakes (in addition to the raid on St. Albans in which Thompson played no part) seemed to confirm their worst fears. As the prospect of a Northern victory in the Civil War grew brighter, the American public became more aggressively anti-Canadian. Though the attitude of the Canadian government was recognized as having been correct and proper as befitted a neutral, the fact that Canada was being used as a base for operations on an increasingly dangerous scale could not be ignored. In Congress there was talk of ending the Rush-Bagot Agreement and of constructing an American fleet to patrol the Great Lakes. The British government hastily took steps to restore friendly relations by warning the Confederate government against further activities in the north and advising the Canadian government to pass legislation to provide stronger powers for the suppression of illegal border activities.<sup>8</sup> The reckless escapades of the Confederates were strongly condemned in Canada where there was some feeling that the Southerners were seriously endangering the safety of Canadians.<sup>9</sup>

Early in 1865 the Canadian legislature considered a proposal which would give the government the powers it needed to deal with persons who, "while availing themselves of the right of asylum which has always been allowed on British soil to political refugees from all foreign countries may be unmindful of the implied obligations, which by their residence among us, they contract to obey our laws and to respect the declared policy of our sovereign."<sup>10</sup> By early February "An Act for the prevention and repression of outrages in violation of the Peace on the frontier of this Province, and for other purposes" was in effect.<sup>11</sup> The act empowered the police to arrest any alien suspected of war-like activities who had refused to leave the country when ordered to do so. It provided also for a punishment of up to three years in jail and a fine of three thousand dollars for anyone who aided in any expedition or attack against the United States. One section of the act referred to vessels which might be intended for such expeditions and provided for their seizure if it were thought necessary. About a month later another act was passed in order to facilitate the summary punishment of aliens engaged in violation of Canada's neutral status.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>8</sup>J. M. Callahan, *American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations* (New York, 1937), 283-284.

<sup>9</sup>Shippee, *Canadian-American Relations*, 134.

<sup>10</sup>Quoted in Shippee, *Canadian-American Relations*, 154.

<sup>11</sup>Province of Canada, *Statutes*, 28 Vic., c. 1, 1-9.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 28 Vic., c. 2, 9-10.

This stricter policy on the part of the Canadian government apparently influenced Thompson's method of operation. His difficulties were many: his agents were put in jail, informers betrayed his schemes, and there were signs that most of his men who had not been jailed were known to the Union agents and were being closely observed. He concluded that there was little more that could be done by the men whom he had employed hitherto and he advised those who had not been caught to return to the Confederacy.<sup>13</sup> Thompson himself, while advising others to leave the country, did not follow suit but remained in Canada until March, 1865. During that time he seems to have adopted new tactics and to have screened his activities behind respected British subjects who sympathized with the Confederate cause and were willing to assist him. One of those who was most helpful was young George Taylor Denison, a member of a leading Toronto family, whom Thompson had met late in 1864.

Denison, throughout his long life, demonstrated an almost embarrassing enthusiasm for any cause which he supported and that for the Confederate States was no exception. His love of the South, which never grew cold and was stimulated in later years by the friendship of such eminent Southerners as Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, was initially inspired by a family tradition of anti-Americanism and distrust of American expansionist ambitions. As a child in a household of strong United Empire Loyalist traditions, he was reared on stories of the severe hardships suffered by his Loyalist forebears in the American Revolutionary War. His prejudice was strengthened by a belief that the United States as a nation was marked by a tendency toward territorial expansion and a desire to impose republican institutions upon the whole of the North American continent. The Civil War appeared to him a clear-cut illustration of these characteristics. It was natural, therefore, for Denison to have been anti-Unionist and to have been eager to assist the Confederates against their "northern oppressors." He met Thompson for the first time in November of 1864 and thereafter became deeply implicated in the activities of the Confederate organization in Toronto.<sup>14</sup>

He proved to be particularly helpful in the case of one Burley, a Scot who had been a participant in one of the ill-fated attempts to rescue the prisoners on Johnson's Island. Burley had been captured and placed in jail where he awaited extradition to the United States and a military trial. His one hope of avoiding extradition lay in recourse to a principle recognized in Canadian courts, which allowed that a case might be dismissed if there were proof that Confederate officers and men had been acting under Confederate government

<sup>13</sup>Headley, *Confederate Operations*, 308.

<sup>14</sup>Public Archives of Canada, Denison Papers, vol. 26, Diary, Nov.-Dec., 1864.

orders.<sup>15</sup> In Burley's case a messenger, Lieutenant S. B. Davis, was sent from Richmond with a communication from the President of the Confederacy which would be of some help. On arrival in Toronto Lieutenant Davis was introduced to Denison who kept him hidden in his home, "Heydon Villa," for several days.<sup>16</sup> When the young officer was ready to make the return trip, Mrs. Denison sewed some messages which Thompson had written on silk inside his clothing, and Denison took him to a remote station where he boarded the train. Davis managed to cross the border undetected, but was recognized at a station in Ohio by some former prisoners of the Andersonville camp where he had been aide-de-camp to the notorious commandant, Winder. Sentenced to death by court-martial, Davis eventually had his sentence commuted by Abraham Lincoln.

A few days after Davis had departed for the South, on January 17 to be exact, Denison purchased the vessel *Georgian* from a John Bates. It was awkward for Denison that a ship called the *Georgiana* had been involved earlier in the futile attempt against Johnson's Island. The similarity in names probably complicated his case later. The *Georgian*, when Denison purchased it, had been commonly referred to as a "pirate" and "privateer," and Denison himself later stated that he had had to show special care in selecting a trustworthy crew because the vessel had been under suspicion. The *Georgiana* had belonged to "Dr. J. B. Bate" and Denison had bought the *Georgian* from John Bates only a few weeks after Thompson had decided that they would have to get rid of the *Georgiana*. When Denison bought it, the vessel was tied up at Collingwood. In February he undertook to fit it out for spring operations and to hire a crew. After consultation with his new captain he decided that some structural changes were necessary and late in February he engaged a carpenter to make the necessary changes. Denison professed that he had been anxious that his crew be carefully handpicked in order to avoid any charge that the *Georgian* was to be used by the Confederates.<sup>17</sup> If this were true, then his choice of a carpenter to make the required alterations was extraordinarily inept. He decided to employ William ("Larry") MacDonald, a well-known Confederate agent who had fled into Canada after the widely publicized attempt to burn New York, a plot in which he had been deeply involved.<sup>18</sup>

While MacDonald was still busy making the alterations, the

<sup>15</sup>Shippee, *Canadian-American Relations*, 154; Headley, *Confederate Operations*, 321.

<sup>16</sup>C. T. Denison, *Soldiering in Canada* (Toronto, 1900), 60-5.

<sup>17</sup>Petition of George Taylor Denison, Jr., To The Honourable House of Assembly Praying Redress in the Matter of the Seizure of the Steamer "Georgian" (Toronto, 1865), 10.

<sup>18</sup>Philip van Doren Stern, ed., *Secret Missions of the Civil War* (New York, 1959), 257 ff.

*Georgian* was seized by the Canadian government on April 7, 1865. The government had acted under the terms of the act passed in February which had given it the power to seize any vessel which there was reason to believe might be used in an expedition against the United States.<sup>19</sup> The seizure was carried out by the Collector of Customs in Toronto, R. A. Spence, who acted on the order of either the Attorney General, John A. Macdonald, or the Solicitor General, James Cockburn. (It was never made clear which minister was responsible for both persistently refused to make any public statement.) Denison had been forewarned and was aboard the ship when Spence appeared to remove essential parts of the engine and to place the ship under the custody of the customs officials in Collingwood. His demands for an explanation from Spence were met by advice to seek the reasons in Quebec City. The Commissioner of Customs in Quebec told Denison that the vessel had been seized because he had been "suspected of having strong leanings and sympathies for the Confederate States and associated with Southerners resident in Canada."<sup>20</sup> The Solicitor General was out of town so Denison aired his complaint before Alexander Campbell, the Commissioner of Crown Lands, who ordered that the *Georgian* be released. Before this order could be put into effect, however, it was countermanded by the Solicitor General and the Postmaster General, and a few days later the government finally obtained a court order for the continued detention of the *Georgian* by producing a statement by Godfrey Hyams who swore that the vessel had been intended as a Confederate privateer.

Hyams in his sworn statement said that in December, several weeks before the vessel was sold to Denison, he had been given "a considerable quantity of munitions of war . . . including hand grenades, cartridges, powder and a sledge" with orders that they be put aboard the *Georgian*.<sup>21</sup> MacDonald was the man who had asked him to do this. He also told him that the vessel was being fitted out "for a raid or expedition from Collingwood . . . in aid of the so-called Confederate States of America." Hyams added that for some time past MacDonald had been manufacturing hand grenades and Greek fire shells in a house on the corner of Agnes and Teraulay Streets in Toronto. Such evidence was sufficient ground in the eyes of a judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Upper Canada to justify holding the *Georgian* in custody.

Denison had the right of appeal to the law courts but here he ran into difficulties. Two judges, one in Toronto and another in Simcoe County (where the seizure had occurred), refused to hear the case on

<sup>19</sup>Province of Canada, *Statutes*, 28 Vic., c. 1, s. 9, 6.

<sup>20</sup>*Petition of George Taylor Denison, Jr.*, 3.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 4.

the ground that they had no jurisdiction in the matter. After an unsuccessful petition for redress before the Assembly for Upper Canada, Denison finally had his case heard by Chief Justice William ("Sweet William") Draper of the Supreme Court of Upper Canada in February, 1866, almost a year after the seizure of the *Georgian*. In the meantime the Civil War had ended (in fact, only seven days after the *Georgian* had been seized) and the United States government in December, 1865, had begun proceedings to gain possession of the *Georgian* as Confederate property. Denison thus found himself involved in two court actions, one with the Canadian government over the seizure and detention of the ship, and the other with the American government over the question of ownership.

The affair was further complicated when Larry MacDonald, who had been arrested under the Alien Act, reversed his position while in jail and seriously weakened Denison's case. At the time of the *Georgian* seizure MacDonald had sworn that he had been hired by Denison purely in his capacity as a carpenter.<sup>22</sup> He admitted that he had been previously an agent of the Confederate government but that he had severed this connection completely before he had gone to work for Denison. However, when later he had appeared before a grand jury he changed his testimony and admitted that the *Georgian* had been intended as a Confederate raider. This confession seemed to be warranted considering the weight of evidence produced against him.<sup>23</sup> One witness told how he had helped MacDonald store ammunition in his house on Agnes Street where they had together lowered shells through a trap door and hidden them under water in the basement. A Toronto police sergeant testified that he had been led to the house by Hyams and had found no fewer than twenty-six shells hidden about the place.<sup>24</sup> The grand jury recommended that MacDonald should stand trial under the Alien Act and if found guilty be deported to the United States where he would face prosecution for his part in the Confederate plots both in Canada and New York. Denison suspected that MacDonald changed his story not because he was faced by overwhelmingly unfavourable evidence during the grand jury appearance but because he had been the victim of pressure from the attorneys for the United States. Denison claimed that the American lawyers had visited MacDonald in jail, and, anxious to obtain the *Georgian* for their government, had promised that if he would admit that the vessel had been intended all along as a Confederate raider they would guarantee that the charges against him in the United States would be dropped. If he insisted on his original story, they would see to it that the case

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>23</sup>*Evening Leader*, April 26, 1865.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, March 31, 1865.

would be pressed by the American government.<sup>25</sup> MacDonald apparently made up his mind to co-operate and upon his release from jail visited Denison. Denison claimed that the Americans were prepared to pay him two thousand dollars in addition to any expenses which he had incurred if he would say that he had been purely the nominal owner of the *Georgian* and that actual ownership had remained with the Confederates. He refused to collaborate even when approached by the American consul: "I told him I would never give in to the United States, if it took ten years hard work to recover the losses I should sustain in fighting them."<sup>26</sup>

The first of the two cases to be heard was Denison's suit against the Canadian government for unlawful seizure and unnecessary detention of the vessel over a seven-month period.<sup>27</sup> Denison argued before the court that he was the legitimate owner of the *Georgian* and that he had intended the vessel for ordinary commerce. He produced witnesses who testified that the structural changes were ones which would have made the ship more seaworthy if it were to be engaged in the carrying trade. Denison also pointed out that he had suffered a considerable financial loss since the ship had been held in custody when it might have been profitably engaged in lake shipping.

The Canadian government presentation was made by R. A. Harrison, a Toronto lawyer who was not to hear the last of either Denison or the *Georgian* for some time. His task was a relatively simple one since he merely had to show that the government's suspicions were reasonable at the time and that the seizure was, therefore, legally carried out. The testimony of Spence, the Collector of Customs, demonstrated that the circumstances (MacDonald's presence on the ship, the work which he was doing, and the discovery of the munitions in his home) were enough to justify his decision to place the vessel under guard. MacDonald testified that the *Georgian* had been held by the Confederates until January, 1865, when it had been thought advisable to transfer the ownership to some British subject friendly to the Confederacy. He swore that he had arranged the whole matter, that he had told Bates what to ask and Denison what to offer. In handing down his decision Chief Justice Draper apparently preferred to avoid some of the key questions in the case and confined himself to a consideration of whether or not the Canadian government had been justified in seizing the vessel. He concluded that the government had acted within the law. He did not address himself to the question of whether or not the government had been acting legally in keeping the vessel in detention

<sup>25</sup>*Leader*, Jan. 3, 1866.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, Jan. 2, 1866.

<sup>27</sup>Upper Canada Queen's Bench, *Reports*, XXV, 319-23.



for seven months, long after the war had ended and during a time when there was no longer any danger from border activities in violation of Canada's position of neutrality.

Meanwhile evidence was being taken in the other case, that of the *United States v. Denison*, which was tried in Chancery Court before Chancellor Vankoughnet.<sup>28</sup> Before any decision was handed down in that case, however, Denison resorted to rather dubious means in an attempt to force the Canadian government to compensate him for the loss of revenue while the *Georgian* was held in custody. He brought political pressure to bear on the Prime Minister himself.

In the spring of 1867 Denison decided that he would stand as a Conservative candidate in the constituency of Toronto West and he wrote to Sir John A. Macdonald asking for the party chieftain's official blessing.<sup>29</sup> Macdonald did not commit himself immediately. He first consulted with the party leaders in Toronto and then gave his support, not to Denison, but rather to R. A. Harrison who had argued the government's case before Chief Justice Draper. He candidly explained to Denison that there had been general agreement in Toronto that Harrison had a better chance than Denison of winning the seat for the Conservatives and expressed the hope that Denison as a "good party man" would accept that decision.<sup>30</sup> Denison, who was keenly disappointed, was not prepared to step aside. "My family," he wrote angrily, "have been staunch Conservatives in Canada since the year 1792 and it seems rather hard that an attempt should have been made to kick us out of the party we have always been with, by ill treatment."<sup>31</sup> At the same time Denison left the door open for compromise and implied that his agreement to leave the field to Harrison could be had in return for a favour: "You have got Mr. R. A. Harrison in a false position by running against his word [?], a fact that will seriously injure his election unless you smooth the way for my releasing him of his promise." Harrison for one was impressed by this threat. He was quite certain that if Denison were a candidate he would split the Conservative vote sufficiently to result in the election of the Liberal candidate. Accordingly he urged Macdonald to placate Denison with some promise of compensation in the *Georgian* affair. Early in July he wrote:

Denison is still distracting my attention and I fear is encouraged to some extent by the Mayor. But a promise in the matter of the *Georgian* will put him all right. What he requires is (1) that the government should so far as they can

<sup>28</sup>Denison Papers, vol. 26, Diary, March 13-21, May 2, 1866; July 24-31, 1867.

<sup>29</sup>P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, vol. 340, 60, Denison to Macdonald, May 9, 1867.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, vol. 513, 663-4, Macdonald to Denison, June 5, 1867 (copy).

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, vol. 340, 141, Denison to Macdonald, June 30, 1867.

withdraw in his favour and let him fairly and squarely fight the Government of the United States as to the ownership of the boat, (2) that his claim to damages should be referred to the provincial or other arbitrators appointed by the government. I apprehend that his views on both these points could be to some extent met and if met he promises not only to withdraw from opposition but give me all the support in his power. Nothing but a promise is expected until after the election.

In this same letter Harrison made some remarkable observations on the *Georgian* case itself. He argued that Denison's claim should be given serious consideration by Macdonald not only because it was politically expedient to do so, but also because it had some legal merit. Coming as they did from the lawyer who had successfully argued the government side in the case, his comments are of considerable interest. "Let Denison fight the Government of the United States," Harrison advised Macdonald.

Our government has no claim to the property of the vessel. I believe myself that the injunction on which the vessel was seized was false. This conclusion of course has been arrived at by facts which have transpired since the seizure. Then as to the damage if the seizure was in any sense illegal though perhaps justified by political necessity he should be paid some damages. He expended a considerable sum of money in putting her in repair. Consider this well and write such a letter as your judgement dictates.<sup>32</sup>

Macdonald characteristically did not act immediately and so Harrison wrote a few days later to stress the need to satisfy Denison before he could do real harm to the party's chances in Toronto by offering himself as a candidate. "It is important," warned Harrison, "that you satisfy him in one way or another. Enclosed you will find a copy of the address which he was about to issue to the electors of West Toronto. If issued during the general campaign it would most assuredly have a bad effect in deluding from me some ultra conservatives."<sup>33</sup> Harrison's second appeal appears to have had some effect. Macdonald made no promises regarding the *Georgian*, but in conversation seems to have intimated to Denison that he might well expect to be appointed to the post of Assistant Adjutant General of Cavalry. The astute Prime Minister knew that this was just the sort of promise which would have the greatest appeal for Denison who was by instinct as well as training a keen soldier. He was indeed pleased by the prospect but somewhat bothered by the lack of any promise in writing. He therefore asked for some more definite undertaking. "You may remember," he reminded Macdonald, "that in my conversation with you in Toronto, you volunteered to have me appointed as Assistant Adjutant General (at my request for the Cavalry) and you said that

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, vol. 340, 158-65, Harrison to Macdonald, July 2, 1867.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, vol. 340, 178-80, Harrison to Macdonald, July 5, 1867.

when you went up to Ottawa you would have a letter written to me from the Militia department offering me the appointment. I was then to write down accepting it and the matter was to lay quiet until after the elections when I was to be formally gazetted."<sup>34</sup> Denison was insistent upon the need for a written promise: "Please have the letter about the . . . matter sent to me as I feel anxious to get it on a proper footing. As it stands I have your promise which will be all right if nothing happens to you, but the business like way is the best." This plea was met by silence. Nevertheless, relying on Macdonald's oral promise, Denison worked hard on behalf of Harrison in the election campaign and the latter won the seat. Denison, however, did not win his reward. When the post of Assistant Adjutant General was finally filled, he was dismayed to find that the appointment had gone to a Permanent Force officer. He was not prepared to accept Macdonald's soothing explanation that the appointment had constituted an internal promotion and had been necessary for better morale.<sup>35</sup> In disgust he resigned from the militia.<sup>36</sup> On the whole, the incident had done credit to neither Macdonald nor Denison. Certainly it had been of no material benefit to Denison for the government's stubborn stand on the *Georgian* affair remained unchanged and he had meanwhile lost the substance (compensation for unfair detention) while grasping for the shadow of Macdonald's promise.

In fact within a few months Denison's position was much worse than it had been. On November 1, 1867, Chancellor Vankoughnet finally handed down a ruling in the case of *United States v. Denison* at Hamilton.<sup>37</sup> Denison was ordered to deliver the *Georgian* into the hands of the United States government and to pay Colonel Thompson, the holder of his promissory notes for the *Georgian*, the sum of thirteen thousand dollars. Despite this unexpected, heavy blow, Denison fought grimly on. He petitioned Parliament which set up a select committee to look into his claims for compensation of loss sustained due to the seven months' detention of his ship. The committee which reported to the House of Commons in May, 1868, found that the only substantial ground for seizure had been the evidence provided by Hyams whom the committee considered to be absolutely

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, vol. 340, 296-9, Denison to Macdonald, Aug. 13, 1867.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, vol. 515, 399, Macdonald to Denison, January 11, 1868 (copy).

<sup>36</sup>Denison later described the circumstances of his resignation rather differently in his military memoirs (see *Soldiering in Canada*, 170-5). A short time after this incident he and several young men formed Canada First. It is quite likely that part at least of Denison's disillusionment with the traditional political parties in Canada and his readiness to participate in a new movement was born of his disappointment and anger at Macdonald's double-dealing. The incident thus provides an interesting footnote to Canadian political history (see G. M. Hougham, "Canada First: A Minor Party In Microcosm," *C. J. E. P. S.*, XIX (2), 174-84).

<sup>37</sup>Denison Papers, Scrapbooks, 1862-70, vol. 32, 12.

untrustworthy.<sup>38</sup> The committee had summoned the officials responsible for ordering the seizure to appear before them to see if they could throw more light on the affair, but both Macdonald and James Cockburn declined the invitation "alleging as a reason that the public interest required them not to make any further communication in support of the grounds on which the Government acted in the matter."<sup>39</sup> The committee had come to the conclusion that there might have been just cause for having seized the *Georgian* in the first place, but that there was absolutely no reason why it should have been held over a seven-month period. Therefore, they recommended to the House that Denison be paid the sum of \$4,359.50 to cover legal expenses, as well as probable lost revenue.

Evidently no action was taken on the committee's recommendation since Denison went into bankruptcy a year later. He had contemplated appealing the case to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council where, as he said in his notice of insolvency, he was confident "Chancellor Vankoughnet's judgement would doubtless have been reversed."<sup>40</sup> He persisted in appeals to Macdonald asking for justice. The Prime Minister continued to be evasive: "The oracle cannot as yet, give any response, but I hope will be able to do so ere long."<sup>41</sup> The last bitter word on the matter appears to have been that of Denison when he wrote to Macdonald in January, 1870: "I write again to ask if you cannot settle my claim for me. I am sure it could be done at once, if you made up your mind to settle it and have done with it. It is several years now since you promised me and you cannot say I have not been patient. I have always been a friend of yours and have always worked for you. You might just as well keep me as one as well as not especially as I only ask for justice. I have lost more than I expect to get from you, so I only will get my own back when you pay me. Let me hear from you soon."<sup>42</sup> Presumably Denison did not hear from Macdonald for in 1872 he broke with the Conservative party and ran unsuccessfully as a Liberal candidate in Algoma. Though the reason given was his dissatisfaction over the Conservative policy on Louis Riel, obviously his personal disagreement with Macdonald would have bulked large. Denison, however, did not hold a grudge against Sir John A. for long, and was in later life one of his greatest admirers, though whenever he mentioned his name he almost invariably (and understandably) added with a smile, "the old rascal".<sup>43</sup>

<sup>38</sup>Canada, House of Commons, *Votes and Proceedings*, May 18, 1868, No. 81, 401-2.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, 402.

<sup>40</sup>Denison Papers, Scrapbooks, 1862-70, vol. 32, 12.

<sup>41</sup>Macdonald Papers, vol. 516, 607, Macdonald to Denison, Nov. 27, 1869 (copy).

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, vol. 342, 350. Denison to Macdonald, Jan. 13, 1870.

<sup>43</sup>Private information supplied by George Denison's daughter, Mrs. A. W. Langmuir.

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## Reviews

### North American

*The History of the Hudson's Bay Company 1670-1870. II. 1763-1870.* By E. E. RICH. London: The Hudson's Bay Record Society. 1959. Pp. xii, 974, xv, maps, illus.

THIS CONCLUDING VOLUME of Professor Rich's history tells the story of the Hudson's Bay Company's second century. It falls naturally into two parts or books, the first entitled "Rivalry with Montreal, 1763-1820," and the second, "Company Rule, 1821-1870." The dividing point is, of course, the coalition with the Montreal traders, in the form of the North West Company, in 1821.

Much of the story has been told before; but, especially in the first part, Professor Rich tells it much more completely, with much greater authority, and with better perspective. His knowledge of the Company and its activities is immense, and on the whole he has resolved very wisely the difficult and ever present problem of deciding when to generalize and when to go into detail. The general reader may find the history as a whole too long (more than 1600 pages in all); but the purpose of writing it was to describe the Company's activities over a period of two centuries as completely as the space available in two stout volumes would permit. This commission the author has carried out most successfully.

Attention is not centred on the Company in any narrow way. Thus in the long and frequently fascinating account of the rivalry with the Montreal traders, the North West Company is dealt with almost as thoroughly as the Hudson's Bay Company. Indeed, a good many aspects of its policies, operations, and finances are better described here than anywhere else. Fundamentally, the rivalry was between a relatively small concern that held firmly to its well entrenched position on Hudson Bay, and a much larger but more loosely knit organization that was sweeping across the vast expanses of the interior, and appeared to many to be outflanking its opponent at every turn. The figures given as to the relative size of the two companies are startling. As early as 1795 it was estimated that the North West Company controlled eleven-fourteenths of the fur trade, whereas the Hudson's Bay Company enjoyed only two-fourteenths, and independent traders the remaining one-fourteenth. Again, in 1800, the furs imported into Britain by the Hudson's Bay Company were valued at about £38,000, whereas those imported from Canada were worth no less than £231,000. But the North West Company incurred costs that were more than proportionate to its share of the trade. In particular, "the costs of the long transport route from Montreal were such that only magnificent returns could make the system pay." The Hudson's Bay Company, limited in scale though it may have been, was economically sounder, and this was proven in the end when in effect it absorbed its huge rival.

Its great asset was the cheaper Hudson Bay supply route, and this was one of the vital things it contributed to the coalition in 1821.

New light is thrown on many other matters along the way. To cite two examples: A good deal of information emerges about Sir Alexander Mackenzie, who has always been a somewhat mysterious figure; and we learn much that is new about his relations not only with the Hudson's Bay Company, but with the XY Company and the North West Company as well. The negotiations for the coalition of 1821 are described in detail, and the steps by which what was essentially a trading agreement gave way by 1824 to complete unity under the Hudson's Bay Company is made clear.

The second half of the book parallels in great part John S. Galbraith's *The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor, 1821-1869*, reviewed in this journal in 1959. With Galbraith's general thesis—that the Hudson's Bay Company held off its competitors much more by its commercial competence than by its rights and privileges under its charter—Rich agrees, and his own account of the period makes the soundness of this view still more evident. Perhaps because much of the story is relatively familiar, the author seems to have been less interested in some aspects of this period than in other matters. At times the treatment is somewhat perfunctory, and the writing is inferior to that in many of the chapters earlier in the volume. But in spite of this the narrative makes striking contributions to a better understanding of the Company and its activities.

George Simpson is of course the central character, and the portrait of him that emerges is of great interest. It is clear that Professor Rich does not like Simpson (perhaps no one did), but this does not prevent him from appreciating fully both his capabilities and the remarkable things he did for the Company. Simpson was an expert picker of brains; he had an astonishing ability to grasp the essentials of a situation; and he dropped ideas and policies without compunction once it became clear that they were unsound. He was in great part responsible for working out the trading policies and strategy that the Company followed after the coalition, and his successes and failures are dealt with here more clearly and perceptively than ever before. On this continent the man was to a great extent the Company. One longs for an adequate biography of him, and yet it remains to be seen whether a biography, if and when it is written, can be much more than another history of the Company.

Two areas loom large in the later part of the narrative—the Columbia district and the Red River settlement. The great economic importance of the former to the Company is made clear, as is the shrewdness with which Simpson seized upon the possibilities of a country that virtually everyone else regarded as a liability. Many points about the Red River are clarified, and the whole story is told from the time Selkirk first became interested in establishing a colony there to the Riel resistance of 1870 and the end of Company rule.

From the historian's point of view, the lack of notes and documentation is the great disappointment of the book. Professor Rich has explained that his narrative is based primarily on the Company's own archives, which can be consulted only in London or (on microfilm) in Ottawa, where complete details of the sources used are to be available. But the lack of references is nevertheless much to be regretted. Some knowledge of the type of document a statement is based upon can frequently be useful, even if the document itself is not immediately available. And the lack of notes is doubly unfortunate because the other major work in the field, *A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71*, published some twenty years ago by Arthur S. Morton, is also without detailed notes. This makes it



impossible, amongst other things, to judge the evidence on a point upon which Rich and Morton differ—as they not infrequently do.

A few slips were noted. Cook's third voyage, referred to in two contexts, is wrongly dated. Fort Vancouver is shown at the mouth of the Fraser instead of the mouth of the Columbia on one of the maps. But the standard of accuracy is very high indeed, and a formidable mass of details has been handled with great skill.

It should be noted that circulation of the history is not to be limited to members of the Hudson's Bay Record Society. A trade edition has been issued; this is published in Canada by McClelland & Stewart, Toronto (\$35.00 the set). In the trade edition each part of the very bulky second volume has been bound separately, and the set thus consists of three volumes instead of two.

W. KAYE LAMB

Public Archives of Canada  
Ottawa

*The Founding of Canada: Beginnings to 1815.* By STANLEY B. RYERSON. Toronto: Progress Books. 1960. Pp. xii, 340, maps, illus. \$3.00 paper, \$5.00 cloth.

WITH ITS SWIFT AND FORCEFUL STYLE, this book could be described as curiously interesting and suggestive, but predetermined and predicative all the way to the last line. It is a sociological study of Canadian economic and political evolution based on the Marxist interpretation of history. Starting from the bedrock of the Canadian shield, it comes along selecting phases and facts of the Indian régime, French colonization, and British expansion, phases and facts suitable to its socialistic elaboration. But whatever periods or institutions the author reviews, his conclusion—the people's exploitation by ruling classes—is automatic. It becomes a kind of repetitive chorus to all his chapters. In reaching such a finale, there unfortunately intervene, more or less unconsciously, inaccuracies, misinterpretations of facts, and undocumented assertions. Here are but a few instances: the wrong report of men being shot for blasphemy at Quebec (120) and a description of the seigneurial régime as "a system of feudal exploitation" (p. 107). On the contrary, while some seigneurs and their daughters had to plough their own land, their *censitaires* or land tenants were growing prosperous enough to buy seigneuries and independent enough to be taxed with insubordination. Or what about styling the American rebels as the victims of "English pillagers . . . and enslavement" (p. 210), when documentary history shows they only revolted to protect their tax exemptions and free smuggling. With his extensive information and keen mind the author has unfortunately missed a fine opportunity to pen a more detached story of Canada's march to democracy.

GUSTAVE LANCTOT

Ottawa

*Dollard, est-il un mythe?* By LIONEL GROULX. Montreal: Editions Fides. 1960. Pp. 60, \$0.75.

OF ALL THE PENS that gladly leap from their clips to avenge even a word that threatens Dollard with insult, that of Canon Groulx has ever been foremost. It

would have been surprising therefore had he not commemorated, in this ter-centenary year, the famous "exploit du Long-Sault," especially since controversy has flared again. Did Dollard lead a hopeless and sacrificial military expedition to save the colony from an Iroquois invasion? Or did he set out instead to intercept the annual Iroquois hunting party? Forty years ago Canon Groulx took his stand unequivocally in defence of the first proposition. Now he reiterates it again. Indeed, *Dollard, est-il un mythe?* is almost an exact reproduction of "Le Dossier de Dollard" (*Notre Maître le Passé*, 2e série, Montréal: Granger, 1936, pp. 24-53), some of the paragraphs being repeated verbatim.

Of course, Dollard is not a myth, nor was he "un simple mercanti"; instead, he was the saviour of the colony. Thus runs the author's thesis, both in the "Dossier" and in this new pamphlet. Yet this time Canon Groulx makes a few significant changes. In the "Dossier," quoting Faillon, he had claimed, as a source on Dollard, Bl. Marguerite Bourgeois' *Ecrits Autographes*, "mémoires étonnants au surplus de vigueur et de lucidité" (p. 46). In fact, the *Ecrits* describe instead the capture of Brigadier Brigeac. Now Canon Groulx allows that "la bonne Mère a pu oublier le nom du commandant" (p. 25). He also concedes that there was no Iroquois army of invasion: "Ne parlons point, si l'on veut, d'une armée de guerriers iroquois" (p. 30). In the "Dossier," he had referred to "l'armée d'invasion" (p. 40) and "une invasion iroquoise jointe au péril d'un massacre général" (p. 38). Above all he now admits that the "hypothèse fourrure" is at least possible: "Donc expédition principalement militaire. Est-ce à dire pour autant que les combattants du Long-Sault n'aient pas ambitionné, du même coup, faire une généreuse cueillette de fourrures? Il ne faut pas craindre ici de l'avouer: l'ambition est plausible, certaine" (p. 35). He even says that he knew it all along, and had written so; but that in 1932 when composing the "Dossier," he had been asked by Aegidius Fauteux "de supprimer ces pages de mon manuscrit" (p. 36).

But despite these variations, Canon Groulx has not changed the main theme. He also continues to write in the tone of polemics. His opponents "s'expriment du ton le plus péremptoire et du plus tranchant" (p. 8), they should "commencer par se démythiser eux-mêmes" (p. 12) etc. etc. The booklet remains accordingly one side of the story. It also makes one wonder whether Dollard's heroic shade will ever find the rest which the "glorieux fait d'armes" of 1660 has so richly earned him.

JACQUES MONET, S.J.

University of Toronto

*The Blessed Communion: The Origins and History of the Diocese of Montreal, 1760-1960.* By JOHN IRWIN COOPER. Montreal: Archives' Committee of the Diocese of Montreal. 1960. Pp. viii, 266, maps, illus. Available from Anglican House, Montreal, \$4.00.

THE SUBTITLE OF THIS BOOK accurately describes the contents. The origins of the Diocese of Montreal are found in the ninety years which followed the capture of the city in 1760; the history of the Diocese covers the years 1850-1960. In the first section, roughly the first quarter of the volume, the author begins with the ministry of John Ogilvie, military chaplain in Montreal, 1760-1764, and goes on to describe the life and times of the French-speaking rector, David Chabrand Delisle. He then tells of the six years when Montreal was administered by the

Bishop of Nova Scotia (1787-1793) and the fifty-seven years when it formed part of the Diocese of Quebec. In this section the episcopates of Charles Inglis, Jacob Mountain, Charles James Stewart, and George J. Mountain are sketched as they relate to the area covered by the present Diocese. The first section contains as well a valuable chapter entitled "Sabrevois" which outlines the rise and fall of Anglican work among French Canadians.

The second and larger section of the book tells much about the seven men who have occupied the Anglican see of Montreal: Fulford, Oxenden, Bond, Carmichael, Farthing, Carlisle, and the present Archbishop, John Dixon. The contribution of each to the Church's welfare is carefully chronicled. Included in the story are numerous shorter accounts of church schools, private schools, and the Diocesan Theological College; of the development of synod with its funds and missionary and social service activities; of the time when Montreal was a fixed metropolitan see; of the Woman's Auxiliary, the religious orders, the Fellowship of the West, and the Hebrew Christian Mission.

Professor Cooper handles the great mass of source material in the manner of a competent and experienced social historian. He preserves his objectivity and does not hesitate to point out where, in his opinion, the Church's leaders and people succumbed to short-sightedness and lack of faith. But he is clearly absorbed in his theme and conveys that absorption to the reader through vivid phrases, picturesque stories, and the choice of fresh new subject matter. The author, who is also an artist, has prepared several maps which add to the history's usefulness. The chief virtue of the book, in the eye of this reviewer, lies in its presentation of the Church not as remote from the workaday world but as carrying on its tasks within the ebb and flow of historic events, adapting itself unwearingly to changing circumstances and developing new institutions to meet new needs.

Hasty publication is indicated by several misprints and misspellings. A comparison of the names of clergy in Appendix G (pp. 235-6) with those printed in Fennings Taylor's *The Last Three Bishops Appointed by the Crown* (p. 130) and in Fulford's *Sermons and Addresses* (pp. 215-16) reveals a number of discrepancies. These are, however, small blemishes on a diocesan history which is by far the best so far produced by Canadian Anglicanism and which, it is hoped, will serve as a model for future histories of its type.

THOMAS R. MILLMAN

Wycliffe College

*The Selected Writings of William Lyon Mackenzie, 1824-1837.* Edited by MARGARET FAIRLEY. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1960. Pp. 383, illus. \$6.50.

THE EDITOR'S PRINCIPLE of selection is nowhere stated, but the apparent purpose of this book is to show the many sides of William Lyon Mackenzie before his ill-starred rebellion. Given the multiplicity of Mackenzie's interests and his *furore scribendi*, the editor is confronted with an embarrassment of riches. Mackenzie's mind has been described as a filing cabinet where facts were stored in quantity but without order or discrimination, to be drawn on in the same manner on any and every occasion. Perhaps it was his advocacy of so many causes which robbed him of immediate victory in any one.

Mackenzie's approach to life was usually negative. He was against much (and in truth there was much to be against in this period)—mercantilism, intemperance, slavery, bad manners, monopolies, illiteracy, poor communications, paper money, land policy, hyphenated nationalism, misrule in Ireland, sectarian education, imperial tariff policy, privilege, over-centralized government, and so forth. Even such a partial catalogue suggests the catholicity—or is it confusion—of Mackenzie's interests. It is more difficult to state what he was for, but his faith seemed to revolve around the efficacy of education and the printed word, the virtue of an independent yeomanry, the universal thirst for liberty, the omnipotence of God, and the inspiration of Robert Burns.

The selections are arranged topically under such broad headings as "The Canadian Scene," "Books and Newspapers," "Appeals to the People," and "Current Comment." Perhaps the more valuable sections are those exemplifying Mackenzie's deep interest in education and foreign affairs—two aspects of his thought which have received less attention in the past. The editor has drawn largely from his printed works, especially the *Colonial Advocate*, but a few excerpts are from manuscript sources in the Canadian and Ontario Archives. The contents are well balanced to show Mackenzie's gradual change from moderation to radicalism under the spur of exasperation and frustration. The editor has eschewed the temptation to use the book as a sounding-board for such political opinions as one might expect from a contributor to *New Horizons*. The net result is a useful and attractively produced volume which will be of interest to the general reader and of value as a ready reference to the student. A second volume of Mackenzie's writings after the Rebellion would provide an instructive comparison.

JOHN S. MOIR

Carleton University

*Letters of Francis Parkman*. Edited and with an Introduction by WILBUR R. JACOBS. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press in co-operation with the Massachusetts Historical Society [Toronto: Burns & MacEachern Ltd.]. 1960. Two volumes. Pp. lxi, 204, xl, 286, illus. \$15.50.

DURING THE PAST DECADE books and articles on Francis Parkman or his works, the multi-volume series *France and England in North America*, have been appearing relentlessly. Nearly all these studies have been highly laudatory; in fact, there now appears to be a flourishing Parkman cult. But leaving aside the question of whether or not Parkman's historical works are the definitive studies that Professor Jacobs appears to consider them to be, the fact remains that Parkman is a commanding figure in American literature. Professor Jacobs is, therefore, to be congratulated for the painstaking scholarship that has gone into the collecting and annotating of these letters. He states in an editorial note that his intention has been "to make easily available all of the preserved letters of Parkman that have literary merit or reveal, so far as letters can, significant information about his life, his work or his times. . . . As a result this edition may be considered an autobiography in the form of letters."

This it certainly is. Beginning with letters written when Parkman was an undergraduate at Harvard—which clearly show his gifts for graphic description—they go on to reveal, at an early date, his preoccupation with his health. (Professor Jacobs, in his Introduction, discusses at some length and with the benefit of

expert medical advice, the nature of Parkman's peculiar malady; it is most revealing.) Then follow letters dealing with his early research for the volume on Pontiac; letters written while on the Oregon trail; letters dealing with the progress of his research and writing; family letters; impressions while abroad; and several letters, amongst the most interesting, wherein Parkman gives his views on contemporary America. From them all emerges an intriguing picture of a great literary artist, and his environment. No student of the nineteenth-century American scene can afford to ignore them.

W. J. ECCLES

University of Alberta

*Alexander Mackenzie: Clear Grit.* By DALE C. THOMSON. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited. 1960. Pp. xli, 436. \$6.75.

THIS WELCOME VOLUME fills what has been until now a regrettable gap in Canadian historiography. The only other life of Mackenzie, by Buckingham and Ross, was published nearly seventy years ago and, while Professor Thomson's copious documentation testifies to its continuing usefulness as a reference, it exhibits most of the defects and few of the virtues of late Victorian biographical writing. Certainly it failed to immortalize Alexander Mackenzie, who has been largely obscured by the more glittering personality and achievements of Sir John A. Macdonald. One's belief that this relative obscurity is by no means wholly undeserved survives a reading of Mr. Thomson's book, which does, however, furnish what has been much needed—a good treatment of Mackenzie himself and of his prime ministership from 1873 to 1878.

In recent years substantial documentary collections relating to Mackenzie's life and career have become available and the author has made excellent use of these to give us a well-organized and competently written narrative. His style has a certain sparseness and angularity, not entirely inappropriate to his subject, but it is almost always clear and the story moves along at a good pace, skilfully enlivened by anecdote and aptly chosen quotations.

It is, of course, the story of a self-made man, an immigrant Scottish stonemason who, by combining no little natural ability with all the familiar Puritan virtues and a certain amount of luck, scaled the political heights of his adopted country. How he scaled them is interesting but less so than what he did and what happened to him when he got to the top. To this phase of Mackenzie's career, his five years in office, Professor Thomson devotes nearly half of his biography. Such an allotment of space may seem disproportionate and the fewer than fifty pages given to the last fifteen years of Mackenzie's life perfunctory by comparison but it was as prime minister, after all, that the man left his mark and not as a defeated politician in almost total eclipse, which he was after 1878.

Professor Thomson's account of the vicissitudes and accomplishments of the Mackenzie administration is the best yet written; it is especially helpful in unravelling the tangled and protracted dispute with British Columbia over the Pacific railway, with all its political and constitutional ramifications. But it is both less critical and less analytical than one might wish. Mr. Thomson is not at all unique among biographers in identifying himself closely and sympathetically with his subject, in refusing to bow down before the goddess of "objectivity." Still, it is fair to remark that one finds here, in all essentials, the conventional "Grit interpretation," with the Liberal forces drawn up in battle array behind a leader

of stainless integrity against the Tory forces of evil led by a bibulous, if clever, opportunist.

In 1878 the Liberal government, which had come to power with such high hopes five years before, was decisively rejected by the voters. It is its failure to probe the reasons for this downfall, and particularly the responsibility Mackenzie himself may have borne for it, which is the chief shortcoming of the book. There was, of course, the commercial depression and Macdonald's shrewd exploitation of it with his promise of a National Policy. There is the further fact that some of Mackenzie's colleagues left a lot to be desired, either in ability or in loyalty to their chief. But one feels there is more to it than that and that Mackenzie's leadership of the party was perhaps also an important factor. That he was able, conscientious, and honest, that he was sorely beset by a host of difficulties, is beyond question but one remains sceptical that he ever really became, in Professor Thomson's phrase, "a Dominion-wide statesman," that as a leader he was capable of transforming his party, as he needed to do, from a collection of provincially-oriented segments into a truly national entity with a national outlook.

One may mention, as well, a number of statements which might be clarified or corrected in later printings. The impression is given (pp. 105-6) that Macdonald in 1867 "yearned to be free" of the "petticoat regime" of his wife Agnes but this is not substantiated by the pages in Donald Creighton's *The Old Chieftain* to which the reader is referred. The description of Donald Smith as "Canadian vice-president of the Hudson's Bay Company" (p. 114) seems out of keeping with the nomenclature used by that Company and Macdonald's famous last words in the session of 1878 ("That fellow Smith is the biggest liar I ever met.") are incorrectly quoted (p. 327). Smith, incidentally, was as yet neither knight nor baron in 1885 (p. 385), nor was Sir Richard Cartwright, at 56, "old" in 1891 (p. 389). One would gather (p. 188) that the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 was not in effect during the American Civil War. In attempting to obtain "the remaining Hudson's Bay Company lands in the North West," presumably the Company's five per cent of the fertile belt, Mackenzie surely had not the intention attributed to him: "To assure orderly colonization, he wanted all the land to be in the hands of the new North West Territories Government" (p. 238).

Again, one doubts that free trade was being practised in 1875 (p. 249) or that by 1878 "a bond of solidarity and understanding approaching affection had grown" between Mackenzie and Edward Blake (p. 319). And one is puzzled by the description of a Mackenzie speech denouncing tariff protection as "an able statement of British *laissez-faire* philosophy from the workingman's point of view" (p. 334), since the viewpoint of the Canadian worker on tariff policy was probably rather different from that of his British counterpart. Finally, two typographical errors, one rather serious, the other less so, may be noted. Mackenzie preferred, not a "non-secular" system of education (p. 136), but a non-sectarian one, while if "the manager of the local railway was disgruntled because the Liberals had appointed him to the Senate" (p. 316), that must surely have been the only case of such disgruntlement in Canadian history!

When all this is said, however, the fact remains that, despite such errors and ambiguities, as well as certain interpretations to which some readers will take exception, Professor Thomson has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of the period with which he deals and to our knowledge of a man who deserves to be better remembered than he has been until now.

ROGER GRAHAM

University of Saskatchewan



*From Sea unto Sea: The Road to Nationhood, 1850-1910.* By W. G. HARDY. Canadian History Series edited by THOMAS B. COSTAIN, IV. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. [Toronto: Doubleday Publishers]. 1960. Pp. 528. \$6.00.

PERHAPS IT IS uncharitable, as it is certainly futile, to expect accurate scholarship or sound judgment from this popular work. The author thinks that the St. Albans raid frightened the Quebec Conference into final agreement. Canada was apparently independent by 1910. Professor Hardy is an amateur—it is not his fault that the dust jacket describes him as “a distinguished Canadian historian”—and is entitled to amateur opinions.

Admirers of his novels will be disappointed, however, in this book. There are too many heroes and the author has been uncertain about the choice of a plot. Revolt against the “Laurentian school” is perhaps overdue. Still, it seems excessive to write more at length about the acquisition of the West in 1870-1 than about the rest of Confederation, to describe the Bering Sea sealing dispute more fully than the National Policy tariff, or to give more attention to Poundmaker than to Edward Blake. Moreover, within this regional bias the emphasis is capricious. Half the account of Sifton's immigration policy is devoted to the Barr and the Doukhobor colonies. Sitting Bull's incursion into Canada is given prominent treatment; land policy and the government of the North West Territories are barely mentioned. Premier Norquay receives less attention than Chief Wandering Spirit. When the author turns to eastern politics, caprice runs riot. Joseph Howe's adventure as a recruiting agent occupies four pages; the Nova Scotia repeal movement is wrapped around McGee's assassination in a strange three-page sandwich. There is room for Gavazzi but not for Sir James Whitney. The pursuit of “good copy” has excluded all balance, focus, or plan. The result is a Wild West script, fatally compromised by an attempt to write history.

In its long passage from the opening to the final *cliché* the book keeps erupting into a desperately vivid, popular style: “tooling along a level road” (p. 58), “A hush seemed to lie over Canada” (p. 413), “Settle! That was Sifton's clarion cry” (p. 467), “And then Sifton rushed back from the United States and the roof fell in” (p. 488). Professor Hardy seems to think that the story of Canada will not be popular until it has been made ridiculous. The tendency, if not the aim, of the Costain series is made clear by this volume. It will make the writing of histories the characteristic peccadillo of Canadian novelists.

S. R. MEALING

Carleton University

*Le Canada et le système interaméricain.* By MARCEL ROUSSIN. Ottawa: Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa. 1960. Pp. x, 285.

ONE OF THE COMMENDABLE TASKS accomplished in Professor Roussin's book, which itself represents the most complete chronological analysis available of Canadian public and private reaction to our involvement in the “Pan American system,” is his bibliography of Canadian material published on the subject. This represents a modest but thorough collection of writing about Canada's lack of relations with the old Pan American Union and, since 1948, with the Organization of American States. This writer believes it is the most complete one extant on the subject.

Implicit in Professor Roussin's painstaking historical analysis of the development of the inter-American system (without Canada's help), and of Canada's relation to it (which at the official level means no relation at all), is the large amount of procrastination, misinformation, and, for Hispanists, frustration which has centred around any attempt to bring about our full membership in O.A.S.

The words of Prime Minister Mackenzie King in March, 1939, so typical of the viewpoint of the Canadian government in pre-war years on almost all contentious issues of foreign policy, still reflect the inability of Canadian leaders of the intervening two decades to agree to any firm continental attachments with Spanish and Portuguese America. "It is a possibility which should be given full consideration in the future, along with other means, trade and governmental, of bringing about closer relationships between our country and those countries . . ." Though Howard Green is hardly expected to use today the same words which King used, the implications of what he does say are just as vague when decisions about Canada's official role in O.A.S. are under discussion. This continuing verbosity about Canada and the Americas at the official level is a major concern of Roussin's tidy, and I think fair, study by a Latin American history professor who is strongly in favour of our union with the O.A.S., and who, as a French-Canadian scholar, might have been expected to give imbalance to such a study in view of the long time French-Canadian intellectual acceptance of official ties with the Americas and of the extensive French-language sources which have supported membership.

The book's only weakness is its failure to include the business community in its analysis of Canadian reaction to the Americas, particularly since 1945. When all is said and done, our main reason for any contact at all with the remote republics of Latin America has been the desire of some industries to trade with them. Professor Roussin might have polled some of these to find the cut-and-dried reasons either for or against our official membership in the O.A.S. which neither academic nor government authorities are yet prepared to make.

JOHN D. HARBRON

Toronto

*In the Face of Danger: The History of the Lake Superior Regiment.* By G. F. G. STANLEY. With an Introduction by R. A. KEENE and maps by C. J. J. BOND. Port Arthur: Lake Superior Scottish Regiment. 1960. Pp. 337, maps, illus.

REGIMENTAL HISTORIES have a reputation for being dull, stodgy works written primarily for veterans of the regiment. The latter still holds true, but in recent years a number of regimental histories have been written by professional historians who have raised the standard to new heights.

*In the Face of Danger* is an excellent example of the latter type. Dr. Stanley tells the story of the Lake Superior Regiment from its origin at the turn of the century to the present. Roughly half of the book deals with the unit in the period from 1885 to July, 1944, when the battalion, as part of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, landed in Normandy. The major portion of the history covers the battles and engagements fought by the "Lake Sups" from Normandy to Germany. Considering the amount of detailed material one must include in such a volume, it is remarkably free of errors, and those which exist are of little significance. Furthermore, Dr. Stanley is careful to place the regiment in its

proper military context, which in turn gives the reader an appreciation of the part it played in action in relation to the over-all battle.

One especially interesting event—one which, incidentally is not mentioned in the army's official history—is the account of the proposed expedition to seize St. Pierre and Miquelon in 1941 which is noted briefly in Pickersgill's recent volume on Mackenzie King. Part of the Lake Superior Regiment, known as "Q" Force, was trained at Debert, N.S., to accomplish this mission. Owing to hesitation and caution on the part of the United States and Great Britain, these islands were eventually occupied by De Gaulle's forces in December of the same year. "Q" Force was disbanded and their secret training ended without the men knowing what their objective was to have been.

*In the Face of Danger* has excellent maps by Major C. C. J. Bond together with a liberal selection of photographs to illustrate a clear, well-written text. There will be some military historians who will wish the author had quoted his sources more frequently, but members and friends of the regiment will be more than satisfied with this first-class military history.

R. H. Roy

Victoria University

*The Windsor Border Region: Canada's Southernmost Frontier.* A collection of documents edited with an Introduction by ERNEST J. LAJEUNESSE, C.S.B. Publications of the Champlain Society, Ontario Series, IV. Toronto: The Champlain Society. 1960. Pp. cxxx, 374, maps. Free to members. Available in the Government of Ontario edition from the University of Toronto Press, \$5.00.

THE DETROIT AREA was certainly one of the more colourful frontiers of the North American interior. In 1701, generations before English colonists on the Atlantic seaboard penetrated the Appalachian barrier and established permanent settlements in the northwest, French artisans, habitants, and soldiers founded a community at Detroit, or "the strait." In the words of its planner, le Sieur de Cadillac: "Its position is delightful and very advantageous; it is at the narrowest part of the river [connecting Lakes St. Clair and Erie] where no one can pass by day without being seen." Quebec not only desired a fortified position that would discourage rival English and Indian adventurers from encroaching on its own western domain, but hoped, as the century progressed, that the settlement would serve as a granary for supplying the scattered French posts on the Ohio, organized to stem the tide of English expansion before the Seven Years' War. This is one of the principal themes that emerges from the collection and, on the whole, the editor has handled it well. But other matters are not neglected in *The Windsor Border Region*. Father Lajeunesse illuminates many facets of the colony's experience in the eighteenth century, outlining the varied problems that challenged its early development, documenting the nature of its society, and noting the important part played by its governors, missionaries, settlers, schools, law courts, and other institutions. Moreover, he devotes much space to an examination of the transference of power after the British conquest of 1760 and, later, traces the changes that resulted when the Loyalists moved into the area following the American Revolution.

Fully one-quarter of the collection is made up of the original French and Latin documents with which the relevant translations in the main body of the work can be compared. While in no way wishing to disparage this laudable

device, one feels that a representative selection of such material would have sufficed for then room could have been found for other pertinent sources. One would have welcomed, for example, documents illustrating the importance which the British attached to Detroit as a commercial base before it was surrendered to the United States in 1796. Again, while the editor has furnished a valuable account of the crisis provoked by Pontiac in 1763, a discussion of the frontier problems that occurred a half century later, during the War of 1812, and the response of French-speaking citizens on that occasion, would doubtless have raised some interesting questions.

Admittedly, however, these are not serious omissions. Indeed Father Lajeunesse, who made good use of important repositories for documentary material in both Canada and the United States, has prepared a very helpful and compact record of the origins and development of the Dominion's southernmost border. Especially commendable are the maps, charts, and diagrams which accompany the collection. This volume should prove to be a worthy companion to the earlier Champlain Society publication dealing with old Cataraqui.

C. M. JOHNSTON

McMaster University

*Recording America's Past: An Interpretation of the Development of Historical Studies in America, 1607-1884.* By DAVID D. VAN TASSEL. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1960. Pp. xii, 223. \$6.00.

*Turner and Beard: American Historical Writing Reconsidered.* By LEE BENSON. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1960. Pp. xiv, 241. \$5.00.

THE APPROACH OF THE AUTHORS of these two studies in American historiography is as different as the scope of their books. Professor Van Tassel's study of historical writing in the United States embraces the period from the founding of the colonies to the establishment in 1884 of the American Historical Association. The wide range of the literature selected, the strict adherence to chronological order, the brief analyses of individual contributions, and the synoptic summaries of trends all reflect admiration of the technique adopted some twenty or more years ago by Merle Curti in *The Growth of American Thought*. And indeed the inspiration provided by Professor Curti is warmly acknowledged. Rather than attempt such a survey, Professor Benson has concentrated his attention on two American giants, Frederick Jackson Turner and Charles A. Beard, with their fruitful hypotheses on the one hand of geographic place and on the other of economic class.

Professor Van Tassel's book has the merit of being both comprehensive and incisive. He is concerned with the role of the amateur, particularly of the local and regional historian. This is the man who laid the basis for the writing of history, moulded sectional and national traditions, and worked to have documents preserved and collected. Through emphasis and interpretation he had influenced the writing of national history even before the demand arose after the War of 1812 for the creation of a national "image." Local historical societies which flourished because of his support performed manifold functions, not the least of which was the collection of relics and records relating to almost every field of human endeavour. In fact, "documania," locally inspired, became between 1815 and 1850 "a national obsession." The romantic historians of the 1830's and later were to draw the American historical tradition closer to the European and a more evident *rapprochement* would take place between 1876 and 1884. But

already the amateur historian had provided American history with a distinctive character and, in addition, he had seen to it that records of a variety unknown in Europe had been collected. By the time the professional historian appeared on the scene, history was being used to bolster respect for constitutional law, to justify political change, and to create a national political tradition.

This careful survey adequately fills what was a major gap in American historiography. In addition, it makes interesting background reading for a study of such major figures as Turner and Beard.

Professor Benson's attention has been caught by the seminal ideas of Turner and Beard, the ambiguities in their writings, the dualism in Beard's thought, and the defective method employed by him. *Recording America's Past* emphasizes the originality of the work of the amateur American historians; *Turner and Beard* measures the reliance of these two professional American historians on European inspiration. Both were influenced, Professor Benson contends, directly and indirectly by the theories and the system of "economic sociology" of Achille Loria, an Italian economist of the late 19th and 20th centuries. Loria, an economic determinist, fused ideas in the air and advanced a thesis by which stages in the evolution of society were explained in terms of the quantity of "free land" available for cultivation. Turner's "ever retreating frontier of free land," which he saw as the "key to American development," reveals striking resemblances to Loria's ideas; but the appeal of these ideas was related to Turner's own deep attachment to the west and his interest in recurring emphases in contemporary discussions concerning economic and social change.

Partly through Turner's "frontier" version of the free-land theory Loria's influence reached Beard. Beard, like Turner, was subject to other influences, and differences in his "intellectual milieu" permitted him to receive a different stimulus. Yet they both believed that "one-to-one relationships" existed between economic development and other phases of American life.

Professor Benson praises Beard's ingenuity in advancing the economic class hypothesis in *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*. But he believes that Beard made an intellectual error in drawing concepts from the "contradictory" and "inconsistent" ideas of "economic determinism" and "economic interpretation." Such recent critics of Beard's work as Robert E. Brown and Forrest McDonald are unaware of the basic dualism in Beard's thought; McDonald has also failed to recognize that "a hypothesis cannot be tested by a logically fallacious design of proof" (p. 139) and both are guilty of misreading Beard. Benson himself finds both Beard's design of proof and his method inadequate, believes that they give rise to obscurity, and concludes that, at present, because voting statistics and other data are not available, "we can say only that a convincing case has yet to be made, for or against" Beard's thesis (p. 175).

In other words, the last revisionist word on Beard has not yet been written, and while it is unlikely that the present study will replace Brown's, the two read in conjunction will reveal how much American historical method has advanced during the last half century. Furthermore, it is possible that restatement of Turner's and Beard's hypotheses and their clarification through adopting a better method of proof, may result in the ambiguities in the original presentations disappearing. In any case, it is encouraging to have Professor Benson acknowledge the significance of originality in historical thought and advocate the desirability of the historian having an adequate general working hypothesis.

MARGARET A. ORMSBY

University of British Columbia

*American Immigration.* By MALDWYN ALLEN JONES. The Chicago History of American Civilization edited by DANIEL J. BOORSTIN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1960. Pp. xii, 360, illus. \$6.00.

MALDWYN JONES remarks in his bibliography that "there is no satisfactory general account of American immigration." Happily, Mr. Jones has himself made this comment inaccurate, for *American Immigration* is a systematic, informative, and stimulating survey. Avoiding the twin perils of annalistic head counting and maudlin sentiment, Mr. Jones examines almost every imaginable aspect of his subject. His treatment is pluralistic, and the reader marvels at his skill in training upon a single event a battery of distinct and dissimilar influences. Insistence upon the complexity of the subject leads to his most significant idea—a rejection of the familiar notion that immigration changed fundamentally during the 1880's. Taking into account more aspects of both "old" and "new" immigration and explaining plausibly the origins of the idea he rejects, he makes a strong case. Beyond this the author steadily argues that the background of immigrants was less important than the American environment that transformed them. Indeed, it often appears that the differences within immigrant groups exceeded the differences between immigrants and native Americans, and some readers will ask whether immigration is even a distinct theme, amenable to separate treatment. *American Immigration* is a short book for so large a subject, and some topics necessarily get brief attention. The long-range cultural effects of immigration are scantily considered, for example. But the book is more notable for what it includes than for what it omits. As is usual in this series, the book contains a careful and extensive bibliographical essay.

Mr. Jones has produced one of the several admirable books on American history written in the last few years by British scholars. They have proved what has always seemed probable, that a fresh view of American history is most likely to come from scholars who are not Americans. Canadians have not yet joined in the enterprise. Indeed, there is probably more advanced study of American history at the University of Manchester than in all of Canada. Is there more reason to study the subject in Britain than in Canada?

WALLACE D. FARNHAM

University of Alberta

*George Washington and the French Revolution.* By LOUIS MARTIN SEARS. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1960. Pp. xii, 416. \$7.00.

THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE, as newly emerging nations are finding to their sorrow today, is often high, and the new status which they achieve frequently presents as many problems as it was supposed to solve. To meet these challenges requires wisdom, judgment, and restraint and these are qualities which are not always characteristic of revolutionary leaders. Americans were blessed, however, when, after gaining independence, they were able to call upon the services of George Washington in the critical period through which they passed during the formative years of their nation.

Professor Sears' present study is devoted to only one aspect of Washington's policies; and that is his relations with France during her Revolutionary period. The subject is an important one, for the Revolution posed grave problems for the United States. It was relatively easy, of course, to deal with France at the



beginning of this event, but when war broke out between France and Britain the United States found herself in a dangerous dilemma. Because America owed much to France she had a natural feeling of sympathy toward her. Indeed, there were some Americans who felt that the Franco-American treaties of 1778 imposed upon their country the moral, if not legal, obligation to give aid to her in her struggle with England. But Washington could not afford to indulge in such sentiments. Instead, it was his task to recognize where America's true interests lay and to steer her along a path that would protect them. As Professor Sears shows, this was a formidable task, for Washington was subject to sharply contradictory advice from a Monroe who was highly sympathetic to France and a Hamilton who was convinced that the preservation of close ties with England was vital to America's existence. Professor Sears argues that Washington was triumphant in his task and that at no time did his eye falter, his grip fail, or his judgment desert him.

There are few who would deny that Washington showed caution, patience, and wisdom in his dealings with France, but some would question the passion with which Professor Sears defends his hero. The President had very real virtues and it does not require uncritical worship of him either to recognize or admire them. Nor is his stature increased by a continual denigration of some who served at his side. Monroe is anathema to Professor Sears and while it is true that the former was foolish and irresponsible and that he placed an intolerable strain upon the President's patience during and immediately after his mission to Paris, he acted in what he deemed to be the best interests of the United States.

The frequent extremity of Professor Sears' judgments is not, unfortunately, balanced by a happy organization of subject or grace in style. The blunt fact is that both the treatment of the material and the style of the book are needlessly tiresome. The study is arranged chronologically with each chapter being titled and devoted to one year. Perhaps this is the only way of dealing with the material, but the steady beat of time dulls the senses and diminishes the appetite for what is to follow. And one can justly complain, too, about the sources that have been used. Professor Sears has confined himself almost entirely to the despatches to and from Paris and Washington and the President's correspondence. He has avoided Federalist material, for he says it is either "pro-English or anti-French." This may be true, but it would be illuminating to have known what men like Hamilton were saying, for Washington was influenced by their arguments. Finally the style lacks charm and ease. It is too often clumsy and too frequently cliché-ridden. But Professor Sears has made distinguished contributions to American history in the past and if the present volume fails to meet the standards which he himself has previously set he has still offered us much useful information upon a critical period.

PATRICK C. T. WHITE

University of Toronto

*Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915.* By ARTHUR S. LINK. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xiv, 736. \$10.50.

THE THIRD VOLUME of Professor Link's biography of Woodrow Wilson continues the same high standards of research and judicious interpretation set by the earlier volumes. The period covered is the first fifteen months of World War I, when the basic public attitudes toward the holocaust were formed and the essential

neutrality policies of the United States were established. In these crucial months President Wilson directed "a relentless and unending struggle for neutrality and noninvolvement," trying to adjust policy to the developing maritime systems of the contending belligerents.

One of the most rewarding chapters of this study is the first one, devoted to a reappraisal of public opinion and belligerent propaganda activities in America. Contrary to the usual version, Link concludes that German propaganda was often shrewd and imaginative and that it scored a degree of success in neutralizing Allied propaganda. The effect of belligerent activity has often been exaggerated, however—the highly efficient British propaganda served mainly to strengthen pro-Allied sentiment in America and to facilitate popular acceptance of the Allied maritime measures.

The author portrays Wilson as guided not only by his own ideals and principles but also by his major advisers—Bryan, House, and Lansing—and by public opinion in the formulation of neutrality policies. After an initial emotional reaction in favour of the Allies, the President came to a more impartial and reasoned view of the origins and nature of the war. He was soon convinced that the outcome most favourable to a just peace would be an indecisive conclusion of the struggle. Yet, as Wilson said in an off-the-record interview, while a complete victory for the Entente would not be ideal, "I cannot see now that it would hurt greatly the interests of the United States. . . ."

The bulk of the volume is devoted to a careful examination of the familiar events of the neutrality period. The author concludes that while the Administration acquiesced to the Allied maritime measures—as trade, sympathy, and neutrality required—Wilson also sought an adjustment to German submarine warfare, shifting from an initial opposition to the U-boat as a weapon to the narrower stand of merely insisting on the safety of American citizens aboard belligerent passenger liners. After the *Arabic* pledges resolved this issue in the fall of 1915, a sweeping protest was made on October 21 against the constantly encroaching Allied blockade practices. Thus was American neutrality re-affirmed in regard to both belligerent camps.

Although many of the author's conclusions and evaluations are in areas which have long been, and will no doubt continue to be, the subjects of scholarly disagreement, his treatment of men and events is balanced and restrained. The volume is well-written, even exciting, and the drama of the period is fully recaptured.

DANIEL M. SMITH

University of Colorado

*Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years.* By ROBIN W. WINKS. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press. 1960. Pp. xx, 430. \$6.50.

THIS BOOK REPRESENTS a major piece of research on a period of Canadian history much traversed by Canadian historians. It provides an excellent analysis of issues and incidents that long have been familiar but which have never received the treatment they deserve. We have now for the first time a full account of the St. Albans raid of October, 1864, and all its ramifications. Even more, we have a searching examination of Canadian and American attitudes throughout the Civil War, and the effect of attitudes and incidents upon the continuing problems of British-American relations. The "North Atlantic triangle" is much in evidence in these pages. The major sources for the book have been the reports of American

consuls in strategic cities and towns of British North America, and the newspapers of both British North America and the United States. But Professor Winks has used a great range of contemporary sources; libraries from Alabama to Oxford, from Victoria to St. John's, have yielded him materials. His chapter, "Public opinion in British North America on the Civil War," is a good example of the usefulness of his method. Having a sound critical sense he is a good detective; he unravels the tangled skein of the *Chesapeake* affair of 1863-4, and tracks down the hectic career of the man who inspired it, and with the same persistence he dispels the myth of 50,000 Civil War enlistments from British North America. Professor Winks has a genial contempt for much that has passed for history in Canada; "so many 'baked meats at the funeral parlor'" is his irreverent description of some old and well-used Canadian biographies. His own book is neither baked nor potted. Based on comprehensive research the whole work has the verisimilitude and freshness of books written straight from the sources. Some of the footnotes are bibliographical essays in their own right. The research techniques here in evidence may even be an object lesson; not a few students of history will profit from seeing what research can mean; and although at times its manifestations seem unnecessarily obtrusive, it is still impressive.

Perhaps the weaknesses of the book are *sui generis*: a disposition to work too closely to the documents, an impatience with the ordinary canons of style, a belief that research is better translated than metamorphosed. If this be the philosophy that informs the writing, a good editor is essential, and this book, handsomely produced, could have been better edited. Words like "limitrophal" (p. vii) and "filiopietistic" (p. 177) do not exist. "Due to" is used incorrectly throughout the book. There are some odd examples of prose: "The existing formalized diplomatic situation" (p. 103); or, "When first begun, the reconsideration [of provincial defence] was oblivious of the presence of the Confederate commissioners, but by November their presence would have been so felt as to become an additional major factor in the ultimate Canadian re-evaluation" (p. 282).

Errors are relatively few. The Montreal "*Evening Telegram*" (pp. 306, 311, 367) should be *Evening Telegraph*. The *Napanee Standard* cannot safely be described as an influential paper (p. 129). Leonard Tilley was not "the Conservative leader" in New Brunswick (p. 350); party labels in New Brunswick were not very meaningful, but before 1867 Tilley was, if anything, a Liberal. A question of interpretation arises in Professor Winks' well-balanced discussion of the effects of the St. Albans raid. He suggests that approval of Confederation by the Colonial Office did not come until after the St. Albans raid. There is of course no doubt that the raid had profound effects in British North America, the United States, and even in England. But Cardwell, as early as August, 1864, had shown himself amenable to Confederation, and his letters to Gordon early in October show that he had given it his full approval, though the formal registration of that approval did not come until December.

The great value of Professor Winks' book is not only in its detailed analysis of Canadian and American attitudes, but also in its conspicuous fairness. It may not necessarily be an advantage to Canadian historians that the book pays more attention to the Canadian side of the border, but it is an advantage to have a work at once so comprehensive and objective. And in the massive research that lies behind it is the solid basis of what must surely be its long and useful life. There is a first-class index.

P. B. WAITE

Dalhousie University

*The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs.* By HUGH L. KEENLEYSIDE, JAMES EAYRS, *et al.* Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, Publications, 14. Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press for the Duke Commonwealth-Studies Center. 1960. Pp. x, 174. \$5.00.

IN HIS CONCLUDING SECTION "Selected Readings on Canadian External Policy 1909-1959," Dr. Gaddis Smith of Duke University comments that "for the historical study of Canadian external policy the dawn is just beginning to break." Meanwhile, this collection of papers by seven scholars which were presented in 1959 to the Commonwealth Summer Seminar and Research Group at Duke will shed a little more light on the Canadian scene. The title is somewhat more ambitious than the book itself, since the authors have naturally concentrated on topics of special interest to themselves, but they have contributed both new material and discerning comments on various aspects of Canadian external policy. Thus, Professor Eayrs has revised and expanded an earlier article, "The Origins of the Department of External Affairs," which should long remain the definitive account, and has also written a witty and provocative essay on some aspects of Canadian policy in the thirties which, borrowing from W. H. Auden, he labels as "A Low Dishonest Decade." Dr. Keenleyside, now free from the restraints of a professional diplomat, is equally vigorous and suggestive in his introductory essay. Dr. Smith breaks new ground in his paper on "Canadian External Policy During World War One," with the help of previously unused material, both American and Canadian. His remarks on the role of the Imperial Munitions Board, or on Loring Christie, whom he describes as "Borden's foreign office," are illustrations of his grasp of the period. He does not appear to have used L. S. Amery's memoirs, which threw light on the Imperial War Cabinet. A welcome innovation is a paper in French by Professor Bergeron of Laval who advances the thesis that French Canada has moved forward in the last decade from provincialism to internationalism "sans le passage intermédiaire du nationalisme pancanadien" and urges other scholars in French Canada to turn their attention to studies in this field. It comes as a shock to find Brebner referred to as "un observateur étranger." Professor McInnis analyses Canada's role as a middle power in the Cold War with skill and brevity, while Dean Bladen contributes a somewhat rarefied note discussing "some issues of principle" in a paper on "Economic Aspects of Foreign Policy." An American scholar, Dr. Deener of Tulane University, presents a carefully documented study of "The Treaty Power in Canada." For both the scholar and the students this volume comes as a welcome addition to the slim collection of monographs in this field.

F. H. SOWARD

University of British Columbia

## General

*A History of Lay Judges.* By JOHN P. DAWSON. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. x, 310. \$7.75.

ALTHOUGH IT WAS the intent of Mr. Dawson in this book to trace the development of lay judges in England, France, and Germany, he has essentially written a fine comparative history of central and local courts in these countries. Mr.

Dawson defines a "professional" judge as "a person who applies a substantial part of his time and energy, with some degree of continuity, to the task at hand." A "lay" judge is not a professional because "he is drawn from his community at random, is in no way distinguished from others by his tenure of an office, and works without continuity." The English justice of the peace is a good example of a lay judge.

After a brief chapter surveying legal procedure in ancient Greece and Rome, where he finds no professional judges until the imperial period, Mr. Dawson takes us in time from the Merovingian period down to the end of the eighteenth century. Throughout the early Middle Ages when Germanic, seigniorial, and feudal custom ruled supreme, all the men involved in justice were lay judges. The officers who presided over the local courts, as for example the Anglo-Saxon sheriff and the Carolingian count, did not judge. The men composing their courts, such as the Anglo-Saxon doomsmen, were lay judges who declared the laws and set the appropriate punishment or fine. Only in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries did professional judges appear in mediaeval Europe; by the 1190's it may be said that the five judges staffing the English Court of Common Pleas were professionals. Not until almost a century later did professional judges of the *Parlement* appear in France. Thereafter in both central and local French royal courts professional judges achieved a monopoly—a development that was followed also by the private French courts. After 1200 the heterogeneous German courts travelled in the same direction. England, however, despite an early professionalization of its central courts, did not follow suit. The county, hundred, and manorial courts remained in the hands of laymen. And when royal justice became more localized, it did so through the lay justices of the peace and the jury system that rested upon laymen. Even such central royal courts as that of Chancery had but a small core of professional judges, leaving the bulk of the legal work, such as the collection of evidence, to non-professionals.

The principal problem that arises out of this history of judges and courts is why the English courts remained almost exclusively in the hands of lay judges while the French and German courts became controlled by professional judges. Mr. Dawson feels that one reason for professionals on the continent was the adoption of the Roman-Canonist system of proof by individual witnesses which necessitated specialized training for the compilation and interpretation of written evidence. In England, where the common law procedure prevailed, the group jury system was incorporated and rested upon laymen. This may explain how legal procedure diverged but Mr. Dawson does not satisfactorily explain why it diverged. He argues that the French crown had not the strength or will to forge a legal system dependent largely upon laymen, whereas the English monarchy, since the time of the Norman Conquest, had the power to develop a system of courts and procedure that depended little upon professionals and largely upon local laymen who gave but part of their time to the business of justice. Perhaps there is some validity to this view but certainly a more convincing argument is that in an England which had long been centralized and unified it was far simpler to secure the co-operation of groups of men at various social and political levels than it was in France which only became centralized and unified in the thirteenth century. It is not primarily the strength of the English and French monarchies that explains this legal divergence but rather the different political and geographical structures to which the Capetian and Norman kings came in the late tenth and eleventh centuries.

This lucid, concise history of judges and courts in early European and English

history will be of real assistance to those interested in legal history. But it is for its synthesis and not its research that this book is valuable. Legal historians already familiar with Maitland, Pollock, Holdsworth, Plucknett, Esmein, and Olivier-Martin will find little that is new. And mediaeval historians will not always be impressed with a documentation that does not reflect familiarity with the latest literature or the most recent currents of debate on such questions as the English borough, the French monarchy and its centralization of thirteenth-century France, or the role of the Hohenstaufen in the feudalization of Germany.

BRYCE LYON

University of California  
Berkeley

*Princes and Parliaments in Germany from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century.*

By F. L. CARSTEN. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1959. Pp. x, 473. \$7.50.

IN 1954 F. L. CARSTEN published *The Origins of Prussia*, in which he analysed the developments which culminated in the defeat of the estates, the rise of the Junkers, and the establishment of Hohenzollern despotism under the Great Elector. He has now produced a work of broader scope, a comparative history of the estates in the leading lay principalities: Württemberg, the most remarkable of the estates which, as Charles James Fox noted a century and a half ago, were comparable with the English parliament; Hesse; Saxony, the Duchies on the Lower Rhine (whose role on the European stage seemed designed to baffle undergraduates); and Bavaria, where the estates fell from the strongest position the earliest. Carsten has had to rely largely on his own explorations of the local archives, and *Princes and Parliaments* is an even more intricate work than the comparable sections of *The Origins of Prussia*, for both the variation in pattern and composition of the estates from territory to territory and the continual changes in their history necessitated the inclusion of a great deal of detail in separate if parallel accounts.

If the resulting product at times makes for heavy going, it is a challenging work from the title onward. Carsten deliberately chose the term parliament because, in his view, the estates of many German principalities from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries had functions very similar to those of the English parliament, and their powers in the beginning at least were by no means inferior and in some cases more extensive. Though the struggles in Germany had much in common with those in England, the outcome was usually the opposite. Many reasons have been advanced to explain this, and Carsten lays stress on the policies and ambitions of the individual princes. Especially critical was the fact that no German prince nurtured the estates as did Henry VIII the English parliament. If this suggests the essential weakness of the estates, Carsten points to the fact that they developed permanent administrative machinery which was efficient and inexpensive, and he argues, against the frequent denigration of the estates by German historians, that they had positive functions which went beyond the protection of their own class interests against those of the princes. They acted as a check against arbitrary government and petty tyranny, and set a limit to adventurous foreign policy. But still more they kept alive in an age of absolutism not only the idea of liberty but the principles of self-government. "It is no accident," he concludes,



"that the liberal movement of the nineteenth century was strongest in those areas of Germany where the estates survived the period of absolute government." The estates thus fulfilled an important historical function; and in explaining their history Carsten has reminded us again that Germany is a country of different and often conflicting traditions.

ROBERT SPENCER

University of Toronto

*The Persecution of Huguenots and French Economic Development, 1680-1720.*

By WARREN C. SCOVILLE. Publications of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of California. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1960. Pp. xii, 492. \$6.50.

WE ARE SELDOM WILLING to see the early history of our country for what it is: a brief and lowly chapter in the history of France. It is therefore chastening to find that in this ample and leisurely monograph Canada is mentioned no more than three times, twice for its trade and once as a place to which Louis XIV threatened to deport the Huguenots, thereby adding insult to the injury which Richelieu had already done us in refusing to allow them to come here earlier. But though Canada was of scant importance to France, the long period of French economic stagnation between 1680 and 1720, which Professor Scoville describes, affected Canada. The decline of the fur trade in those years was a function of the general decline of French trade and industry and so was the failure to continue Colbert's development programme. The recovery of France by the mid-eighteenth century came too late for New France.

Was the revocation of the Edict of Nantes the cause of the thirty years of economic distress that followed it? Were the emigrant Huguenots responsible for the contrasting prosperity and industrial growth of Holland and England? Many observers of the time and most historians after them have thought so. Professor Scoville would like to be able to agree with them that the cruel persecution of the French Protestant minority brought swift retribution, but he cannot. His painstaking research has convinced him that the flight of some 200,000 Huguenots, about 1 per cent of the total French population, was no more important as a cause of economic distress than war, crop failure, plague, oppressive state regulation, or administrative confusion. The woollen, tin-plate, and steel manufactures were not much affected by the Huguenot emigration; the silk industry was already beginning to decline earlier; the Royal Plate Glass Company suffered in the depression though it employed practically no Protestants; Catholics proved quite capable of refining sugar and of taking over other abandoned industries; French cardinals might well have had to send to England for their Caudebec hats even if the Protestant hatters had not been hounded out of Normandy. And after all, nine-tenths of the nearly two million Huguenots remained in France.

According to common practice on this continent where the sources for writing foreign history are difficult to obtain, Professor Scoville gives us a good deal of his material in addition to the ideas he has drawn from it. His chapters are made of thick layers of evidence in which conclusions germinate very slowly. He is exceedingly cautious—almost scholastic—in his consideration of contrary arguments and possibilities. But the loss in readability is more than made up in solidity. The book is an impressive achievement.

JOHN BOSHER

University of British Columbia

*Politics and Religion in Seventeenth-Century France: A Study of Political Ideas from the Monarchomachs to Bayle as Reflected in the Toleration Controversy.*  
By W. J. STANKIEWICZ. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1960. Pp. xii, 269. \$6.00.

THIS BOOK, as the subtitle informs us, is "a study of political ideas from the Monarchomachs to Bayle, as reflected in the Toleration controversy"; an investigation, in other words, into the political thought of one of the most confused eras of French history. What emerges is an even greater sense of this confusion than one previously had for the author has succeeded in revealing more than is customary of the continually shifting, fluid currents of events and ideas of this complex period.

This impression arises not merely from an elaboration of detail but also, I think, from an exploration of psychological factors. Another dimension of complexity has been probed, and what has been discovered banishes simplicity even farther from the picture. However, along with this complexity there is presented a simple, general theme, refurbished here with much documentary reference but rather old and familiar; namely, that the failure of toleration in seventeenth-century France was the product of the rise of the unitary, absolutist monarchy, that Cardinal Richelieu was the chief architect of this construction, and that Louis XIV was the willing, if somewhat befuddled, legatee and finisher of the absolutist building. Throughout the *deus ex machina* is the Roman Catholic Church. The attempt to combine so modern an evaluation, sensitive to a myriad of complexities, with what is essentially a traditional, rather old-fashioned, liberal-rationalist, and Protestant view creates an impression of dichotomy, and the reader is left feeling that the author never satisfactorily resolves this division in his own mind.

Possibly the reason for this irresolution is that the author is obviously struggling to portray history as it really was but wanting it to be history as it ought to be. He is annoyed when "a unique opportunity," as he sees it, "for achieving political unity" arose after the establishment of the Edict of Nantes "but no party seemed able to grasp the opportunity that was at hand." He finds it "strange" that the Fronde failed to upset the absolutist system, even contributing to its greater strength, and then goes on to unravel the way in which this quite naturally happened. To the author this was manifestly an example of the victory of unreason and another lost opportunity. Patently, this is a book with a purpose other than the narration of history as it happened. The author is battling certain ideas all the way through and supporting others.

This is a book with a lesson, the nature of which is given us in the last line where, in reference to John Locke, we are told that, "his lifework was to show that religious freedom lies at the root of political and social freedom." But the lesson is undercut in the postscript where, in good Baylean emphasis, we are informed that, "History has thus completed a full circle, bringing no solution to the perennial problem of how rational control over men can be achieved." The dichotomy is present then to the end, and is reasserted in full force at the finish of the postscript where Richelieu, previously termed "truly totalitarian" and "not truly progressive," and who, we have been told, looked upon the Huguenots as "prey," "already half-strangled," for whom "the kill was only a matter of time," is now presented, apparently, as a statesman whose "rationality contributed to his success" and whose "avoidance of an appeal to the irrational" is held up as a road to successful statesmanship. This last seeming *volte-face* is a little hard to understand. If this is, as I feel forced to conclude, an essay in applied history, it does not quite come off.

RICHARD M. SAUNDERS

University of Toronto

*The Life of Charles XII, King of Sweden, 1697-1718.* By FRANS G. BENGTTSSON. Translated by NAOMI WALFORD, with an Introduction by ERIC LINKLATER. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. 1960. Pp. xiv, 495, maps, illus. \$8.25.

THE AUTHOR OF THIS BOOK, who died in 1954, is described as a poet, novelist, essayist, and historian with a "taste for the kind of history which provides the stuff of poetry and food for the imagination." He has produced a novel portrait of the great eighteenth-century figure who is his subject. Charles XII, as delineated by Frans Bengtsson, is not (to quote Trevelyan's phrase) a man of "raw, barbarian pride," nor does he conform to the common textbook picture of an unbalanced warrior who lived only for fighting. Here we meet a boy burdened with the responsibilities of a man, fifteen years old when he succeeded to his throne, and a ruler who had no real chance to rule in peace between his accession and his death at the youthful age of thirty-five. We also meet one who was both a genius and, as the author puts it, "a consummate product of pedagogy." His triumph at Narva combined the daring of a Nelson with the technical expertness of a veteran student of war, and he was no older than the average college freshman when he won it. If Charles XII was a poor politician, there are two reasons for the fact, inexperience and the rigid Puritanism of his character. For, in sharp contrast to the other great warrior king of the eighteenth century, he was no Machiavelli; instead he constantly suggests to the reader one of Cromwell's Ironsides born out of due time to inherit a kingdom beset by a host of double-dealing foes, among whom was (at the end) the Prussian Machiavelli's father. His great political problem was the all too familiar one of how to make peace with politicians who were not men of their word. This fact makes comprehensible both his determination to evict Augustus the Strong from the throne of Poland, and his attempt to treat Peter of Russia likewise. But he could learn, and it must never be forgotten that he was not yet middle-aged when he was shot through the head at Fredrikshall. We would have a very different impression of Frederick the Great if he had been killed at Zorndorf; and we would almost certainly have a very different impression of Charles XII if he also had lived to reign in peace and to die of old age.

This book provides some useful battle plans but one could wish for something more than the single map which, on a minute scale, covers nearly all Europe east of France. Its author knows the general picture of European politics, can describe a battle clearly, and shows a welcome awareness of logistics. The translation reads well; and, though there is no *apparatus criticus*, the work is a valuable addition to our literature on eighteenth-century history.

RICHARD GLOVER

University of Manitoba

*Nationalism: A Religion.* By CARLTON J. H. HAYES. New York: The Macmillan Company [Galt: Brett-Macmillan Limited]. 1960. Pp. xii, 187. \$5.00.

IN A PREFACE entitled "A Personal Apology," Professor Hayes says that this book "is simply a précis, of what one person, through a life time of study, has conceived and learned about nationalism." As such, it is disappointing. Professor Hayes has published several books and many articles on different aspects of nationalism and, in the present work, frequently refers the reader to his fuller treatment of particular matters, elsewhere; and admirers of his earlier work will probably think

that, had he really given us the results of his life-time study of the subject, he would have given us something better than the present volume.

The first two chapters are analytical, inquiring into the nature of nationalism and into that of religion; but, since they only comprise ten and eight pages, respectively, they are, almost necessarily, elementary. The fourth and fifth chapters deal with the seeds of "modern nationalism" (said to have "had its original seat in England") and the sixth chapter, with the "transition of nationalism from England to the European Continent," in the last decade of the eighteenth century, and "its emergence in democratic and essentially religious form." The next six chapters cover the period from 1800 to the present day and, as the book advances, it becomes more and more indistinguishable from an outline of general modern history, with less and less of nationalism and of analysis. For example, the "liberal" and even "utopian" associations of nationalism, in the first half of the nineteenth century, get less than one page, but unnecessary and sketchy descriptions of the diplomatic origins of the First World War get two and one-half, and of the origins and history of the Second, four pages. This diluting of the analytical purpose of the book is furthered by the fact that, in these chapters, the meaning of "nationalism" is given some unusual extensions, as in the description of the "imperialism" of 1874-1914 as having been "nationalist."

It is a little difficult to guess for whom this work was intended. There is no bibliography, in the formal sense, although footnotes provide what, in effect, is a useful, if unsystematic, bibliography. But one wonders whether the beginner, for whom, alone, the text seems to be meant, is likely to follow up the footnotes; while those who know enough about the subject to be familiar with the works suggested for reading in the footnotes, do not seem likely to find much in the text. One hopes that Professor Hayes will, before long, really give us the ripe results of his long reflection on the subject.

H. N. FIELDHOUSE

McGill University

*The New Cambridge Modern History. X. The Zenith of European Power, 1830-70.*

Edited by J. P. T. Bury. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. 1960. Pp. xxii, 766. \$8.00.

WHETHER OR NOT one agrees that this and not the subsequent volume would be more appropriately entitled *The Zenith of European Power*, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that this is one of the strongest of the published volumes of the *New Cambridge Modern History*. Somewhat like the editors of the new *Propyläen Weltgeschichte*, the editor of this volume, J. P. T. Bury, has decided to make it a work of international co-operation; of the twenty-six contributors, four are Americans, and one a Frenchman. Despite this breadth of authorship, the volume is, however, concentrated on Europe. Two of the twenty-six chapters deal with the United States and one with Latin America; only one chapter is devoted to the Far East—and it emphasizes European penetration. A happy balance is struck between the topical approach and national history. The first twelve chapters are devoted to topics ranging from the art of painting to the art of war, and Charles Pouthas' later chapter on the 1848 revolutions also takes the topical approach. The remaining thirteen chapters cover developments on the national or regional level or deal with diplomacy. As stated by the editor, the July Monarchy in France and pre-1848 developments in Austria-Hungary are reserved for the preceding and the history of India and socialism for the following volume.

The various topical chapters, however, do not always cover developments in

all of Europe and North America. Herbert Heaton's chapter on economic developments, John Roach's treatment of education and the press, Erich Heller's account of imaginative literature, Nicholas Pevsner's story of art and architecture, and Liddell Hart's and Michael Lewis' chapters on military and naval developments provide comprehensive, able, and even brilliant coverage of developments in Europe and North America. On the other hand, Dean Sykes' account of religion and state-church relations is restricted to Britain and Catholic Western Europe; it says nothing about Austria, Russia, Poland, and Balkans, America, continental Protestantism, or Judaism.

Generally, one might complain that the treatment of science is too technical, that the development of the historian's craft under Ranke's influence is ignored, and that the considerations of liberalism are limited in scope—slighting theory and underplaying the economic side. The treatment of the controversial subject of nationalism is uneven: there seems to be some prejudice in favour of the Italians and against the Germans; there are occasional tendencies to exaggerate, especially with reference to east-central Europe. Yet all of the topical chapters are good within their scope and some are provocative.

The national or regional chapters, while generally competent, vary somewhat in quality, ranging from brilliant to disappointing, and like the topical chapters are strongly orientated toward western Europe and its interests. D. Mack Smith's treatment of Italy is not only a brilliant synthesis but also presents for the first time in English the results of recent Italian research. It points out, for instance, that participation in the Crimean war was not part of Cavour's plan of raising the Italian question but was instead Victor Emmanuel's version of sportsmanship on the international stage, disapproved by Cavour. The chapters on Britain and the empire, the Second French Empire, the origins of the Franco-Prussian war, the United States, and Latin America are very well done. On the other hand, Agatha Ramm's treatment of the Crimean war fails to sustain her original contentions which exculpate France and Britain, and J. M. R. Vyvyan's account of Russia, while attempting to find continuity between the Czarist and Soviet periods, fails to deal with the underlying causes or motives of Alexander II's reforms and Russian expansion in Asia. James Joll's treatment of Germany is perhaps the most disappointing—at least to German specialists. He suggests (p. 494) that the *Zollverein* was founded in 1834, overlooking the fact that it had by then gone through fifteen years of gradual expansion. The Prussian constitution of 1849 cannot be said to have restored the "old restricted franchise" (p. 498) for such franchise did not previously exist in Prussia. Nor can the Gerlach-dominated *Camarilla* be viewed as holding "undisputed power" during Manteuffel's premiership (p. 499), for the latter was by no means agreeable to it. The *Nationalverein* was not championing exclusive Prussian leadership in Germany, but was willing to support any German power which was willing to assume such leadership—even Austria. What is more serious, Joll demonstrates his ignorance of recent literature in German on Bismarck when he decides to base his account of that statesman on Erich Eyck's biography which he considers definitive. Recent scholarship—not exclusively German—has found serious flaws in Eyck's account (See the Swiss historian, L. von Muralt's *Bismarcks Verantwortlichkeit*, Göttingen, 1955).

It is easy to say that the *Zenith of European Power* demonstrates both the weaknesses and strengths of a collaborative effort—uneven quality and brilliance—but this reviewer feels that in spite of the shortcomings of some chapters it is a first-class volume which should be eagerly welcomed by specialists and non-specialists alike.

Ivo N. LAMBI

University of Saskatchewan

*Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century.* By H. S. FERNS. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1960. Pp. xvi, 517, maps. \$9.50.

IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE for an American to review in a Canadian historical journal a British book about Argentina: the four Atlantic nations have profound interconnections, and Mr. Ferns' book contributes decidedly to understanding the most important of those ties in the nineteenth century.

The theme of the book is economic growth. The organization is chronological, proceeding through accepted periods of Argentine history from the British invasions to the salvage measures taken after the Great Crash of 1890, which nearly destroyed the House of Baring and the government of Argentina. Each chapter is a model essay on its subject; together they comprise a well-executed synthesis and analysis of a fairly complex pattern of events. The folly of Popham's invasion of the Río de la Plata (which, in the end, was not such folly) is merged nicely, in the author's description, with other causes of the war for independence which broke out a few years after the 1806 and 1807 British attempts at conquest. Canning's brilliant diplomacy is skilfully treated, and so on through the régime of the dictator Rosas into the first period of important British economic expansion in Argentina, 1852 to 1862, of which Mr. Ferns says that British diplomats worked for "a united, peaceful, liberal Argentina, and they assigned exactly that order to their objectives." Railroad investment, commercial banking, speculation in *cédulas* (land-mortgage bonds of a peculiar but alluring character), and many other facets of British enterprise in Argentina are examined.

Mr. Ferns, of the University of Birmingham, has written a book of significance on both sides of the Atlantic. Its chief flaw may be that while it is lucid and objective so far as it goes in its approach, its approach does not go far beyond a standard that may be summed up in the phrase, "what was good for Britain was good for Argentina." The cost of British economic supremacy in many aspects of the Argentine economy is on occasion stated, and on other occasions implied, but never resolutely faced: I speak of human as well as economic costs to the Argentines. On this side of the case one should read the great, bitter *Radiografía de la pampa* by Ezequiel Martínez Estrada.

Sturdily constructed, showing a keen sense of social and political intricacies as well as of evolving economic conditions, Mr. Ferns has made good use of British Foreign Office records, business papers, and standard monographs to produce a standard monograph of high quality. And he writes well.

THOMAS F. MCGANN

University of Texas

*Nehru: A Political Biography.* By MICHAEL BRECHER. London and Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. xvi, 682. \$8.95.

IT IS SOMETHING NEW for a Canadian to write a book about the prime minister of a nation on the other side of the world. This is the achievement of Michael Brecher, associate professor of political economy at McGill University, in his native city of Montreal. His work, moreover, has been acclaimed both in the popular press and in learned journals, even in the country about which he has written.

The life of Nehru, says the author, "is admirably suited to serve as the binding



thread in an account of recent Indian history. . . . The book is, then, both a biographical history and a political biography." He adds, "I leave the final verdict on Nehru to the historians. My concern is . . . with the actions of statesmen when and as they take place" (pp. vii-viii).

But of course, what happened only yesterday is already history. What little Dr. Brecher may lose in historical perspective through being so close to his subject is more than compensated for by his ability to get the feel of his period through first-hand contact with many of the people about whom he is writing, including Nehru himself. When, however, a political scientist, unlike a historian, uses the present tense, he runs the risk of having his book overtaken by events. "Friendship with China has been an axiom of Indian foreign policy during the past decade," he writes. "And the leaders of both countries never cease to proclaim their undying friendship, though India is more effusive in expressing the attachment. . . . Nehru is strengthened in this course of action by the conviction that Peking does not represent a threat to Indian interests in the foreseeable future, certainly not for a generation" (pp. 588-91). But by the time this went on sale in New Delhi, an intense anti-China campaign was already under way, soon to be led by the Prime Minister himself.

The book begins and ends as biography, not history. First there is a "portrait" of "a sensitive man who had succeeded in absorbing the shocks of life" (p. 31), while the last chapter is a "portrait of a leader" whose "creed is best defined as democratic socialism and refined and humane materialism" (p. 606). Surely nationalism should be added to this definition. One gets the impression that Dr. Brecher overdoes a little the picture of Mr. Nehru valiantly struggling for the survival in India of western ideology. It is an exaggeration to say that in 1957 the Communists "emerged as the undisputed second party" (p. 22), and that this revealed "the polarization of Indian politics around the Congress and the Communist Party" (p. 478). By 1957 the Communist Party, we are told again, "had become the second-largest organized political force. . . . They benefit from the growing discontent with the Congress, particularly because of the weakness of the Praja Socialists and the trend to polarization in Indian politics. They are aided, too, by the example of China" (p. 639).

In fact, however, this was true of only one state, Kerala, out of fourteen. Although they form the second largest single group in the House of the People, the Communists in 1957 did not do as well in the country as a whole as the China-hating Praja Socialists, either in total votes or in the number of constituencies in which they were the chief opponents of the Congress. It is slightly misleading to say that "the number of parties was drastically reduced, as a result of a ruling by the Election Commission" (p. 474). The minor parties were still there, recognized as such by the newspapers, although many of their candidates were officially listed as "independents." But so far were Indian politics from "polarization" that, among the opposition, more important than any party were the genuine Independents. These are difficult to describe, and Dr. Brecher does not make the attempt. He does concede that in "the short-run the danger to constitutional democracy is more from the extreme Right than from the Left" (p. 639). But he believes that once an authoritarian régime were established, the contest "would be between a form of Hindu Fascism and Communism;" and that Communism "would be the likely victor" (p. 640). The final conclusion is that "Nehru's continued leadership is indispensable for some years to come."

In the main, however, Dr. Brecher's book is a history of India since the 1880's, built around the Congress Party (formed 1885) and Jawaharlal Nehru (born

1889). The hero is somewhat romantically presented as a "polished aristocrat," though he is a product of the wealthy Indian *bourgeoisie*, a lawyer by training and the son of a lawyer, with an unbounded middle-class enthusiasm for natural science. A footnote provides a useful list of Nehru's imprisonments (p. 81). Soon "the young Brahmin" is "fired by the goal of Indian freedom and the example of Gandhi." From his second imprisonment he emerged in 1923 to effect, with Azad, a temporary reconciliation between their quarrelling elders in the Congress. (The reference to Rajagopalacharia as "the first and last Governor-General of the Dominion," p. 86, is obviously a slip). In an able chapter entitled "Sojourn in the West," 1926-7, the author sums up Nehru's political outlook (p. 113): "Then as later his primary loyalty was to Indian national interests. In case of conflict his attachment to socialism and internationalism was invariably expendable. While this priority is normal for a responsible statesman, it was also true of Nehru twenty years before he assumed power. He has always been the nationalist *par excellence*." As president of the All-India Trades Union Congress in 1929-30, he stood aloof from both the Second and the Third International (p. 141), just as today he stands between their successors in India, the Praja Socialists and the Communists. In 1929, too, he became President of Congress for the first time. He was not, and is not, a pacifist—"if we reject the way of violence, it is because it promises no substantive results" (p. 145).

Nehru wanted "an honorable political settlement with Britain which would permit active Congress participation in the war." Instead, with the other Congress leaders, he got imprisonment from the Churchill Government, while the Muslim League campaigned for partition unopposed. The Cripps offer in 1942 "implied acceptance of the Pakistan demand." About 100,000 nationalists were imprisoned—"the outcome of persistent British intransigence" (p. 293). The Attlee Government, also, shows up badly in the handling of the Pakistan question.

The second half of the book deals with Nehru in power—"whatever progress has been achieved is primarily due to the efforts of the Prime Minister." Dr. Brecher regards India's "refusal to establish normal diplomatic relations" with Israel as "a glaring violation of Delhi's oft-proclaimed view on the need to accept the 'political facts of life'" (p. 572)—a debatable point. But otherwise he is sympathetic to Nehru's foreign policy.

The author is definitely an admirer of the Indian prime minister. Yet some of those who know Mr. Nehru best in India have complained that Dr. Brecher has described him as though his character and views are static, whereas in reality, it is said, they are constantly changing. On the other hand, critics of Mr. Nehru in India have seized upon the few mild criticisms which the book contains. "Perhaps his gravest defect is indecision" (p. 627). This charge is frequently repeated in the right-wing English-language press, though it too is debatable. The future of parliamentary government in its present form is probably even less certain than Dr. Brecher indicates. As one of many favourable features he mentions "the acceptance of defeat at the polls by the governing party (Kerala in 1957)" (p. 638), an assumption which was proved premature a few months after the publication of the book. As the author says, "democratic processes are not yet rooted in Indian soil. Economic planning is more important" (p. 470).

There is some validity in the complaint that has been made in England that Dr. Brecher has not given enough credit to opinion in Britain as an essential factor in bringing about independence. Though Indian nationalists had to struggle for so many years against British governments, Conservative, Liberal, and Labour alike, nevertheless it was British education and the support of British intellectuals

which in the final analysis made the democratic struggle both possible and successful. At the same time it should be recognized that Dr. Brecher brings to his study an objectivity which neither British nor Indian writers can be expected to achieve. His book is a very notable contribution to an understanding of the politics of another nation—a contribution of which Canadian scholars can well feel proud.

G. O. ROTHNEY

Memorial University of Newfoundland

*The Cross and the Fasces: Christian Democracy and Fascism in Italy.* By RICHARD A. WEBSTER. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1960. Pp. xiv, 229. \$5.00.

FEW TOPICS IN ITALIAN HISTORY are more important or more difficult than the political role of the Church. Professor Webster, in treating this subject during the fascist period, has tackled it at its most illusive and dangerously controversial. He does so by focussing on the Catholic political leaders themselves and discussing the political groupings they formed. Such an approach permits him to deal with Catholic politics in relation to the wider concerns of Italian society. Mr. Webster thus limits his subject and makes it intelligible while still conveying a sense of the subterranean connections so vital to all Italian politics and without making the Church appear a political monolith. This requires a rare sensitivity to the Italian political environment and great knowledge; both are here impressively displayed. This is, then, neither a broad history of the role of the Church in Italian society nor a narrow monograph on a political party. With great care, Mr. Webster goes only so far as his information takes him. Indeed, he could have been less cautious; for the book itself would give great weight to those further generalizations from which he has restrained himself.

Beginning with a review of Catholic politics since the Risorgimento, this study succinctly interweaves the development of a Catholic party, the temptations Catholics found in the nationalism of the Libyan war, the political confusion during the First World War, and the failure of the Italian political system in face of the needs of mass politics. Such themes are used to cast light on the origins of fascism as well as on the Catholic position itself. The sinewy style, which allows for many a well-turned phrase, rises to eloquence in the analysis of De Gasperi's "political agnosticism" and his quiet exile in the Vatican. The discussion of the Christian Democratic party becomes a kind of summary of what has gone before. A score of its leaders, many of them still prominent in Italy, are neatly analysed; and their own disconcerting flexibility is quietly used to explain the tone and diversity of their amorphous party. It is here that the book's main thesis emerges: as a result of the fascist experience, the Christian Democratic party, despite its many similarities to the old Popular party, is much less autonomous, much closer to the Vatican. That this is in many ways a loss for Italian politics and that it explains much of the party's history since De Gasperi is made clear.

A well-controlled monograph of surprising breadth, Mr. Webster's study contributes to an understanding of the varied positions within Catholic politics and of the Church's role in modern Italy. The perceptive appendices on Christian Democratic programmes and on some statistics of Italian elections can only make one wish the book were longer. The intelligent comments and invaluable bibliography of the notes so deserve attention that surely a university press should have

given them their convenient place of honour at the bottom of the page. Still, this book merits all the *clichés* of academic reviewing. It "fills a gap," the filling of which is in fact an "achievement." Professor Webster makes the Catholic politics of modern Italy more significant by writing in terms of that historical continuity which, before his book, historians had only assumed as an item of professional faith.

RAYMOND GREW

Princeton University

*Hitler Confronts England*. By WALTER ANSEL. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1960. Pp. xx, 348. \$7.50.

WHAT DISTINGUISHES Admiral Ansel's study of Operation Sea Lion (from a documentary point of view) is the diligence and the success with which he has sought out and interviewed officers of the former German Army, Navy, and Air Force who were concerned with the planning and preparation of the ill-fated scheme. Having reviewed the published materials, and after consulting the still classified German documents held by the Government of the United States, he supplemented his findings by talks in Germany and by correspondence. The result is to add a series of stories which afford interesting, important but generally minor rectifications, but which do not fundamentally alter the over-all picture of Sea Lion as already put together in some detail by German and British historians. Perhaps Ansel has been rather uncritical of the German officers' evaluation of the Führer, taking them too much at their post-1945 word; certainly he finds that the scheme failed because of Hitler's miscalculations and hesitancy. This possible flaw aside, there is no doubt that the personal researches of Ansel have yielded useful additional evidence on matters as diverse as the celebrated halt order given to von Rundstedt's victorious, if weary, armour before Dunkirk (May 24, 1940) and the technical aspects of German landing-craft and landing preparations. He has been over the ground involved in France and Germany, surveyed the proposed beaches in England, and talked not merely with top brass but with humbler actors too. The book is marked throughout by his personal approach, at once lively, diffuse, salty, and slightly chaotic. There is none of the disciplined control of Ronald Wheatley's *Operation Sea Lion* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1958)—which certainly deserved something more than a B.Litt. degree—and any student will wish to keep this admirable British study beside him while using Ansel. Not trying for any degree nor writing for a team of official historians, the Admiral has let himself go, and the result is engaging but occasionally bewildering. He gets, nevertheless, full marks for the excitement he communicates, especially in the earlier chapters. The book does not smell of the lamp. And this is a major advantage.

It has its difficulties, however. I do not think one often encounters a sustained piece of prose so nearly unreadable as *Hitler Confronts England*. Stylistically it is a horrendous mishmash of chattiness, TIME-style, sports-reporter flippancy, service jocularly, and gross assault upon the English (American, *pace* Mencken) language. Admiral Ansel admits that it was hard slugging for him ("a sailor unused to the compromises of shore life and unskilled in the task he had set himself"), but where were the friends and helpers he so generously lists when it came time to read his manuscript? (Perhaps one would have had to see all this in its pristine state *before* publication; but the mind boggles.) At all events, the book retains passages which are quite simply an editor's nightmare, a school-

teacher's object lesson in what never to do, and, by virtue of being comprehensible at all, a tribute to Ansel's exuberant enthusiasm for his subject. It is, by and large, a dreadful piece of writing, just quite awful. But it should be read all the same. For, like *Sea Lion* itself, it is seriously intended. The photographs are excellent. The references are totally inadequate. The bibliography is nil. But the spirit behind the intention is the real thing.

JOHN C. CAIRNS

University of Toronto

*Neither War Nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Post-War World.* By HUGH SETON-WATSON. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. [Toronto: The Ryerson Press]. 1960. Pp. 504. \$7.25.

ARNOLD TOYNBEE once said that historians can be divided into two categories: the ants and the kangaroos. The ants crawl busily over the landscape of history, exploring every crevice, and examining the minutiae of their surroundings. Of course they never get very far. The kangaroos, on the other hand, leap vigorously over the centuries, bound for distant destinations, and only come down to the ground in order to take off again. In this way they travel immense distances, but their knowledge of what is going on beneath them is extremely limited.

Professor Seton-Watson has had a distinguished career as an ant. Now he is attempting to turn himself into a kangaroo. To change the metaphor, there was never a better case of falling between two stools. The book looks as though it was designed for freshmen at American universities. It begins with a summary of the main political events which have occurred in the world since 1945. The account is straightforward, unexceptional. "The essential trends . . . are the conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers in Europe; the growth of nationalist movements in the Arab Lands and Asia . . . ; and the victory of totalitarianism in China . . . Both totalitarianism and nationalism are revolutionary forces." The Professor then turns to an analysis of these revolutionary trends in terms of the motivating forces. But here his training in painstaking minutiae will not let him overlook obstinate facts for the sake of some grand oversimplifying theory. The result is to make the analysis confused. He first attempts a sociological approach, which assesses the contribution made by the peasants, the workers, the *bourgeoisie*, and the intelligentsia. Yet the revolutionary forces turn out to be more powerful than any of these group interests, or even of them all in combination. "The peasants are an inert force . . . potential material; . . . the materially depressed and socially uprooted working class of underdeveloped societies is a potentially explosive revolutionary force; . . . the intelligentsia is a specific social group of the greatest political importance in a transitional period of social development . . . but . . . the intelligentsia loses much of its importance when the general material and cultural level of the people has risen." The actual spark of revolution he therefore believes is to be found in an ideological cause—principally in the phenomenon of totalitarianism. But why does this only occur in some societies? Partly because of the national tradition, institutions, and habits of mind: "One is inclined to suggest that the combination of an absence of feudalism, a tradition of despotic bureaucratic government, and the possession of modern means of mass communication provide the most favourable setting for totalitarianism." But such a formula would not fit Germany, and has failed to produce totalitarianism in India. So perforce the "Wille zur Macht" theory is called into service. Again, he is honest enough to admit that "Democracies can be

at least as belligerent as other forms of government." Despite this, Germany and Russia emerge as the prime examples of totalitarianism. Indeed they are in a class apart. Mussolini, Franco, Salazar, and Peron are relegated to a secondary level. They are to be regarded as authoritarian and commendable, rather than totalitarian and rejected.

Similar strange juggling with the facts leads one to the conclusion that Mr. Seton-Watson should have eschewed generalization and stuck to detailed studies, for which he has already earned his reputation.

JOHN S. CONWAY

University of British Columbia

*Noveshaya Istoriya*. II. 1939-1959. By N. I. SOMIN *et al.* Moscow: Izdatelstvo VPSH i AON pri TsK KPSS. 1959. Pp. 669. 12 rubles and 70 copecks.

THE TWO-VOLUME *Modern History* is based on a series of lectures delivered under the auspices of the Chair of History of the International Labour and National Liberation Movements at the Higher Party School in Moscow, which is attached to the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The first volume of *Modern History* appeared in 1958 and covers the years 1917-1939. The second carries the story of Khrushchev's first visit to the United States. It is divided into four unequal parts: a survey of the Second World War; "the establishment and development of the world socialist system"; "the deepening crisis and disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism"; and "the most important countries of the capitalist camp."

Events in each of the "socialist countries," including Yugoslavia but excluding the U.S.S.R., are dealt with in separate chapters. The same treatment is accorded to the United States, Britain, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, and West Germany. The countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America are covered in area studies. Emphasis throughout is on economic and political developments and the rôle of the Communist parties and "national liberation movements" in the struggle against Western imperialism and capitalism. The Soviet government is never attacked by the twenty-two contributors to this volume, though Stalin is condemned for not taking the necessary precautions against the possibility of a German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941.

*Modern History* adds little to our understanding of the postwar world. The entire bibliography, with two exceptions, consists of Communist publications. The interpretation of events follows the standard Soviet approach and includes such statements as "on 25th June 1950 Syngman Rhee's army under the command of American military advisers invaded the territory North of the 38th parallel." The chief value of this Communist textbook, of which 150,000 copies were printed, is that it provides a convenient summary of current Soviet attitudes in the field of contemporary history.

University of Manitoba

IVAN AVAKUMOVIC

*The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia*. By ROBERT VINCENT DANIELS. Russian Research Center Studies, 40. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xi, 526, \$11.95.

CONSIDERING THE BREADTH AND DEPTH of the studies of Carr, Deutscher, Schapiro, and Wolfe on the history of the Russian Communist Party, especially before 1930, one might doubt that a new study of the subject would be likely to contribute



much. Robert Vincent Daniels, of the University of Vermont, has demonstrated that such doubts are misplaced. Not only does his history of the Communist opposition in Russia demonstrate in lucid and vigorous prose mastery of the complex sources, it also provides a new dimension to the history of Russian Communism. Previous studies have concentrated on the orthodox line of Lenin and Stalin or on the most conspicuous oppositionist of the post-Lenin era, Trotsky. Although Schapiro's *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy* has much to say on Communist opposition between 1917 and 1921, the variety and importance of the opposition groups in the twenties still awaited their historian until Daniels' work, which is descriptively more original in its treatment of the post-Lenin era than the earlier years. But the entire work is original in the analytical sense. No previous study so clearly delineates the continuity of Lenin's and Stalin's struggle with opposition groups, an important point since it indicates the major degree in which Stalin was the true heir of Lenin. Indeed, this reader finds Daniels' impartial willingness to do justice to Stalin's talents and his role in history one of the most salutary aspects of *The Conscience of the Revolution*.

There is one major difficulty inherent in the subject, the lack of cohesion among the changing opposition groups in Russian Communism. While there is continuity in the orthodox Lenin-Stalin leadership and its struggle with various oppositions, the latter are discontinuous, always changing in personnel and organization. Daniels observes that there was more continuity in the "left" opposition than in the "right," but he also emphasizes that a perennial weakness of any opposition was its unwillingness or inability to form a separate Communist party. Consequently, it is difficult to keep the focus of such a book on the fluctuating opposition groups instead of the continuous, organized party. Daniels has only partly succeeded in meeting this problem, and one often finds it easier to form a clear picture of the dominant leadership than of the opposition. In attempting to give substance to the opposition he has awarded them an upper case "O," as if they actually were a continuous entity, and he sometimes speaks of them collectively as "the conscience of the revolution," even though he also acknowledges that some of the consciences were evidently upset only by the disadvantages of finding themselves a minority. Still, the reader may find it difficult to follow the evolution of the opposition in terms of individuals and ideas. For example, the important left oppositionist Preobrazhensky is encountered in succeeding chapters in the context of different disputes between orthodoxy and heresy, but it would require a special review on the part of the reader to see how this individual and his ideas fit into a connected pattern.

But if special studies on individual oppositionists are still needed, this does not diminish Daniels' achievement in providing in one volume a stimulating general analysis of the history of Russian Communism and the first comprehensive survey of the lost cause that was the Communist opposition.

R. H. McNEAL

University of Alberta

## Recent Publications Relating to Canada

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS  
BY MARION MACEE

NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later and more extended review.

The following abbreviations are used: C.H.R.—*Canadian Historical Review*; C.J.E.P.S.—*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*; R.H.A.F.—*Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

Sections of the bibliography omitted from this issue for reasons of space will be included in later issues.

### I. CANADA'S COMMONWEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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## Contributors

BARBARA FRASER, a graduate student at the University of Toronto, will join the Department of History at the University of Alberta in September.

GUY MACLEAN is Associate Professor of History at Dalhousie University.

